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Cover Photo Information

Statue of Sun Tzu

Sun Tzu (544BC – 496BC), Chinese philosopher, admired in Chinese and East Asian cultures as legendary historical and military figure. Author of the great Chinese classic *Bingfa* (The Art of War), the earliest known treatise on war and military science, focuses much more on alternatives to battles, like the use of spies, delay, the making and keeping of alliances etc. to more powerful foes.

(*Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win.*)

Sun Tzu

Sources :

1. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Sunzi
2. *Ancient warfare* edited by John Carman and Anthony Harding, page 41
3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sun_Tzu#cite_note-3

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CONSERVATION OR IMPLICIT DESTRUCTION: DEFORESTATION IN THE PRINCELY STATE OF DIR ON THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER AND THE IMPERIAL STRATEGY OF BRITISH INDIA

Saeeda[*] & Khalil ur Rehman[**]

Abstract

The Czarist Empire during the nineteenth century emerged on the scene as a Eurasian colonial power challenging British supremacy, especially in Central Asia. The trans-continental Russian expansion and the ensuing influence were on the march as a result of the increase in the territory controlled by Imperial Russia. Inevitably, the Russian advances in the Caucasus and Central Asia were increasingly perceived by the British as a strategic threat to the interests of the British Indian Empire. These geo-political and geo-strategic developments enhanced the importance of Afghanistan in the British perception as a first line of defense against the advancing Russians and the threat of presumed invasion of British India. Moreover, a mix of these developments also had an impact on the British strategic perception that now viewed the defense of the North-West Frontier as a vital interest for the security of British India. The strategic imperative was to deter the Czarist Empire from having any direct contact with the conquered subjects, especially the North Indian Muslims. An operational expression of this policy gradually unfolded when the Princely State of Dir was loosely incorporated, but quite not settled, into the formal framework of the imperial structure of British India. The elements of this bilateral arrangement included the supply of arms and ammunition, subsidies and formal agreements regarding governance of the state. These agreements created enough time and space for the British to pursue colonial interests in

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the Great Game, in rivalry with the rapidly-expanding Czarist Empire. British strategic pursuits in the north-west of British India finally emerged as a strategy that historians refer to as the three-fold Frontier Policy. The greater context of the interaction between British India and the Princely State of Dir was the Frontier Policy. Despite the academic awareness of it, there is a lack of comprehensive and coherent research on the subject. This paper is an attempt to bring to the fore an important aspect of the agreements reached and executed between the British Indian government and the Nawab of the Princely State of Dir with regard to the rich forest resources located within the geographic limits of the state. It argues that the British government initially intended to have greater control over the forests under the pretext of preventing deforestation. However, in reality the British turned a blind eye to the threat and practice of widespread deforestation in order to secure a stable frontier for its strategic and commercial interests. No research-based inductive work exists on the theme, and a systematic study analyzing the agreement and its impact is not available. This study is an effort to fill the gap in this area of research. The paper has an additional academic value since the deforestation in the Princely State of Dir has been explored from the point of view of the British imperial strategy in the north-west of British India, which is very much relevant even today. It is all about establishing linkages and connections.

Keywords: Czarist Russian Empire, British Indian Empire, North-West Frontier, Princely State of Dir, Deforestation in Dir, Great Game, Frontier Policy

Introduction

> ***Frontiers are indeed the razor's edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war or peace, of life or death to nations.***
>
> Lord Curzon, Romanes Lecture, 1907.

The nineteenth century Anglo-Russian competition was a race and rivalry over colonial possessions, natural resources, neutral territories, peripheries, buffer states, frontiers and an economic, political and strategic influence in the geo-strategic spaces fought for by the British and Russians, especially in the north-west of British India. In this context, the British thought and sense got translated over time into a meaningful reality on ground through strategic decision making. The implementation of decisions by the British was crafty. The same was true for the locals. The passage of time unfolded the new north-western reality that persisted until the recent past, when the erstwhile tribal areas were incorporated into mainland Pakistan. A secure north-west was critical for British India, keeping in view the simultaneous expansion of the British and Russian Empires. The collision between the two expanding imperial powers had to be avoided at any cost. Indeed, it was avoided by the British through a mixture of

statecraft involving the use of power and force, plus art of persuasion through subsidies. The idea was to create a stable frontier. The search for a stable frontier took the British deep into the Hindu Kush Mountains. The fundamental assumption was that the British Indian Empire needed a "Frontier of Separation" as opposed to a "Frontier of Contact".[1] However, the strategic problem was the exercise of power in the geographic space of "Frontier of Separation". The solution was the *Three-fold Frontier*.[2] It was a unique geographic innovation by the British cartographers that worked for more than two centuries with far-reaching regional and extra-regional consequences. The region and beyond continues to live with the effects of the nineteenth-century British Frontier policy. The New Great Game makes it meaningful, too.

The three-fold legal and geographic architecture created by the British in the north-west of India was the center of gravity for British strategic activity for more than a century. It remained so even after the departure of the British from the sub-continent. The first-fold of the frontier comprised the directly-administered settled districts of the British India where legal courts functioned and British laws prevailed, the second-fold included the indirectly-administered tribal areas where agreements were concluded with the tribes to block the advancing Czarist Empire from making inroads into the British Indian Empire in combination with the forward edge of the tribal areas as a demarcated boundary between British India and Afghanistan called the Durand Line. Additionally, Afghanistan was perceived as a buffer client state secured through agreements with British India. The implementation of the Frontier Policy not only involved physical territorial control, but also control or influence over territory the British considered crucial to imperial defense. Subsequently, the British perceived the Princely State of Dir located on the North-West Frontier as a geographic space to be loosely integrated through agreements into the British Indian Empire in order to exercise power and influence in the region and beyond. A new geographic and strategic reality was created in the north-west from north to south by the British as an extension of British India and its foreign and strategic policies in the Hindu Kush Mountains and further afield. The Princely State of Dir was part of this arrangement in the north-west part of British India.

During British rule in the Indian subcontinent, the areas ruled by Her Majesty the Queen either through the Governor-General of India or any governor or agent subordinate to the Governor-General were jointly referred

[1] Ainslle T. Embree, 'Pakistan's Imperial Legacy', in Masuma Hasan (ed), *Pakistan in a Changing World* (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1978), 3.
[2] Lord Curzon was the first one to use the expression the *Three-Fold Frontier*.

to as British India.[3] However, there were various regions and territories not directly ruled by the British Indian government. This had important policy implications for the locals in more ways than one, not to mention the impact on British imperial strategy in the north-western regions. These territories and regions had native rulers or chiefs who exercised power under the suzerainty of the Queen through the Governor-General or any other agent accountable to him. Accordingly, these states were referred to as Princely or Native States.[4] These states were independent in their internal affairs; though, their defense and foreign policies were supervised, if not totally controlled, by the British Indian government. Significantly, the Princely States in the north-west of India were an extension of British imperial foreign policy towards Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the Czarist Empire. The British imperial foreign policy legacy remains to this day in the extended South Asian region. *The Imperial Gazetteer of India* listed 693 Princely States in India along with the Shan States of Burma and Nepal.[5] On the other hand, the Indian States Committee's report limited the number to 562 states in 1929.[6] The Memoranda on the Indian States counted the Princely States to be 578.[7]

The Princely State of Dir was one such state where the British executed a policy of deforestation while exercising indirect control. It was a classic case of management of vital and critical interests. The Princely State of Dir had an area of three thousand square miles, and a population of

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[3] *The Interpretation Act, 1889, (52&53 Vict.c.63) (a),* Imperial Parliament of the British Empire March 30, 1889, 12. Accessed on August 10, 2020. https://www.legislation.gov.uk,1889.

[4] William Lee Warner defined a native state as: "A political community occupying a territory in India of defined boundaries and subject to a common and responsible ruler who has actually enjoyed and exercised, as belonging to him in his own right duly exercised the supreme authority of the British government, any of the functions and attributes of internal sovereignty" William Lee Warner, *The Native States of India* (London: Macmillan and Co. Limited, 1910), 31. The term native (meaning Indian) states was used during the 19th century and as the Princely States during the twentieth century. See Barbara N. Ramusack, *The New Cambridge History of India III.6, The Indian Princes and Their States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004),12-13. This shift in British usage represented a conscious or unconscious effort to subordinate British Indian allies as they were drawn into an evolving subsidiary alliance system. See Caroline Keen, *Princely India and the British Political Development and the Operation of the Empire* (New Delhi: Viva Books Private Limited, 2013), 218.

[5] *The Imperial Gazetteer of India, The Indian Empire, Administrative,* vol.4, 1907 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1909), 92-103.

[6] *East India (Indian States) Report of the Indian States Committee, 1928-1929* (London: H.M Stationary Office, 1929), 10-11.

[7] *Memoranda on the Indian States 1935* (*Corrected up to the 1st January 1935)* (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1936).

350,000.[8] The State was bounded on the west by Afghanistan, and on the north and east by the Princely States of Chitral and Swat respectively. The main tribes of the State of Dir were Malezai, Tarkanri, Isazai, and Salimzai. They were predominantly Muslims and belonged to the Pashtun ethnic group. These tribes were administered and represented by their hereditary chiefs (Khans), whereas external affairs were run by a British political agent under orders from the British government. This research paper attempts to assess, analyze, and answer the following three questions: First, why and how did the British decide to enter into a relationship with the Nawab of Dir; second, what factors and benefits motivated the Nawab of Dir to collaborate with the British Indian government? And third, what were the consequences of the agreement executed between the British Indian government and the Nawab of Dir? To explore these questions the paper follows a historical approach mainly based on archival sources. An inductive interpretation of these archival sources involves, methodologically, an empiric-analytic reasoning that adds to research on the subject.

Factors leading to the establishment of relations between the British Indian Government and the Princely State of Dir

Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia started with the Franco-Russian Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 and continued until the Convention between the two in 1907. It lingered on in Persia, the Caucasus, and specifically in Transcaucasia, until 1921. This conflict in Central Asia between the two great imperial powers is known as "The Great Game".[9] Russia did not have a warm-water port because parts of the Baltic Sea and Odessa Port in the Black Sea were covered with snow for five and three months respectively. This not only blocked the growth of Russian naval power, but also its merchant navy. For this reason, Constantinople, with its control over the Bosporus Strait, held great attraction for Russia.[10] The way towards the Bosporus was paved by the invasion of Crimea between 1771 and 1783 and the step-by-step annexation of Kartli-Kakheti (East Georgia) in 1783 and Imereti (West Georgia) in 1810.[11] It enabled Russia to establish bases, one on the sea in the Crimean Peninsula and the other on land in Georgia, from

[8] Ibid,150.

[9] "The Great Game" was used in this context for the first time by the officer and historian John William Kay (1814-76). On the other hand, Russian foreign minister Count Nesselrode (in office from 1816-56) compared this Cold War to "A Tournament of Shadows". See Christoph Baumer, *The History of Central Asia: The Age of Decline and Revival, vol.* iv (London: I.B. Taurus, 2018).

[10] Ibid.

[11] Donald Rayfield, *Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia* (London: Reaktion Books, 2012), 250-59.

where it could operate against Constantinople. The Treaty of Gulistan on 24 October 1913 signaled the end of the Russo-Persian war fought since 1804, and also confirmed Russia's possession of the Khanates of present-day Azerbaijan.[12] Russian power shone in the north of the Ottoman Empire and in Persia. Moreover, there was another subtle reason for the Russian involvement in the Caucasus and Persia: it was interested in luring part of the European trade with India, then dealt through the sea route, into the land route controlled by the Russian Empire.[13]

Besides, Russia's (supposed) interest in the Mediterranean Sea had alarmed Britain which in 1818 had reestablished its supremacy over the Mediterranean by controlling the island of Cyprus. From Cyprus, Britain could keep an eye on the Dardanelles and the Suez Canal and its navy could block the Strait of Hurmuz, too. Britain had a long reach and a firm grasp. Therefore, an attractive option for Russia was to have land access to the Indian Ocean. The Russian desire to reach warm waters remained a strong one. Russia to that end focused on the Afghan city of Herat and usurped the Oasis of Panjdeh from Afghanistan in March 1885, with the further intention to seize Herat.[14] To counter Russia, Britain mobilized its navy forcing Russia to retreat. Simultaneously, the arena of "The Great Game" shifted towards the east to the Pamirs. In the summer of 1887 the British urged Amir Abdur Rehman of Afghanistan (1880-1901) to seize the area north of the Oxus River up to the Chinese border in the Pamirs. In retaliation, Russia advanced and in 1888, Captain Grombchevsky (1885-1920) traipsed into the Pamirs and entered Hunza.[15] The British were alarmed because the area was perceived by them to be part of their strategic sphere of influence. Matters got worse in 1889 when the Russian Colonel Mikhail Loner crossed the Pamir and Wakhan rivers, and advanced further into the three passes of Khora Bhort (4615m), Baroghsl (3882m) and Darkot (4704m) from where Chitral was accessible.[16]

The Princely State of Chitral was one of the largest and the most important state located at the north-western end of India. It was backed up in the north by the Hindu Kush Mountains which separated it from Wakhan, it was bounded in the south by the Indus Valley, Panjkora, and Swat rivers, by Kanjut, Gilgit, Punjal, and Dir in the east, and the mountains of Afghanistan

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[12] Martin Ewans, *Securing the Indian Frontier in Central Asia Confrontation and Negotiations 1865-1895 (Central Asian Studies)* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 7.
[13] Baumer, *The History of Central Asia: The Age of Decline and Revival, vol:* iv.
[14] Ibid. See also for details Charles Thomas Marvin, *The Russians at the Gates of Herat* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1885), 17-45.
[15] William Brown, *Gilgit Rebellion*: *The Major Who Mutinied Over Partition of India* (South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Books Limited, 2014), 7.
[16] Garry John Alder, *British India's Northern Frontier 1865-95*: *A Study in Imperial Policy* (London: Longman, 1963), 374.

were to the west.[17] Some of the lowest and easiest passes across the Hindu Kush were commanded by Chitral. The British government wanted better control over the Hindu Kush passes for fear of Russian military intervention. Wakhan posed an immediate threat to nearly all the northern passes. Moreover, Chitral was also vulnerable from the west. The Amir of Afghanistan had initiated a new route from Badakhshan to Kunar River, and it was generally assumed that it would be used as the route into British India by Russia without having any need of entering into Afghan territory.[18] Besides sharing the border in Asmar Valley with Afghanistan, Chitral was bordered with Dir in the south and east. Of necessity the Nawab of Dir had friendly long-standing relations with the Amir of Afghanistan.[19] For the British government, Chitral could serve as a good watchtower from which the region south of the Hindu Kush range might be controlled.[20]

With the growing threat of a Russian military advance from the northern border in mind, the British Indian Government established relations with the Mehtar of Chitral through the offices of the Maharajah of Kashmir who had accepted British suzerainty in 1846. Lord Lytton, the British Viceroy of India, warned Maharajah Ranbir Singh of Kashmir about his borders' safety in a meeting arranged between the two at Madhpor in 1876, and persuaded him to enter into friendly relations with the Mehtar of Chitral. The Viceroy argued that neighbourly states, such as Chitral and Yasin, should be controlled by an ally of the British Raj, like Kashmir State, rather than by those hostile to Kashmir, like Russia. He also stressed the importance of northern passes as being more practicable for the possible passage of troops.[21] Convinced, the Maharajah of Kashmir entered into a friendly

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[17] H.C. Thompson, *The Chitral Campaign: A Narrative of Events in Chitral Swat and Bajour* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1999), 295.

[18] Extract from the letter of the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to the late Mehtar Amanul Mulk Sahib ruler Chitral (Translation of the abstract from the original Persian text dated 11 August, 1884). *The Agreement Brought into between the late Mehtar of Chitral, the representatives of the Government of India and the Maharajas of Kashmir and Jammu State, No. 2.* Directorate of Archives, Government of N.W.F.P, (Renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on April 15, 2010).

[19] Captain A.H. McMahon, Political Agent Dir, Swat and Chitral to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department No 100-C, dated Malakand, 15th December, 1902, *"Proposals for the formation of Chitral scouts"* File No 92, Nos 685-710 B, December 1902, Political Branch, Chief Commissioner's Office, N.W.F.P, Agencies, Bundle No 428, Serial No 15, Directorate of Archives, Government of N.W.F.P.

[20] H.C. Wylly, *Tribes of Central Asia: From the Black Mountain to Waziristan* (Delhi: Adarsh Books, 1998), 186. First published in 1912.

[21] Ahmad Hasan Dani, *History of Northern Areas of Pakistan (Up to 2000 AD*) (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2001), 258.

arrangement with the Mehtar of Chitral in 1878.[22] The State of Chitral accepted the Durbars' Suzerainty by accepting the subsidy of 12,000 rupees in exchange for a *Nazrana* (bestowment) of three horses, five hawks, and five hounds.[23]

During Lord Lytton's viceroyalty the aim of the British Indian government was to place an effective check on Chitral's external affairs in order to have better control over its northern passes, and to be apprised of what was going on beyond those passes.[24] Chitral was (and continues to be) a strategic point of concern. For that reason Major Biddulph was sent to Gilgit in 1878 by the British government. He succeeded in entering into a friendly relationship with the Mehtar of Chitral.[25] Later on, in 1885-86, Major Lockhart paved the way for political negotiations between the British government and the State of Chitral by leading the mission to survey the northern passes over the Hindu Kush. To strengthen the bond, the Major gifted the Mehtar with rifles and money.[26] Colonel A. Durand also visited Chitral in 1888 and 1889. The British Government agreed to pay an annual subsidy of Rs. 6000 to the Mehtar which was later increased to Rs. 12000 in 1891.[27] In 1892, the Mehtar of Chitral, Amanul Mulk, passed away causing a succession dispute among his sixteen sons.[28] The elder son, Nizam ul Mulk, was proclaimed as Mehtar in December 1892 by the British government. He received a British mission under Dr. Robertson during the winter of 1892-1893.[29] All went well in the British-Chitral relationship until 1st June 1895 when Nizam Ul Mulk was shot dead at the instigation of his younger brother Amir ul Mulk.[30] The British Agent Major Robertson was

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[22] Extract from the letter of Maharaja Partab Singh of Kashmir and Jammu to Mehtar Sahib Amanul Mulk, ruler of Chitral, (translation from Persian text). *The Agreement between Mehtar of Chitral, the representatives of the Government of India and the Maharajas of Kashmir and Jammu State No. 6, 1878*. Directorate of Archives, Government of N.W.F.P.

[23] A.D. Dundas to Chief Secretary the Government of N.W.F.P "*Annual Nazranas from His Highness the Mehtar of Chitral to His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir"* External Affairs Department, dated New Delhi, 9th December, 1938, confidential D.O No-74, file no. 138, Directorate of Archives, Government of N.W.F.P.

[24] J. Biddulph, *Tribes of The Hindoo Koosh* (Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, 1880), Preface.

[25] George S. Robertson, *Chitral: The Story of a Minor Siege* (New Delhi: Bhavaha Books, 2001), 25-26. The book was originally published in London; Methuen, 1898.

[26] *Military Report and Gazetteer on Chitral* Part-I, Catalogue No O.C 110, Case No 21538/M03/Book 2nd edition (Calcutta: Government of India Press, 1928).

[27] Ibid.

[28] *Memoranda on the Indian States 1935 (Corrected up to the 1st January 1935*), 152.

[29] H.L. Nevill, *Campaigns on the North-West Frontier* (London: John Murray, 1912), 165.

[30] *Military Report and Gazetteer on Chitral* Part-I, Catalogue No O.C 110 Case No 2/538/M03/Book, 2nd edition, 2.

under siege in the fortress of Chitral by claimants to the throne.[31] The siege of Chitral Fort went on from 3 March 1895 until 19 April 1895 when one relief force from Gilgit and another from Malakand arrived under Colonel Kelly and Sir Robert Low respectively.[32] There were two options available to the British after the siege ended. The first was to keep the British garrison in Chitral intact and the second was to withdraw control over the external affairs of the State.[33]

The Government of India favoured the second option and proposed in May 1895 to construct a road from Peshawar to Chitral via Swat to ensure the safety of the garrison in Chitral.[34] The Liberal Party government in Britain was concerned with the huge expense and the risky two-fold nature of constructing such a road serving both as defender and invader.[35] However, the decision was overturned as Tories came into power two months later. Lord Curzon, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was in favor of keeping Chitral at any cost. He cautioned about the looming threat of Russia, and even if Russia did not strike south, a British retreat from Chitral would be viewed by the tribes as a token of weakening strength in the wake of a Russian victory in the Pamirs. Lord Curzon prevailed and the strategic decision was made to keep Chitral.[36] Chitral would be partly sovereign as the Mehtar would be independent in administering its internal affairs, while external matters would be taken care of by the British Government. The Garrison was to be maintained in Chitral permanently in

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[31] Muhammad Afzal Khan, *Chitral & Kafiristan: A Personal Study* (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1975), 13.

[32] There were two routes for relieving Chitral: one from Gilgit over the Shandor Pass, most of it roadless, through mountainous country, at that time of year considered impossible. The other led from Naoshera, on the Kabul River, by the Malakand Pass, into the Swat Valley; thence across the Panjkora River through Jandol by Dir and the Lowari Pass, into the valley of the river which flowed past Chitral. The latter route was much easier physically, but a force following it would have to fight the whole way against warlike tribes. For a detailed account of the siege of Chitral 1895 see Captain G.J. Younghusband & Francis Younghusband, *The Relief of Chitral* (London: MacMillan and Co. Limited, 1910), and Sir George S. Robertson, *Chitral The Story of a Minor Siege* (London: Methuen and Co., 1898).

[33] C. Collin Davies, The *Problem of North-West Frontier 1890-1908 with the Survey of Policy Since 1849* (London: Curzon Press, 1974),185. The book was originally published by Cambridge University Press in 1932.

[34] Peter Hopkirk, *The Great Game on Secret Service in High Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 531.

[35] Ibid., see also Akihiro Kanamori, "The Siege of Chitral as an Imperial Factor," *Journal of Indian History* 46 (1968) 398.

[36] Hopkirk, *The Great Game on Secret Service in High Asia*, 531.

order to ensure the safety of the border and the Mehtar himself.[37] Chitral was separated from Gilgit Agency in 1896 and placed under the political agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral Agency.[38] The result was that Chitral became one of the centers of gravity of the British government's military policy in the region. They gave the same importance to the defense of Chitral as to that of Gilgit. They considered any threats posed to both states, along with their denizens, one and the same. The origin of the perceived threats emanated from the same source, that is, the Russian Empire.[39]

Additionally, it was impossible to defend Chitral through troops garrisoned in Gilgit at a time of danger. Chitral was rather more exposed to any threat than Gilgit. It could simultaneously be threatened from both the north and the south. Other than the Afghan border in the west, it shared a long borderline with Dir in the south and east. Considering the number of the directions from which Chitral was threatened, along with the number of passes via which any foe could infiltrate, and the length and width of the region to be shielded, made it necessary for the British Indian government to have a strong military base in Chitral.[40] The importance of the British Garrison at Chitral was immense; for it also provided the troops with the ability to mount a forceful attack as well as to allow it a strong base of defense. An adversary had an advantage of entering into numerous northern passes via Wakhan, but the same advantage could not turn into victory for the British had the upside of being able to harass invading troops returning through any of the passes at Wakhan. Offensives of that kind were of special importance for British troops if an enemy used the Vernu route along the west point of Chitral Valley.[41] In addition, British troops garrisoned at Chitral also enabled the British to exert formidable influence on southern neighbours like Dir, Swat, and Kohistan.[42] Before attempting to displease the British, they had to think twice, since their upper regions were prone to attacks from the British troops stationed at Chitral. The British actually killed two birds with one stone, retaining peace from within and barring aggression from without.

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[37] Davies, The *Problem of North-West Frontier 1890-1908 with the Survey of Policy Since 1849*, 88.

[38] C.U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries*, vol. XI (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1933), 416.

[39] Captain A.H. McMahon, Political Agent Dir, Swat and Chitral to the Secretary of the Government of India, December, 1900, Chief Commissioner Office, N.W.F.P December 1902, Nos 685-710 B, File No 92/1 Agencies, Chitral, Serial No-15, Bundle No 428, Directorate of Archives, Government of N.W.F.P.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

The majority tribes of Chitral were notably of the Maulai shia Muslim sect.[43] They represented the rationalist side, as opposed to an intuitive one. The tribes of Chitral were greatly influenced by their *pirs* (a religious instructor, especially of the mystical sects and traditions) in all matters of life, mainly decision-making. The *pirs* in turn were accountable to and acknowledged the unquestionable authority of their spiritual leader, the Agha Khan.[44] This gave the Agha Khan great power and authority that his successors still exercise. The *pirs* played the role of being the link between the British Indian government and the local tribes. They were urged by the Agha Khan to acknowledge British authority. This spiritual influence helped maintain not only the locals' loyalty towards the British, but also helped sustain British control over Hindu Kush territories and beyond in case of foreign transgression. The same is true even today as the Sino-American competition heats-up in the region and beyond. The case of Chitral as part of the history of north-west India can serve as a good analogy for Pakistan. It can draw lessons from this history for the management of emerging geo-political and geo-strategic regional realities, especially in the Wakhan Corridor and beyond.

Chitral also served as a black market for the illegal trade of *charas* (hashish) from Badakhshan and Yarkand into British India. The merchants involved in this trade wanted to evade taxes on the product. The trade in *charas* via Chitral after it left the state was dealt with by the merchants of Charas, who having reached Dir sold their product to Hindu merchants of Dir, Uch, Thana, Bajaur, Mian Killi, and Nawagai. Those merchants in turn sold it to people coming from British India.[45] There were also additional means of transporting *charas* into British Indian territory, especially by labourers and the others who could easily move through the passes from the British region to Dir. Chitral was not a big market for the consumption of *charas*, and the smugglers favoured the more meandering Yarkand-Chitral route over the Yarkand-Leh route to escape the toll paid to the British. The duty on *charas* in the Punjab exceeded 100 percent over the price of *charas* at Yarkand.[46] Therefore, the traders made a substantial profit even if they

[43] Brown, *Gilgit Rebellion: The Major Who Mutinied Over Partition* of *India*, 7.

[44] Horace Arthur Rose, *A Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab and North-West Frontier Province*, vol. III (Delhi: Nirmal Publishers and Distributors, 1997).

[45] Major S.H. Godfrey, C.S.I. Political Agent Dir, Swat and Chitral to the Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor General North West Frontier Province. "*Import of Charas into British Territory via Chitral and the imposition of a prohibitive Tax by the Mehtar of Chitral*" No 1118 dated Malakand 16th December 1902, No 924-928-B, Political Branch, Tribal Research Cell, Home and Tribal Affairs, Government of N.W.F.P.

[46] Ibid.

went for the more tedious and costly route. The Dir-Swat route for the import of *charas* was unlawful. Since there was no toll along the way, the illegal trade was on the high route although officials and contractors in Peshawar were putting into effect all kinds of measures to halt that illicit trade.[47] It was not deemed wise by the government of the British India to ban the import into Chitral from where it was distributed, because that would dry up the trade completely. On the contrary, what appealed to Major Parsons, Political Agent Dir Swat & Chitral Agency, was the authorization of the Malakand route. The legalization of Afghan opium also augmented the idea.[48]

The British were also alarmed by the Russian construction of the strategically important trans-Caspian railway begun in 1879 at a frantic speed. Its eastward expansion was a cause of concern for the British with regard to the safety of the North-West Frontier of British India. The British obsession with railways was obvious from the significantly high number of railway tracks built by the government. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, India boasted the most advanced, and the largest, railway network among all the colonial powers. The system grew from twenty miles in 1853 to an impressive 23,627 miles in 1900.[49] Railway construction in India depended on the local forests for the provision of wooden sleepers and firewood. Cedar (deodar) from the local forests was considered to be the most resistant in terms of insect infestations and weather hazards and, therefore, preferred for railway use.[50] Timber was already in demand in 1869 with the construction of the Punjab Northern Railway connecting Lahore with Peshawar covering a distance of 280 miles. The forests of Ravi, Jhelum, Chenab, and Kabul rivers had provided timber from 1869 to 1879, but that could only count for approximately 200,000 sleepers which were only adequate for the railway line between Lahore and Jhelum covering 109 miles.[51] From 1879 onwards, the British Indian government was eager to acquire timber for railways. The cedar trees in forests in Dir were seen as an alternate source to address the problem of the scarcity of timber. In addition, the forests were owned and controlled by the Khans of Dir.

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[47] The Assistant Political Agent Chitral to the Political Agent Dir, Swat and Chitral "*Import of Charas into British Territory via Chitral and the imposition of a Prohibitive Tax by the Mehtar of Chitral*" No-739, dated Malakand 9th December 1902, File No 924-925 B, Political Branch, March 1903, Tribal Research Cell, Home and Tribal Affairs, Government of N.W.F.P.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Pallavia Das, "Colonialism and the Environment in India: Railways and Deforestation in 19th Century Punjab", *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 46, no.1 (2011), 40.

[50] Are Knudsen, "Logging the Frontier Narratives of Deforestation in Northern Borderlands of British India C.1850-1940*", Forum for Development Studies,* vol.38, no.3 (2011), 303.

[51] Das, "Colonialism and the Environment in India: Railways and Deforestation in 19th Century Punjab", 40.

British Indian Government Relations with the Princely State of Dir

The British Indian Government had maintained a policy of non-interference in the tribal areas of the North-West Frontier, except when the government's own interests dictated otherwise. The strategic environment, however, tested the British strategic genius. The Dir, Swat, and Chitral Agency posed a different challenge, for, in order to safeguard the road to Chitral and beyond, the government could not make sufficient arrangements singlehandedly, except at an immense expenditure. Hence, a strategy was espoused to procure the help of the respective rulers of the region and their subjects to protect the road.[52] The road stretched from Chakdarra to Lawari Pass through the Malezai branch of Yousafzai tribe, and the British Indian government made significant changes to the tribal system by appointing Muhammad Sharif Khan as their ruler. He was later made a Nawab as a personal distinction in 1897.[53] The British Indian government's step to appoint a single ruler for that region was interference of considerable importance in the tribal region as with the exception of Umra Khan of Jandol,[54] who made himself the sole ruler of the whole region, there was not one but several Khans in the region.

Nonetheless, upon entering the region in 1895, the British treated the matter differently. After ousting Umra Khan of Jandol, they made Sharif Khan of Dir the sole ruler of the region extending from Chakdarra to Malezai. Thus, a longstanding policy of non-interference was revised to protect the road running through the region. The Nawab, without the assistance of the British, could never have claimed himself to be a "King". This was precisely the reason he was considered a mere puppet of the British Government.[55] The British had actually made the Nawab's cause their own, and a couple or more times, he was assisted with active military support. He

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[52] N.I. Keen, Political Agent Dir, Swat and Chitral "*A note on the Future policy in Dir*" dated 15th March, 1918, Annual File No 2 S-St(1), Political Department, Chief Commissioner Office, N.W.F. Province, 1918-24, 5/Dir, Tribal Research Cell, Government of N.W.F.P.

[53] Sultan-i-Rome, *Forestry in the Princely State of Swat and Kalam (North-West Pakistan: A Historical Perspective on Norms and Practices)* IP6 Working Paper No 6 (NCCR) North-South, 2005, 23.

[54] For details see Allah Bakhsh Yousafi, *Silsila e-Tareekh Azad Pathan 3 Yousafzai Yanni Tarekhi Allaqa Zilla Mardan, Malakand, Swat, Bunir, Dir, Bajaur Waghaira* in Urdu (Karachi: Muhammad Ali Educational Society,1960), 397- 416. See also Noor Hassan, Dir Swat Relations, Unpublished M.A Thesis, Pakistan Study Center, University of Peshawar, Session 1983-84, 31-42.

[55] Keen, "*A note on the Future policy in Dir*".

was also assured profits and subsidies to maintain his position.[56] When he ultimately passed away in 1904, scuffles broke out among the hopefuls for the throne. In 1905, the British had to make use of a mobile army column to aid his successor, Badshah Khan, because as on many other occasions, the ruler's position, without British assistance, was a flimsy one.[57] Badshah Khan, in return for British support, showed his unwavering loyalty by personally leading his *lashkars* (tribal forces) against the tribes of Bajaur who routinely raided the levy personnel. He had prohibited the clerics from preaching against the British, and anyone who approached him with a suggestion to ally against the British was either rebuked or personally attacked.[58] Owing to his tenacious control over the region and the levy posts, British troops could, without any hindrance, rush up and down the road to Chitral.

The levy personnel escorted convoys of weaponry, ammunition, valuables, and stores through the tribal areas without any fears. The British were optimistic that as long as Badshah Khan remained in power, he would assist the British against the Amir of Afghanistan. The perception was that without the Nawab's support, it would be difficult to maintain a line of communication with Chitral and withstand the alliance of tribes in Malakand and Chakdarra. Indeed, the Nawab was not challenged by the ordinary scuffles that normally the Khans of those regions were used to, but his problems were of a deeper nature exacerbated by his loyalty towards the British.[59] In 1937, the Nawab of Dir started to build a road from the Balambat Bridge (Height 2402) over the Panj Kora River to Barwa (Height 3213) in Jandol through Lal Qala (Height 3380) in the Valley of Maidan, which at a distance of approximately 20 miles crossed the Salara Kandara (Height 5130) into Jandol.[60] The construction of the road triggered a story that the road was being built by the British, and would be stretched as far as the Afghan border with the intention of extending the Nawab's control over the Bajaur tribes, who were essentially democratic in nature. This tale was

[56] Yousafi, *Silsila e-Tareekh Azad Pathan 3 Yousafzai*, 61.
[57] Keen, "*A note on the Future policy in Dir*".
[58] Ibid.
[59] A.D.F. Dundas, Political Agent Dir, Swat and Chitral to the Secretary to the Hon'ble, the Chief Commissioner, N.W.F.P "*Proposed Grant of 50,000 to the Nawab of Dir in addition to his usual annual allowance*", No 20. S-St (1), dated Malakand, 15th April 1932, Political Branch, Chief Commissioner Office, N.W.F.P 25/Dir, Tribal Research Cell, Government of N.W.F.P.
[60] "*A note on the Nawab of Dir and Bajour Affairs*" by Major E.H. Cobb, Political Agent Dir, Swat and Chitral, dated Malakand the 11th April 1937, File No-20. S-St (1) Political Branch, Chief Commissioner Office, N.W.F.P, 25/Dir, Tribal Research Cell, Government of N.W.F.P.

spread by many influential anti-British figures in Bajaur, particularly by Alamzeb Khan[61], the Afghan allowance holders, and the Faqir of Alingar.[62]

The conflict was escalated by the proximity of Barwa to the Afghan border by 10 miles only. Among all those anti-British agents, the Faqir of Alingar was the most formidable. He tried to intimidate the Nawab with a declaration of *jehad* (Holy War) against him unless he complied with the demand to halt construction of the road. In response, the Nawab avoided open confrontation but rather achieved his objective through endless negotiations with the tribes. The British had multiple interests in the construction of the road although it was built specifically for motor traffic. On one hand, it would protect the road to Chitral along Panjkora River, while on the other it would serve to protect the traffic from Balambat along the Jandol river in case of an advance from Malakand to Khar and Nawagai. In addition, it would cement the Nawab's control of Jandol.[63] During 1930-31, the Faqir's menacing exhortation against the Nawab spurred many tribes to raid the British. To stop the raids, the Nawab blocked passage to the Bajaur tribes going through his territory. Nevertheless, the Faqir's propaganda played a major role in strengthening the Nawab's foes and weakening his followers. Ultimately, the Nawab was able to defeat two lashkars and to reopen the road to British convoys.

The Nawab of Dir was also assigned an additional task of exercising control over the tribes in neighbouring Bajaur by the Government of British India. He undertook the responsibility primarily to defend his own region with a view to further protect Chitral road, and to contain the tribes and maintain the balance of power in order to keep the settled districts of British India safe from tribal raids[64]. Without the Nawab of Dir's substantial help, it

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[61] He was the younger son of Mohammad Aurngzeb Khan, Nawab of Dir (1905-25). After the death of his father in 1925 he was supported by a strong faction in Dir State in the struggle for succession. However, his elder brother, Shahjehan Khan, was recognized as the Nawab by the British government. There were continued intrigues between the two brothers and in 1928 he was expelled from Jandul by Shahjehan. He was a close associate of the Faqir of Alingar in the attacks on Jandul during 1932. *Who's who in the Dir Swat and Chitral Agency Corrected up to 1st September, 1933* (New Delhi: The Manager Government of India Press 1933), 5-6.

[62] His original name was Faqir Shah and he belonged to a Mians family in Upper Swat. He had set up his headquarters at Alingar and aimed to stir up the tribes against the British government and the Nawab of Dir. Ibid, 7.

[63] Cobb, "*A note on the Nawab of Dir and Bajour Affairs*".

[64] The Chief Secretary to the Governor North-West Frontier Province to the Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department "*Grant of a loan of Rs Two Lakhs to the Nawab of Dir in connection with the destruction of his property by an outbreak of fire*" No 687-CTB/141-St (1) dated Nathiagali, 3 June, 1940, File No-41,

was not possible for the British Indian Government to exercise its influence over the tribes of Bajaur for any length of time; conversely, if the Nawab of Dir's position became fortified in Bajaur, the British automatically became powerful, too. According to Major G.L. Mallan, Political Agent Dir, Swat and Chitral, the interests of the two allies were so intertwined that the British Indian Government could not risk weakening the State of Dir without causing some serious harm to their interests in that part of the country.[65] According to Sir George Roos Keppel, there were two courses open to the British Indian Government with regard to its policy in Dir: to support and strengthen the Nawab of Dir or to keep aloof from Dir politics.[66] This involved a set of strategic decision-making on the part of the British to protect a mixture of vital and critical British Indian interests.

After much deliberation, Sir George Roos Keppel supported the first option. According to him, the British policy of non-interference could not succeed in Dir, because any disorder, whether large or small, could easily spread from Dir to Bajaur and upper Swat, and perhaps to lower Swat and Buner, or even to the Uthman Khel and Mohmands; it would certainly affect all the people in Dir. The major setback would be collapse of the communication with Chitral, and the only way left would be the costlier and harder route via Gilgit. He opined that this policy of aloofness would not even free British India from keeping a garrison in the Malakand Agency since the troops were stationed at Chakdara, which was situated in Adinzai, and there were fears that any British withdrawal from Dir would encourage the Swatis to invade Chakdarra, and that would necessitate sending a column to Chakdara and Malakand. He recommended that the British Indian government should take a clear stance towards the Nawab of Dir, and should support him openly, as he had displayed unwavering loyalty during the Second Anglo-Afghan War. Further, it was owing to the influence of the Nawab that the Chitral road was open in times good and bad, and the garrison at Chitral was protected from within and without.[67]

S-St, Political Branch, Civil Secretariat, N.W.F.P, 103/DIR, Tribal Research Cell, Government of N.W.F.P.

[65] Major G.L. Mallan, Political Agent Dir, Swat and Chitral to the Chief Secretary to the Government of N.W.F.P "*Dir Finance*" No 1010/C dated Malakand, 12th March, 1940 File No 41. S-St (1), Political Branch, Civil Secretariat, N.W.F.P 103/Dir, Tribal Research Cell, Government of N.W.F.P.

[66] The Hon'ble Sir George Roos Keppel, Chief Commissioner, N.W.F.P to the Hon'ble Sir Hamilton Grant, Foreign Secretary to the Government of Indian Foreign and Political Department, No 794-R, dated Peshawar, the 20th March, 1918, Annual File No-2 S-St (1), Political Department, Chief Commissioner Office, N.W.F.P 1918-24, 5/DIR, Tribal Research Cell, Government of N.W.F.P.

[67] Ibid.

Deforestation in the Princely State of Dir and British Raj Schemes

The British were attracted to Dir because of its location along with the possibility of wealth generated through the management of forest products by contractors. One such contractor was Khan Bahadur Mian Rahim Shah who had been involved in the timber business with the Nawab since 1896-97.[68] Around 1899, Sir Henry McMahon, Political Agent Malakand Agency, discovered irregularities in Rahim Shah's business practices and asked the Nawab to nullify his deal. He did so and also banished him from the territory.[69] Instead, the contract was given to Harji Mall, a banker and a trader at Peshawar. A contract was signed under Sir Henry McMahon's authority for cutting down 10,000 trees at 51 rupees for each tree, thus garnering a sum of 50,000 rupees. The deal was signed on March 1st 1900.[70] Around 1903, the British Indian Government asked the Nawab of Dir, Mohammad Sharif Khan, to manage his timber trade more closely. In response, the Nawab assured that he would settle with Harji Mall to transport the balance of timber before certain dates. Harji Mall agreed to the terms of the contract which specified that in case of failure to fulfill the conditions of the agreement, he would forfeit his right to the property.[71] Having failed to meet the conditions of the contract, the Nawab gifted some timber that had not been removed from his territory, to the hospital.[72] Enraged, Harji Mall filed a civil suit in the District Court against the Nawab. The District Judge, however, ruled in favor of the Nawab on the grounds that he was an independent ruler, and he had full rights to adjudicate disputes in his territory, Harji Mall's case was dismissed.[73]

Harji Mall then appealed in the court of Judicial Commission but he had no luck there as it confirmed the ruling of the lower court. In the aftermath, the Nawab of Dir finally signed an agreement with the British

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[68] Harji Mall, "*History of Timber Business in Dir Territory*" dated 13 March 1912, File No 107/Dir, "Dir Timber Trade Note" (1911-12) Tribal Research Cell, Government of N.W.F.P.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid.

[71] S.M. Robinson, Legal Remembrance, Punjab, "*Opinion as to the validity of L. Harji Mall's title to the property in the logs marks Chakdara Hospital*". Annual File No-23 "Dir Timber Trade" Political Department, Chief Commissioner Office N.W.F.P, 1906, 41/Dir, Tribal Research Cell, Government of N.W.F.P.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, N.W.F.P to Lala Harji Mall, Letter No 201-P dated Peshawar, 15 March 1912, File No 107/Dir, "*Dir Timber Note (1911-12)*" Chief Commissioner Office N.W.F.P, Tribal Research Cell, Government of N.W.F.P.

Indian Government in 1905.[74] In exchange for a grant of fifteen thousand rupees, the Nawab of Dir agreed to comply with the clause I, sub clause (i) to maintain the road from Chakdarra (the capital of Dir State) to Chitral.[75] Moreover, according to clause I, sub clauses (ii), (iii) and (iv) of the agreement, it was mandatory for the Nawab of Dir to provide adequate measures for the safety of levy posts and telegraph lines along with the supervision of posts and encampments. The Nawab was required to keep the road safe by the stationing of levy personnel. Even though the British government under clause III of the agreement pledged not to interfere in the internal affairs of the State of Dir, it did interfere on many occasions in its internal affairs when its own interests were at stake. The government also attempted to control trade in the territory in order to keep an effective check on trade. In doing so it deprived the Nawab of levy in exchange for ten thousand rupees (Clause IV).[76] Clause V of the agreement also deprived the Nawab of his grazing rights and other prerogatives between Dir and Chitral. Clause VII required the Nawab to allow the government to station troops, albeit temporarily, on either Laram Hill or on Dosha Khel Range. Clause VIII of the agreement restricted the Nawab from having any interest in the boundary between Dir and Chitral or Dir and Afghanistan as demarked by the British, or to have any connection with the tribes residing on or beyond those borders.

The government had the final say through the political agent in managing affairs between the Nawab and the tribes. This clause also allowed British officials to inspect the forests.[77] The agreement bound the Nawab to hire labour directly, as opposed to subcontracting it through a contractor, before the required wood was cut and taken to British India. The deal required the purchasing contractors to collect their timber together and pay any amount of duty required. The purchasers could not own the timber before it reached British-controlled territory.[78] In addition, the Nawab had to allow a competent forest officer to brand each log with the sign of the Nawab of Dir and the purchaser.[79] The British Indian Government informed the Nawab that: (i) the British Indian Government was entitled to control the timber import because of the damage and loss caused in India by the floods, (ii) the Nawab was using up the capital of a steady source of income, (iii) the

[74] For the text of the agreement see Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries*, vol XI, 435-37.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Robinson, "*Opinion as to the validity of L. Harji Mall's title to the property in the logs marks Chakdara Hospital*".
[79] Chief Commissioner N.W.F.P to the Secretary of the Government of India Foreign Department, No. 148-P, dated Peshawar 31st January 1911, Chief Commissioner Office, N.W.F.P.

government intention was to have the forests inspected by a forest officer who would report whether the forests were worth conserving or not, if they were, that would necessitate the drawing up of a plan suited to local conditions and necessary staff would be sent for that purpose, (iv) that an occasional inspection by a senior forest officer was vital to ensure that certified contracts were being worked in accord with the authorized instructions, (v) the main interest of the British in Dir forests was imposing a heavy duty against the damage caused by continuous and heavy clear fellings.[80]

According to Sir George Roos Keppel, the British government had two alternatives with regard to Dir forests: first, if the Government of British India considered the forests its property or right of control, then those interests dictated it necessary to remove every impediment facing the Nawab; second, if the government was concerned with the preservation of the forests, then its objective should be fulfilled with minimum interference in matters concerning the tribes.[81] In his opinion, exclusive control over the forests could lead to an uprising by the tribes. He further elaborated that the Nawab counted very considerably on his forest assets, for given his weak position he had to provide for a large number of his *lashkars* along with a need to either bribe or win over opposing factions to his side. His forests were the only means of providing him with easy money with which to do so. British awareness of this along with its strategic management of the issue was as meaningful as it was insightful.

Likewise, Sir George Roos Keppel was concerned that a strict system of checks and balance would result in a financial loss for the Nawab.[82] He was certain that any forest officer inspecting the forests of Dir would inevitably be manipulated to a lesser or greater degree by the Nawab because he would have to look after his bodyguards, his provisions, and his route. There was also the concern that if the Nawab suspected the officer of writing any unfavorable report he might curtail his movement in the forests of Dir by showing him only a limited area, and giving such reasons for his action as political instability, the presence of enemies, or a dearth of provisions. Sir George Roos Keppel deemed it necessary to have a check on

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[80] Major J.W. Thomson Glover, Political Agent Dir, Swat and Chitral to the Secretary to the Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner N.W.F.P., "*Appointment of Naib Tahsildar for Dir Froest*" No 2360, dated Malakand, the 8th August 1929, File No 52," Dir Timber Trade, Tribal Research Cell, Government of N.W.F.P.

[81] The Hon'ble Lieutenant Col Sir George Roos Keppel, Agent to the Governor General and Chief Commissioner N.W.F.P to the Secretary to the Government of India Foreign Department No 176-P, Confidential, dated Peshawar the 2nd of March 1911, File No 107/Dir Timber Trade Note (1911-12). Tribal Research Cell, Government of N.W.F.P.

[82] Ibid.

Dir's timber trade as sales were skyrocketing. He asked the Nawab to submit all contracts for approval to the local government which had the additional power to either lower the price or prevent the sale in case of exorbitant prices.[83] British India was a bureaucratic state with a strong center guarding British vital interests. The bureaucratic management of the Princely States in the north-west of British India is full of lessons for Pakistan and the region at large.

W.P. Barton, Political Agent Dir, Swat, and Chitral, considered any effort undertaken by the British Indian Government at conservation of Dir forests to be useless.[84] He argued that conservation could not be achieved by exercising a degree of control; any such action would lead to bitter unrest in the region and beyond. He warned Sir George Roos Keppel that an open access, without any controls imposed, would give far more authority to contractors, and there would be no fears of any impact on the government's sway in Dir. He believed it was likely that a contractor would offer to buy the whole of the forest output at ten percent of the original price, which the political agent thought was a sufficient amount of money for the Nawab to be unable to resist.[85] In his opinion that money might be used in hostilities against the government and there was also the possibility that the Nawab might use the money to buy weapons and ammunition and employ people to feed unrest in Jandol and Bajour, threatening the peace of the entire region. He further suspected that if the government did not comply with his wishes, he could have communications with the Amir of Afghanistan and the religious community. This would ultimately force the government to intervene militarily in the state.

He stated that all these were just speculations, but they were, nevertheless, essential matters to be considered. He suggested, "As far as the government has control over Chitral, it is in its best interest to have a dedicated ruler in Dir, who would safeguard the interests of the government by keeping the road to Chitral open, and that purpose can only be achieved if the treasury at Dir is full, which in turn required the highest price of timber compatible with the outside world, but this will inevitably harm the government and the private buyer".[86] Keeping in mind all the above-mentioned reservations, W.P. Barton proposed to Sir George Roos Keppel that the Nawab of Dir's main source of income depended on the forests of Dir, so no policy should be devised that would displease him; this would

[83] Ibid.
[84] W.P. Barton, Political Agent Dir, Swat and Chitral to F.W Johnston, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, N.W.F Province "*Dir Timber Trade*" dated Malakand, 7th January 1911, File No. 24., Political Branch, Chief Commissioner Office, N.W.F.P.
[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid.

make him more amenable, if conditions made it necessary to enforce an agreement with him.[87]

F.W. Johnson, Assistant Secretary to the Chief Commissioner N.W.F.P, had serious doubts about the Nawab's compliance with the agreement of cutting the trees and putting the logs into the river, and even if that was overlooked, his intention to deal honestly with any contractor was not guaranteed. In his view, this was because the Nawab was in dire need of money all the time and forests were an endless source of income for him. Any limit imposed on the sale of timber would be regarded as unnecessary intervention. Mr. Johnson opined, "The idea of preserving the forest by any means short of an actual occupation of Dir, I am forced to regard as Utopian".[88] He further added that illegal practices would persist, and in future as was the practice in the past, all paperwork would be avoided; trees would be cut down and sold, giving way to disruption and division. Similarly, Lieutenant Colonel W. Stewart, Political Agent Dir, Swat and Chitral, pointed out that the orders of the British Indian Government regarding the protection of the forests for coming generations never had and never would be obeyed unless the forests were closed for further trade and the Nawab was persuaded to allow trained inspectors free license in the forests.[89]

Political officers who had dealt with the question of the preservation of Dir forests had different opinions. Major Kennion in 1912 stated, "A fact that has before been recognized, namely that the Nawab will put his name to anything for ready money even to the extent of selling rights that have previously been disposed of, and also, the agreements he signed amount to little more than permits, revocable at will, to join in the scramble for trees".[90] Similarly, Major Lyall had come to the conclusion that it would be entirely useless to give a free hand to the Nawab to sign a contract with dealers regarding the felling and floating of logs because there was an utter dearth of honest traders in the business; moreover, the Nawab himself was not in the least interested in carrying out the orders of the British Indian Government. Colonel Stewart, Political Agent Dir, Swat, and Chitral, however, after visiting the forests of Dir and Kohistan, hoped the British Indian Government, "…will not leave the Nawab alone and it was essential

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[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Lieutenant Colonel H. Stewart, Political Agent Dir, Swat and Chitral to the Secretary to the Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner, North West Frontier Province, "*Timber Felling in Dir Kohistan"* No 40 dated Malakand the 8th January 1923, File No 2-States Vol-II January 1923, Political Office, N.W.F.P, Tribal Research Cell, Government of N.W.F.P.
[90] Ibid.

to help him so that he could maintain safety and order on the Chitral Road". He further added, "No one could say with certainty what the coming generations would be like for whose benefit the British Indian Government might seek to conserve those trees".[91]

However, Sir George Maffan, Chief Commissioner N.W.F.P, did not agree with the suggestions of his political agents. He was of the opinion that any instructions to the Nawab would yield multiple claims, and then it would be difficult for the government to make decisions.[92] Refusal to sanction fresh contracts would be taken advantage of by removing unwanted people from the territory, but it could never stop illegal or excessive felling of trees, or removal of undersized trees. In addition, he stated that the government had no means of ascertaining that the Nawab would comply with the government's wish for honest dealings. Although the British initially intended to exercise control over the forests under the pretense of preventing deforestation, in practice clauses relevant to the prevention of deforestation were never implemented as it could harm the relatively peaceful relationship with the Nawab. This was deemed essential for the security of the road to Chitral. The agreed ban on logging was neither carried out nor were the forests inspected by British forest officials.

In 1913, K.S. Imam-ud-Din, a British forest officer, was literally stopped from entering Dir and Kohistan. Colonel Stewart's visit to the forests was interrupted, too. After that, no other inspection was allowed by the Nawab. Thus, he never acted in accordance with one of the terms of the deal.[93] Furthermore, the Political Agent Dir, Swat and Chitral had the authority to either accept or annul any contract along with the ability to fix prices. Contractors had to pay duty to the British upon entry into the British-administered territory. The agreement required the Nawab to brand each log with a registered mark for himself and for the purchaser, which put wood out of the hands of local traders, as the timber trade was monopolized by the traders of British choice belonging to the settled districts. As a result, locals suffered from the loss of a livelihood in their native region. This agreement indirectly points out how the British turned a blind eye to the threat of widespread deforestation and to the miseries of the people in order to secure a stable frontier for strategic and commercial reasons.

Conclusion

The Princely State of Chitral was of significance to the British because it was located on the border with Afghanistan which the British wanted to hold in a way that would strengthen its hegemonic power in the region. Geographically, the State of Dir provided the shortest and safest line of

[91] Ibid.
[92] Ibid.
[93] Ibid.

communication to Chitral and beyond. The British alone did not have sufficient resources to ensure the safety of this route. As a result, they adopted the policy of expanding its indirect influence through the Nawab. That allowed him a certain degree of independence as long as he did not cross limits defined by the government. This form of indirect rule had multiple benefits for the British. There was no need to set up an administrative structure so the government's budget was saved from a significant burden. In addition, it was more acceptable to the local people. It also helped in deterring rebellion among them as they were more prone to rebel against foreign rulers than their own leaders. This kind of indirect rule also provided the government with a chance to exercise its moral right to intervene and mediate. In Dir, a symbiotic relationship developed between the Nawab and the British through which he received regular subsidies, allowances, and military assistance in order to crush religious and tribal opponents.

The Nawab governed his State through listening but not always obeying the counsel of the British political agent, kept a military body for the security of the Chitral Road, made the road secure for the levy posts and telegraph lines, and gave up his hereditary claims to grazing and commercial rights. He also allowed the stationing of troops on strategic mountain ranges, promised to abide by the boundary limits set up between Dir and Chitral and Dir and Afghanistan, and, in theory, regulated his timber trade according to the advice of the political agent. The Nawab continued to exert his influence on the neighbouring tribes of Bajaur in order to refrain them from attacking the settled districts. All this severely hampered the Nawab's independence as he was required to support the British in every major crisis. The agreements signed between the British and the Nawab of Dir signaled the start of the testing of the Nawab's loyalty in return for British allowances and subsidies. The Machiavellian insight and wisdom of the British was evident for all to see. For his part, the Nawab was no less conniving and he was equally unscrupulous. The larger portion of the Nawab's income was from the revenue extracted from the timber trade centered on the forests of Dir. This timber trade was very attractive to the British but they knew that any attempt at controlling it would result in the breakdown of law and order in Dir, Bajaur, and an interruption to peaceful travel on the road to Chitral. The Nawab made huge profits from the timber trade by manipulating and exploiting his subjects' hard work. And with geo-politics yet again causing tensions, how true are such things in the region and beyond? More importantly, what needs to be understood is that tactical brilliance is no substitute for strategic genius in the conduct of statecraft.

The moral standards of the British Indian government were tested by the fact that it did nothing to stop the ruthless cutting of the forests of Dir;

instead it actively assisted the Nawab in exploiting and destroying natural resources and manipulating neighbouring tribes to further its selfish ends. The principal factors that paved the way for British rule in the North-West Frontier region included regional rivalries and petty jealousies between tribal leaders. The British thoroughly exploited these differences to reach their objectives. They turned it into an art form. The newly-found status of the Nawab of Dir as a subordinate of the British government had an additional adverse effect. The Nawab mainly acted on orders coming from British officials. He failed to understand that following orders is two-third of the equation; one-third is the unsaid part of it. And that is where creativity and initiative resides. The Nawab proved himself to be yet another *gentleman* in the service of the British Indian Empire.[94] Traditional or not, he was supposed to protect his subjects' interests but his legitimacy was seriously questioned when he acted more as a petty officer of the colonizers than as the protector of his own people. Interestingly and ironically, the relationship between the British Indian government and the Nawab of Dir strengthened the position of *mullahs* as protectors of tribes against the machinations of the British and their collaborators.

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[94] A.E.W. Mason, *The Three Gentlemen* (London: Hodder & Stoughton,1922).

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SINO-RUSSIAN ROLE IN THE 21ST CENTURY WORLD ORDER

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Abstract

China and Russia have developed an underlying empathy on the transition of the contemporary US-led hegemonic world order. Since the dawn of the 21st century, the two Eurasian powers have been striving for transforming the global system to a multipolar world system. As Beijing and Moscow, along with other emerging powers were already weary of Washington's unipolar moment and its self-proclaimed authority of overriding the entire international system. In the American worldwide hegemony, the rest of the nations; neither alone nor collectively could challenge its supremacy; as the political, economic and military dominance of the US was ascertained by its ascendency in the post-World war II established international organizations. However, during the past few decades the rapid rise of China; the resurgence of Russia and the relative decline of the US; evidently specify that the era of Pax-American is on the go. Moreover, the launching of Beijing sponsored transnational initiatives can be acknowledged as the pillars of a new multicentric global system in future. Hence, the dynamics of international politics are apparently heading towards the transition of the contemporary world system to a multipolar structure; where besides the US, China and Russia would also play significant role.

Keywords: Unilateralist, multipolar, declinism, triumphalism, hegemony.

Introduction

Since the dawn of the 21st century, the US-led hegemonic world system has been consistently challenged by the rising powers, particularly those from the East. The US-EU transatlantic axis, essentially the driving force of the hegemonic world order, has started to lose its overall capacity of governing the entire global system. Owing to the emergence of multiple

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power centers in the contemporary world system, the likelihood of a single most dominant epicenter of global politics seems dubious. The newly emerging powerful players, especially China and Russia are patently striving for a new multipolar world order. Scholars of international politics maintain that China is stretching muscles for introducing its own brand of globalisation through institutionalization[1] by launching massive transnational initiatives like; the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative.[2]

One of the most critical aspects of the 21st century world order would be the simultaneous presence of conflict and cooperation amid the future superpowers, the US and China. The two global powers, despite being the largest trading partners, have already launched a global trade war that was further intensified by the eruption of coronavirus, in early 2020. Hence, rivalry and interdependence, as propounded by the realists and liberalists, may run side by side in the upcoming international system. The great powers particularly; the US, China and Russia needs to be exceedingly watchful to any intensification in conflict of interests that may result an all-out belligerence and worldwide destabilization of the entire global system.

The international political theater heralds the culmination of Pax-Americana; which gives rise to the question that what would be the major fault-lines of this transition. Certainly, the key elements of this dramatic shift would predominantly be the internal and external drivers of the American hegemonic decline, as narrated by Christopher Layne.[3] As for the domestic drivers of American decline; debt, deficits, and the depreciating Dollar are the horrendous challenges to the US hegemony. On the external fronts the emerging powers; particularly the rise of China at the global stage and the resurgence of Russian influence in Eastern Europe and the Middle East; along with growing strategic alignment between the two Eurasian powers; are the tests of American global hegemony. The debates that "unipolarity is ending, has ended, or will soon end", and the global system is reverting to multipolar, bipolar, apolar or any other coinage; has become an essential gist of international politics[4]. Hence, the voices broadcasting that the US-led hegemonic world order is taking its last breaths are certainly materializing with every passing day.[5] This paper aims to analyse the interplay amid the

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[1] Bora Ly, "China and Global Governance: Leadership through BRI," *Cogent Social Sciences*, *6*(1), (2020), 1801371.

[2] Serafettin Yilmaz & Bo Li, "The BRI-Led Globalization and its Implications for East Asian Regionalization," *Chinese Political Science Review*, (2020): 1-22.

[3] Christopher Layne, "This Time It's Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax-Americana," *International studies quarterly*, *56*(1), (2012): 203-213.

[4] Stephen G. Brooks & William C. Wohlforth, "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-first Century: China's Rise and the Fate of America's Global position," *International Security*, 40(3), (Winter 2015/16): 7-53.

[5] ibid

Russia-China-US bewildered engagement and its exclusive role in shaping the 21st century world order.

Significance of International Organizations in the World Order

In the post WW-II era, based on the overwhelming military and economic supremacy, the US established itself as the most dominant actor of the international system. Maintaining the biggest monetary reserves with half of the share in world economy; the American-Dollar outplayed the British-Pound as the reserve currency of the international economic system.[6] In addition to its indisputable worldwide military dominance; Washington also ensured supremacy in global security and financial institutions like the; United Nations, UN Security Council, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, World Bank and International Monitory Fund. It can be stated that these IOs were effectively serving as the outfits of American global hegemony.[7] The US also undertook the responsibility of resurrecting the overwhelmingly war trodden economies of its allies.[8] Washington also formed a comprehensive framework of alliances; many of them are still functional, to ensure stability in Europe and East-Asia. The post WW-II world order was also reinforced by the US through employing its soft power that aimed at broadcasting the ideological, political and cultural appeal all over the globe.[9] The US also played a leading role in establishing the major IOs and their further promotion through laws, values and norms; which in turn buttressed the American worldwide hegemony.[10]

The hegemonic stability theory model may well explain the formulation of Pax-Americana; as the model holds that the presence of a hegemon in the world better serves in managing and further stabilizing the global system, primarily its political and economic structures.[11] The American hegemonic triumphalism in the post-Cold War era can be condensed by stating that, following the Soviet disintegration, as the benefactor of worldwide security and the ultimate manager of the transnational economy; the US, in essence, acted as the de-facto government of the global system.[12] Likewise, in fiscal downturn, the hegemon has to undertake the responsibility of formulating

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[6] Robert J. Carbaugh & David W. Hedrick, "Will the Dollar be dethroned as the Main Reserve Currency?" *Global Economy Journal*, 9(3), (2009).

[7] Yilmaz & Li (2020): 1-22.

[8] Cecil Bohanon, "*Economic recovery: Lessons from the post-World War II period*," (George Mason University, September 2012).

[9] Ibid

[10] Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane, and Michael Mastanduno, *"US hegemony and international organizations: The United States and multilateral institutions"*, (Oxford University Press, 2003).

[11] Robert Gilpin, "*US Power Multinational Corp"* vol. 2, (Basic Books, 1975).

[12] Mandelbaum, M., The case for Goliath: How America acts as the world's government in the twenty-first century, *Public Affairs*, (2005).

the rules of business for the global economic order. It has to kick-start the world market as a last resort for the goods from other suffering economies by cheering imports from them and providing a reserve currency to the international economy.[13] Militarily, the hegemon has to ensure the worldwide stability by safeguarding the transnational communication lanes, the global commons, which are vital for an open international economy and free movement of intercontinental trade.[14]

The US can be rated as more or less successful in undertaking these perplexed assignments in the post WW-II era. However, since the dawn of the 21st century, Pax-Americana has been consistently challenged by the internal and external trials; and its hegemonic capability of exclusively performing such bewildered assignments in future is quite uncertain.[15]

Chinese Drive of Polarization thru Institutionalization

One of the most vital aspects of the 21st century world order is the complex engagement amid the emerging powers from the "Rest", particularly China and the declining "West"; mainly, the US.[16] This interface would not be mere an economic and military antagonism between the rising and retiring hegemons. Perhaps, it may be a series of happenings that would prove as the trailer of an overriding transition of the world system from the American hegemonic triumphalism to declinism. Traditionally, a waning hegemon is replaced or joined by another one or more ambitiously rising great powers. Generally the transition takes place amid catastrophic conflicts; as stated by Graham Allison that 12 out of 16 transitions in global system are conflictual.[17] Nonetheless, until now the 21st century world order is portrayed to be an exceptional case because the most prominent emerging power, China, has repeatedly asserted that its rise will be peaceful.[18]

In the past few decades China has launched a number of economic, political and security initiatives that would ultimately help in implementing Beijing's transnational agenda. All these enterprises, Fareed Zakaria argues, may enable China to first place itself at an advantageous position in global system and then challenge the contemporary world system and with the help of its strategic allies, Beijing may even go up to paralyze the existing world

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[13] Christopher Layne, "Avoiding a Sino-American Confrontation why the US should Accommodate a Rising China," *Atlantisch Perspectief*, (4), (2015): 3-8

[14] Barry R. Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of US Hegemony. *International security*, 28(1), (2003): 5-46.

[15] Christopher Layne, "The US–Chinese Power Shift and the End of the Pax-Americana, *International Affairs*, *94*(1), (2018): 89-111.

[16] Kishore Mahbubani, *Can Asians Think?* (Marshall Cavendish Intl. Asia Pte Ltd., 2010).

[17] Graham Allison, *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides' Trap?* (2017): Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

[18] Barry Buzan, "China in International Society: Is 'Peaceful RISE' possible?" *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 3(1), (2010): 5-36.

order.[19] Correspondingly, the increasingly under pressure Washington, for its internal and external challenges, may also threaten to pullout its worldwide support; the global system may collapse in both these critical scenarios.[20] China may also opt the strategy of launching new hub of parallel transnational institutions like the; SCO, AIIB and BRI; that will be comparatively more catching for those nations which are already weary of the existing system.[21] The China sponsored new transnational organizations would enable it to expand Beijing's worldwide influence, particularly in Eurasia and Africa. Then China may demand radical changes in the existing world order, where the US has held a dominant position for decades. Eventually, these scenarios may lead international system to new multipolar or multicentric world order in the 21st century.[22]

The "America First" Regime Echoes the US Hegemonic Decline

The American inward looking policy not only signals the degeneration of greater Pax-Americana; but also supplements China's desire of leadership role world over.[23] The US president Donald Trump's election slogan in 2016, 'America First' was enough to send an underlying message to the American rivals and allies in Europe and Asia to look for their own engagements with rapidly rising China and newly assertive Russia.[24] Philip Stephens, a prominent analyst and foreign affairs columnist for the Financial Times; has identified that the Trump's policy of "America First" promotes belligerent isolationism of the United States.[25] Similarly the American passive response to the COVID-19 has also frustrated various nations including its allies in Europe; for Washington's inability to play a global leadership role.[26] On the contrary, China offered exclusive support to

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[19] Fareed Zakaria, "We have to Look beyond the Madness," *The Washington Post*, (September 6, 2018) Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/

[20] Ibid.

[21] Andrew F. Cooper & Yanbing Zhang, "Chinese Leadership in the Evolution of "Hub" and "Parallel" Globally Oriented Institutions" *Chinese Political Science Review*, (2018): *3*(1), 28-47.

[22] David Shambaugh, *China Goes Global: The Partial Power*, vol. 409, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[23] Paul Street, *The world will not mourn the decline of U.S. hegemony. Common Dreams*. (2018, February 22). Retrieved from https://www.commondreams.org/views/2018/02/22/world-will-not-mourn-decline-us-hegemony

[24] David Ignatius, "What President Trump's Foreign Policy will Look Like," *Washington Post*. (Nov. 9, 2016). Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/

[25] Paul Stephens, "America can Survive Trump. Not so the West". *Financial Times*. (Nov. 10, 2016). Retrieved from: https://www.ft.com/content/73313d4c-a68e-11e6-8898-79a99e2a4de6

[26] Robbie Gramer, Morten Soendergaard Larsen, "China Casts itself as Global Savior, while the US and EU Focus on Virus at Home," *Foreign Policy*, (2020): *19*.

various stakeholders and it has smartly capitalised the universal challenge of Coronavirus to a kind of opportunity, in order to mark itself as the "global savior."[27] A parallel may be drawn between the American 20th century politics and the Chinese approach to the devastating COVID-19. The US employed the 1923-24 Dawes Plan[28] and Marshall Plan[29] strategies for the down trodden European economies. Just like Washington, Beijing may also aim to level ground for expanding its transnational influence through economic assistance to the affecties of Coronavirus pandemic.

Figure 1: The 1923-24 Dawes Economic Assistance Plan



Hence, it can be argued that the Pax-Americana, constructed in the post WW-II era, is on the collapsing trajectory due to the highly upsetting internal and external challenges to Washington.[30]

Challenges to the Pax-Americana

China and Russia, since last few decades, have launched an enterprise to the majority of key pillars to the Pax-Americana like; military, economic, institutional and ideational. In such critical circumstances the fundamental question arises that in case the challengers, mainly China exceeds, equals or even approximates its overall power to that of the US in these areas, will the Pax-Americana sustain any further? Though, such inquiries have wider implications, but for the Americans it is a highly contentious issue. A former US diplomat, Jon Huntsman categorically argues that the decline is un-

[27] Ibid.

[28] Schuker, Stephen A. *American" reparations" to Germany, 1919-33: implications for the Third-World debt crisis*, (Princeton, NJ: International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University, 1988).

[29] Xi v Marshall, "Will China's Belt and Road Initiative Outdo the Marshall Plan? How China's infrastructure projects around the world stack up against America's plan to rebuild post-war Europe, *The Economist*. (2018, March 8): Retrieved from: https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/03/08/will-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-outdo-the-marshall-plan

[30] Layne, (2018): 89-111.

American.[31] Some of the high rank officials still believe in the American unipolar fantasy; however, empirically such claims are unconvincing and even suspicious.[32] The ever growing volume of China's GDP, its share in global trade, an annually 10 percent increase in its military spending since last two decades and the rapidly narrowing gape of the US power; are the eye-opener for Washington and the whole world.[33]

United States has been confronting grave internal and external challenges since last two decades. The shrinking economy, the mounting debts and trade deficit, the growing concerns on job security and the inflow of immigrants, the overstretched worldwide military commitments and their pressure on the overall economy; are exerting immense burden on Washington. At the same time the US has also been facing highly precarious external challenges.[34] The American military dominance in East-Asia is consistently flouted by China through its encroachment strategy, particularly in the South China Sea. The Chinese economic boom, its rapidly infusing hard and soft power; the budding Russian tactical influence in Eurasian region and the growing Sino-Russian strategic alignment are highly serious challenges to the Pax-Americana.

Military Challenges to the American Hegemony

The US foreign policy establishment believes that despite all the debates about the decline; even then the advantage in American military dominance has been undefeatable; and it will continue for a significant time-frame in future[35]. The American policy-makers and security studies experts are of the view that military power is their geopolitical trump card and it will certainly ensure Washington's lasting supremacy even if its competitors get closer to the economic and technological advancement of the US.[36]

The argument of American hegemonic decline revolves around a highly critical question of how long its competitors, mainly China, would take to match with the US military power. Some of the studies on the Sino-US military power balancing identify that the two great powers confront dissimilar geo-strategic challenges.[37] The Chinese strategic goals are

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[31] Patrick Porter, "*The Global Village Myth: Distance, War, and the Limits of Power,"* (Georgetown University Press, 2015).

[32] Ibid.

[33] Chapman, Bert, "China's Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win." (2019). Retrieved from: https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf

[34] Layne, *56*(1), (2012): 203-213.

[35] Justin Lynch, "The Myth of American Military Dominance," *War on the Rocks*, (August 15, 2019). Retrieved from: https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/the-myth-of-american-military-dominance/

[36] Ibid

[37] Robert D. Blackwill & Ashley J. Tellis, '*Revising US Grand Strategy toward China*,' (Council on Foreign Relations, 2015).

currently believed to be more limited than the US. For Beijing, the main strategic objective is to dominate its own geographic backyard in south-east Asia. Since, China believes that establishing regional hegemony in the area would be the foundation of its global doctrine and south-east Asia might be the pivot of Sino-US worldwide geopolitical competition.[38]

Though, China currently may not be capable of launching an all-out global challenge to the American hegemony; there are palpable indications that it has started to draw levels with the US military power in East-Asia.[39] The RAND Corporation, an American global policy think tank, in its recent study on the Sino-US balance of power has referred to the overall receding trend in Washington's military supremacy in East-Asian region.[40] However, China could not yet seal the gap with the US; yet it has quite rapidly narrowed the breach. It can be estimated that in the coming years China would be capable of challenging the American status-quo in the Fareast.

The US Defense Department in "*Annual Report to Congress; military and security developments involving the People's Republic of China 2019*" identifies that since the dawn of the 21st century, China has scrupulously benefited from, what it calls the "period of strategic opportunity"[41]. Beijing aims at indigenously developed industry to multiply its overall national power.[42] In the coming decades, its leadership would be concentrating more on progressive, prosperous and powerful China, backed by a world-class military. Beijing also aims to implement the long term strategies like, "made in China 2025" and other industrial development plans to swap the foreign defense equipment with the indigenous paraphernalia.[43] These renovation and indigenization measures are certainly economic and strategic challenges to the US and its worldwide military supremacy.[44]

The policies of Chinese growing economic, diplomatic and military clout may ultimately seek to establish regional supremacy and expanding its

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[38] Ibid.

[39] Joseph Cheng, "China's Regional Strategy and Challenges in East Asia," *China Perspectives*, 2, (2013): 53-65.

[40] Heginbotham, E., Nixon, M., Morgan, F. E., Heim, J. L., Hagen, J., Li, S., & Frelinger, "*The US-China military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017"*. (Rand Corporation, 2015).

[41] Kerry Brown, " Xi Jinping in 2017: The World's Luckiest Man, Period of strategic opportunity". *The Diplomat* (December 16, 2017). Retrieved from: https://thediplomat.com/ 2017/12/xi-jinping-in-2017-the-worlds-luckiest-man/

[42] US Department of Defense. *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China*, (2019).

[43] James McBride & Andrew Chatzky, "Is 'Made in China 2025'a Threat to Global Trade?" *Council on Foreign Relations*, (2018) Retrieved from: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ made-china-2025-threat-global-trade accessed October 10, 2018.

[44] Louis Uchitelle, "The US Still Leans on the Military-Industrial Complex" *The New York Times, 22*. (2017).

worldwide influence. The multinational nonmilitary initiatives; like the BRI, would eventually necessitate China's overseas military basing on the plea of security to these mega projects, which again would be a challenge for the US.[45] Beijing is rigid in its territorial claims; yet its tactics are too calculated to offend Washington, a key stakeholder in the Asia- Pacific region. China's ultimate aim is to make the People's Liberation Army capable of fighting and wining wars against the rivals, deter potential adversaries including the US and to ensure safeguarding China's national interests all around.[46]

China's Economic Challenge to the US Hegemony

The Great Recession of 2008 has bitterly affected the hegemonic role of the US across the world[47]. It has directed the focus of attention towards the internal and external challenges of the US and its diminishing economic supremacy. The global economic downturn may quicken the US declinism that would be chipping away the other pillars of Pax-Americana. The Slump, from various aspects, has elucidated that the US is no more capable of being the manager of the global economy. Instead of causing, the economic hegemon has to resolve the global economic crisis; it has to be the lender of last resort and not the debtor; whereas, the US has turned out to be the world's largest debtor and China the largest creditor.[48] At the G-20 summit of 2009 in London, the US demanded to attain rebalancing of the global economy by persuading the Europeans, particularly Germany, to export less and import or consume more from Washington; Angela Merkel, plainly rejected this petition that indicates Washington's fading ability of acting as the frontrunner of the global economy.[49]

On the contrary, the rapidly rising China is fiercely challenging the US-led liberal hegemonic order. Since last decade, China has been taking away the top positions in various disciplines of the global economy. By 2010, *The Wall Street Journal* announced that China has surpassed Germany in the world exports[50] and by 2014 *The Guardian* declared that after passing the

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[45] US Department of Defense. *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China*, (2019).

[46] Scott W. Harold, '*Defeat, Not Merely Compete: China's View of Its Military Aerospace Goals and Requirements in Relation to the United States'* (No. RR2588). (RAND Corp Santa Monica United States, 2018).

[47] Bulent Gokay, "The 2008 World Economic Crisis: Global Shifts and Fault Lines", *Global Research*, (February 15, 2009). Retrieved from: https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-2008-world-economic-crisis-global-shifts-and-faultlines/12283.

[48] Shalendra D. Sharma, "China as the World's Creditor and the United States as the World's Debtor: Implications for Sino-American Relations", *China Perspectives*, 4, (2010).

[49] Nicholas Kulish & Judy Dempsey, "Merkel is set to Greet, and then Resist, Obama". *The New York Times*, *29*(03). (2009).

[50] John W. Miller & Marcus Walker, "China Dethrones Germany as Top Goods Exporter", *The Wall Street Journal*, A6, (2010).

US, China has become the world's largest trading nation.[51] Finally China crossed the US in manufacturing, a title the US had held for around a century.[52] The World Bank in its 2014 report declared that China, by crossing the US had grabbed the title of being the largest global economy in purchasing power parity.[53] The Bank also predicted that by mid-2020s, China would overtake the US in GDP and acquire the status of the largest economy in the world as measured by global market exchange rate.[54]

These gains will certainly yield massive geostrategic advantage to China against the US in the 21st century world order. Through a highly sensational statement in July 2017; Christine Lagarde, the IMF's managing director, stated that according to the by-laws, the IMF headquarters may be repositioned in next 10 years to another member country that enjoy the status of being the largest economy, most likely to be in China.[55] These indicators specify that the US economy is relatively declining; while its primacists have been presenting numerous crafty opinions. Apart from economic genius China is rapidly modernizing its industry through scientific innovation in various key areas, which in turn are certainly pressurizing the American economy and its establishment.[56]

The plummeting ability of the US to manage the international economy and the rapid rise of China will obviously have profound implications on the dynamics of strategic balance between the two great powers. In this regard China has made a lot of ground to turn the situation in its own favor at various levels. The contemporary economic trends suggest that large number of states would be inexorably drawn into geopolitical orbit of China for overwhelming magnetic pull of its economic bloom. The American global economic sway is gradually shrinking, while that of China is mounting dramatically; as its exports has risen from US$ 200 billion to 2.4 trillion during 1995-2017.[57]

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[51] Monaghan, "China Surpasses US as World's Largest Trading Nation", *The Guardian*, (January 10, 2014).

[52] West, D., & Lansang, C. *Global Manufacturing Scorecard: How the US compares to 18 other nations*, (*Brookings*, *July*, *10*. 2018).

[53] Fray, K., China's leap forward: overtaking the US as world's biggest economy. *Financial Times*, (*October 8*, 2014)

[54] Layne, (2018): 89-111.

[55] Lagarde, C., IMF could be based in Beijing in a decade. *Reuters*, (July 24, 2017). Retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-imf-china-lagarde-idUSKBN1A922L

[56] Layne, (2018): 89-111.

[57] Retrieved from: https://oec.world/en/visualize/line/hs92/show/chn/all/all/1995.2017/

Figure2: A Comparison of Chinese Exports and Imports 1995-2017



Institutional Challenges to the Pax-Americana

The Pax-Americana was established on the basis of the economic, military and geostrategic ascendency of the US; in addition to its dominant role in the international monetary and security institutions. China also understands that its rise to the status of a superpower is sturdily coupled with the same variables of power; therefore Beijing has already launched a series of institutional frameworks that would challenge the US-led hegemonic world order. Just like the occurrence of the Pax-Americana on institutional pillars, its erosion may also lie in the weakening of its legacy in key IOs. China seems to be alert of the fact that the likelihood of transition in the existing world order would happen through transnational institutions.

China, along with other emerging powers demand fundamental reforms in the world's economic and security institutions like; the IMF, World Bank, the UNSC and others for ensuring better and greater role of these great powers. One of the key indicators of the global power balancing swing is the conversion of G-8 into G-20 on the insistence of China in 2008 global economic summit.[58] The advent of G-20 also establishes necessity of yielding the global economic power to the emerging nations, especially China, which ultimately confirms the relative decline of the US. It also underlined that the shift in global economic power is correspondingly taking place from the "West" to the "Rest", especially in Asia. Since, Japan had been the only Asian member of G-8; while the G-20 comprises one third of its members from Asia. Being a principal organ of global economy, the G-20 confirms that after the 2008 Great Recession, the US-EU nexus has dramatically slipped away from playing its worldwide stewardship role.[59]

The China sponsored transnational initiatives like; SCO, AIIB, BRI and BRICS; may potentially constitute a shadow or parallel world order outside

[58] Schmucker, C., & Gnath, K. From the G8 to the G-20: reforming the global economic governance system. In *European Yearbook of International Economic Law*, (Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2011): 389-402.

[59] Wolf, M. Three years and new fault lines threaten. *Financial Times*, *13*, (2010): 39-41.

the precincts of the contemporary global structure.[60] Though, neither the existing power nor the ultimate objectives of these institutions is certain so for; however, their symbolic role in the present world system and their future role in the 21st century world order might be significant. For the declining Pax-Americana; they accentuate the degeneration of the US designed and dominated post WW-II liberal international order; and for the "Rest" or the emerging powers, these institutions are the symbol of recognition of their status and prestige in the future world system.[61]

The SCO as a Geopolitical Challenge

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is basically a China-lead and Russia backed Eurasian political and security institution. The primary objective of SCO was to maintain regional peace and promote cooperation among the member states against terrorism and security threats; for growing significance in Eurasia, it is generally labeled as the "alliance of the East".[62] It is viewed as the largest regional organization in the world in terms of geographical coverage and population, covering around 50 percent of the Eurasian landmass, the world population and energy reserves.[63] Such a massive alliance in the East, where China and Russia are having central role is certainly a challenge for US in the 21st century world order.

In the post 9/11 international politics, one of the worst terror affected regions comprised of the SCO countries. In the 'War on Terror' its members individually decided to collaborate with the US-led NATO forces; in fact few of them offered military and logistic support to the ISAF.[64] However, the long-term American presence and its growing influence in the region started intimidating Beijing and Moscow; they ultimately decided to revive the structure of SCO with an increased prominence for its contribution as a coalition to counter-terror campaign. The broader analysis of SCO reveals its unique inter-state partnership, providing an institutional platform for wider regional economic, political, security and cultural cooperation. It is an exceptional model of regionalism within the context of the contemporary realities of Eurasian zone.[65]

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[60] Chin, G., & Thakur, R. Will China change the rules of global order?. *The Washington Quarterly*, *33*(4), (2010): 119-138.

[61] Park, I. "*US–China competition in Asia-Pacific region: The AIIB and the New Global Order?* (City College of New York, 2016). Retrieved from: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1597&context=cc_etds_theses

[62] Bhadrakumar, M. K. The new 'NATO of the East' takes shape: The SCO and China, Russia, and US Maneuvers. *The Asia-Pacific Journal| Japan Focus*, *5*(8),(2007)

[63] Ibid.

[64] Faisal Javaid & Mamnoon Ahmed, "The Role of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with special reference to US Rivalry towards Central Asia", *International Research Journal of Social Sciences .4(3),* 5, (2015): 58-63.

[65] Ibid.

Keeping in view the dynamics of 21st century world order, the SCO has got a highly significant status at the regional and global levels. The major emerging powers; China and Russia are its key members, with ever growing sense of multifaceted cooperation. The Beijing initiated BRI is going to help in further strengthening the connectivity among its members and also with the Western Europe. Above all, the SCO aims to obtain common political and security objectives; along with its efforts for searching the optimum level of contrivance to expand the economic ties, strengthening cultural bonds and humanitarian interactions among its members.[66]

The formulation of SCO could possibly be the first experience of transnational engagement of alliance-making that is based on an equal partnership among states of different sizes, with varying degree of political influence, varied economic potentials, and diverse cultural and civilizational features. The enormous geographical structure of SCO may accentuate the likelihood of a thoroughly connected Eurasian continent, as an epicenter of world's energy and population hubs. The SCO will obviously provide common platform to the member states to reinforce their strategic ties that would obviously perplex the West in general and the US in specific.[67] However, this rosy picture may also get withered in the coming decades; for conflict of interests and rivalries amid different members of the SCO like; India-China, and India-Pakistan; could hamper its smooth functioning.

The AIIB as Economic and Political Challenge

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is a Chinese initiated transnational body with primary objective to foster viable infrastructure expansion as well as connectivity in Asia. The bank aims to offer massive investment capital in energy, maritime and land routes among various countries, mainly in Eurasia. It also aims to promote regional cooperation and partnership to address the future development challenges and to create an environment of closer cooperation with other key bilateral and multilateral development institutions. The AIIB is the first non-Western financial institution, established on the initiative of emerging economic superpower, China. This multinational body has 84 members; out of them 48 are regional and 36 non regional countries; including 14 EU member states. The financial resources of AIIB are over US$ 100 billion with 20 percent paid-in and 80 percent callable amount; with China, India, Russia and Germany as the biggest shareholders.[68]

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[66] Alimov, R. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Its role and place in the development of Eurasia. *Journal of Eurasian studies*, *9*(2), (2018): 114-124.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Notes, E. S., The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. A new multilateral financial institution or a vehicle for China's geostrategic goals. European Political Strategy Centre. *European Political Strategy Centre*, (1), 24, (2015).

The AIIB would be a game-changer of financing the multidimensional development in global infrastructure networks. Since, its early signs point to the China's derive of using the project not only for economic development but also for pursuing far reaching political interests in Eurasia. The bank is essentially a driver of accelerating the Beijing's plans for reviving as well as revitalizing the new 'Silk Road' connecting Asia and Europe. It also reflects the greater economic significance of the rapidly emerging markets in general and that of China in specific. The AIIB, along with the other key China-led initiatives currently have an overall collective capital base of US$ 250 billion, which is roughly equivalent to that of the World Bank.[69]

The foundation of such transnational institutions certainly reflects the mounting discontent of rising great powers in the existing global institutions as well as the growing economic power of China. Being one of the top two world economies, Beijing has been complaining for her under representation in the international financial institutions; mainly in the IMF and World Bank. China and other emerging markets complain their inadequate sway in major IOs and they are also unhappy with the meager pace of reforms in addressing the unbalancing practices. Therefore, the AIIB could be in some measures an economic vehicle of regional economic and infrastructure development. However, it may also be an instrument of pursuing the long term and wider geo-political interests of China at the regional and global levels; hence, the US and Japan are reluctant to join the Bank.[70]

The AIIB has obviously triggered a sense of nervousness among the icons of the contemporary economic order like; the US, Japan and others as they considered it the preamble of China-led new multipolar world.[71] It is only another exhibition of China's quest for extending unmatched financial and tactical capabilities to other Asian states for the development of vital infrastructure and broader economic capabilities. The EU seems to be in a perplexed situation; on the one hand to welcome the AIIB as a global financial balancing mechanism and on the other hand, the bank is going to shift the world economic center away from the West. In short, the development of the AIIB signals that the Sino-US balance of power, both in economic and geostrategic terms, is now relatively tilting towards Beijing.[72]

The Geostrategic Challenge: BRI

The Belt and Road Initiative also referred as the 'New Silk Road' is yet another one of the most significant enterprises of China's ambitious future

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[69] Ibid.

[70] Etzioni, A., The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: a case study of multifaceted containment. *Asian Perspective*, *40*(2), (2016): 173-196.

[71] Rein, S. *The War for China's Wallet: Profiting from the New World Order*, (Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG, 2017).

[72] Notes, E. S. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. A new multilateral financial institution or a vehicle for China's geostrategic goals. European Political Strategy Centre. *European Political Strategy Centre*, (1), 24, (2015).

goals and the continuation of AIIB. The BRI is a signature policy of China that calls for the multibillion dollars investment (up to US$ 1 trillion) to stimulate a massive trade and economic development plan.[73] The prime objective of the mega project is to construct trade and shipping routes, ultimately aiming to integrate the industrial hubs of emerging economies in Europe and East-Asia with consumer markets and raw material producers in Asia and Africa. The developmental aspects of BRI may be viewed as Chin's version of a new Marshall Plan, the post WW-II American initiative; rather it may be even of much grander significance.[74] It is also professed as an instrument of Chinese expanding geopolitical influence in different regions. Several references may suggest that the initiative is part of the Beijing's strategy to cement its supremacy over the Eurasian 'heartland'.
The AIIB and BRI would indicate the declining American economic and strategic supremacy.[75] These transnational mega initiatives may also challenge the Pax-Americana, in geopolitical, global economic leadership and in the hierarchy of international institutions. Although, in the debates of Sino-US rivalry, the economic perspective is slightly overshadowed by the military balance of power amid Beijing and Washington, predominantly around the strategic theaters of; Taiwan, South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Korean peninsula; since these flashpoints could spark devastating conflict between two superpowers of the future world system.[76]

Sino-Russian Axis: A Grand Challenge to the US Hegemony

The growing strategic partnership between China and Russia can be viewed in reference to the balance of power mechanism amid US-China-Russia; the existing hegemon, the ascending superpower and the resurging or reasserting key, respectively. Beijing and Moscow have the history of being the world's superpowers; however since the era of Pax-Americana, the two Eurasian players were ardently marginalized by Washington. In its unipolar fantasy, the US militarily over-engaged itself in in Afghanistan and Iraq; whereas China and Russia started promptly asserting their influence on the world stage. In an era of declining American hegemony; the rapidly rising China and the resurging Russia are looking to transform the existing world order. Hence, the likelihood of shifting the epicenter of global politics from the "West" to the "Rest" is too evident.

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[73] Layne, (2018): 89-111.
[74] Xi v Marshall, Will China's Belt and Road Initiative outdo the Marshall Plan? How China's infrastructure projects around the world stack up against America's plan to rebuild post-war Europe, *The Economist*. (2018, March 8). Retrieved from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/03/08/will-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-outdo-the-marshall-plan
[75] Layne, (2018): 89-111.
[76] John J. Mearsheimer, "The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia" *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, *3*(4), (2010): 381-396.

The rapidly emerging developments and the associated debates like; the American inability to avert or overcome the Great Recession, the expansion of G-8 to G-20, the discussions about the reforms or review of the UNSC and the growing literature on the US hegemonic declinism; are the symptoms of multilateral world system in the 21st century. The wide-ranging symmetry between Beijing and Moscow in formulating major blocks like SCO, BRICS, AIIB, NDB and BRI also signpost the strategic partnership of the two Eurasian great powers.[77] The deepening and broadening of the Sino-Russian ties have more adverse implications for the US; rather the main driver of this strategic cooperation is their rivalry against Washington. The Sino-Russian strategic ties would be mainly based on common objectives, values and the perceived exposure to the US and Western pressures in various social and political issues; and the visions of the two emerging great powers to expand their influence at the expense of the decline of the US-led world order.[78]

The partnership between China and Russia developed in the post-Cold War era; has been further broadened since the start of the 21st century. The current leadership of the two countries; President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin; support stronger bilateral relations, based on the common objectives, values along with common challenges and opportunities, in special reference to the American hegemony and its subsequent decline. The growing alignment amid China and Russia no longer is only an "axis of convenience" having too much narrow impact on the affairs of world order; instead the cooperation seems meaningful, extensive and result oriented.[79] The Sino-Russian ties are meant to challenge the American hegemony and reshape the 21st century world order. The display of such objectives was noticeable in the 2018 Russian military exercise, Vostok, under the "joint" command; the exercise was bigger than any previous Russian military drills since the end of Cold War; again a matter of greater concern for the US.[80] The Sino-Russian cooperation challenges the US-led world order in their respective spheres of priorities and concerns. Russia is asserting itself in Europe and the Middle East to counterbalance the American ascendency; while China is trying to defuse the American supremacy in a number of regions, particularly in the Indo-Pacific along the China's continental and maritime peripheries. The challenges that Russia has to deal with encompass

[77] Carsten Rauch & Iris Wurm, "Making the World Safe for Power Transition-Towards a Conceptual Combination of Power Transition Theory and Hegemony Theory" *Journal of Global Faultlines, 1*(1), (2013): 50-69.

[78] Andrea Kendall-Taylor, "An Emerging China-Russia Axis?: Implications for the US in an Era of Strategic Competition". Statement before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. (2019). Retrieved from: https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/ files/Sutter_Testimony.pdf

[79] Ibid.

[80] Yu Bin, "Crouching army, hidden alliance?" *Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, 20*(3). (2019).

the military and paramilitary actions in Europe and the Middle East. Moscow is also engaged in cyber and political warfare, of varied intensity and goals, aiming to undermine the harmony of NATO, the cohesion of EU and the internal sociopolitical dynamics of the US.[81] China is engaged in undermining the resolve of the US and its allies through covert and overt means of manipulation. The key characteristic of the Chinese strategic incursion is to launch the soft power derive against the US by employing economic incentives and propaganda campaign[82].

The American officials have repeatedly complained about the cyber-attacks for stealing substantial strategic information and intellectual property rights. Beijing, allegedly, fixes all these steps in order to foster its technological and economic competitiveness and ultimately to dominate the global trade and intellectual markets.[83] It is also perceived that the China's act of intimidating the neighbors by an extraordinary buildup of its military forces is eventually helping Beijing to expand its regional influence. These clandestine tactics also support China in advancing its military industrial complex, at the expense of leading American and other multinational companies. *The Japan Times* reports that the designs of Chinese developed "fifth-generation" fighter jets; the J-20 and J-31; are the prototype design of the American F-35 stealth fighter; and the design was stolen by the Chinese hackers from the Lockheed, a leading US jet fighters production company.[84]

China and Russia are separately and collectively engaged in confounding and curtailing the American hegemony; its influence in global political, economic and security issues. In synchronized moves they support each other in their corresponding challenges posed against the US and its close allies in Europe, the Middle East and different regions of Asia. These collective efforts from the two emerging great powers also encompass the diplomatic, security and economic agencies in multidimensional forums. The two Eurasian powers also support one another in the issues confronting the US and the allied grievances about the Russian and Chinese coercive expansion in various regions. They also complement each other in other measures that are challenging the regional order and the global norms in addition to the American backed transnational institutions. They also incorporate bilateral relations with various actors mostly involving the opponents of the US, particularly those in Tehran, Pyongyang and Damascus; which are also openly challenging the American hegemony.

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[81] Kendall-Taylor, (2019).

[82] Ibid.

[83] Yu Bin, "Crouching army, Hidden Alliance?" *Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations*, (2019): 20(3).

[84] Kyodo, "China stole F-35 Blueprints from Lockheed, Snowden data Appears to show. *The Japan Times*, (2015, January 19). Retrieved from: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/01/19/ , accessed on October 13, 2019.

Certainly these critical issues are severely embarrassing the US authorities like the frustration of Donald Trump can be easily observed in his regular tweets on China in 2017;

17 March: North Korea is behaving very badly. They have been 'playing' the United States for years. China has done little to help!

29 July: I am very disappointed in China. Our foolish past leaders have allowed them to make hundreds of billions of dollars a year in trade,

30 November: The Chinese Envoy, who just returned from North Korea, seems to have had no impact on Little Rocket Man ….. Russia and China condemned the launch.

28 December: Caught RED HANDED — very disappointed that China is allowing oil to go into North Korea.[85]

Conclusion

China and Russia have been diligently working together in reaction to the stronger pressure from Washington. They also support each other in their joint response on the hardening of American security, economic and political pressures on China and Russia and the two countries work together to counter the American interests. Beijing and Moscow are close partners in various areas of strategic, economic, political and even cultural harmony. They share common views on different regional and global issues, particularly in their response to the American worldwide supremacy.

However, in some of the areas things may not be as rosy as they are perceived; as the two players have been persistently avoiding entering in any substantial security alliance. They are unenthusiastic in taking extensive risks for supporting one another in the arenas where the prospects of overlapping their respective interests are unattractive. Long term vulnerabilities can also mar the relationships between the two countries like; the Russian dissatisfaction over its increasingly junior role to that of China may explode and eventually exploit the existing understanding between the two powers.

China and Russia have varied interests on the issues of preserving or perturbing the existing world order. They have different positions over the issue of regional expansion on the part of significant but smaller powers in Europe and Asia looking for the support of the US. The strategic ties between china and Russia are also short of laid down principles or parameters. The two powers also have the history of conventional rivalry and even a slight miscalculation on the part of any actor may eventually result into grave consequences.

The debate can be summed up by stating that any arrangement short of strategic alliance between China and Russia may not be adequate for

[85] Trump, D. J. Donald J. Trump on Twitter: Retrieved from: https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/810288321880555520?lang=en

transforming the existing international system into a multipolar world order in future. Even if over the time they essentially succeed in undermining the American influence in some of the geopolitical regions, the chances of tensions amid them are also likely to grow than shrinking.

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CHINA'S ROLE IN WAR ON TERROR: AN ANALYSIS OF XINJIANG REGION

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Abstract

Terrorism being the primary threat to China's national security therefore counter terrorism has turned out to be the main point of China's domestic and foreign policy. The major terrorist threat that China faces is posed by Uyghur separatist fighters of Xinjiang. They claim and fight for a separate independent state called "East Turkistan". The Xinjiang issue is the major anxiety and the focal point of China's war on terror. To stop extremism and terrorism in Xinjiang China has adopted a multi-dimensional approach i.e. Strike Hard Campaign, diplomatic actions to isolate terrorists and get the help of other countries, religious, economic and social anti-terrorist policies to eradicate the roots of terrorism from society. China is also cooperating with the countries including US, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asian Republics, and many others in fighting against terrorism. From the platform of Shanghai Cooperation Organization China is also playing important role in counterterrorism. China major interest in war on terror is to stop the spread of extremism and terrorism within her borders particularly in Xinjiang province, as well as to make sure that neighbouring countries not become safe haven and base camp for the Uyghur militants. The main objective of this paper is to analyses the phenomena of terrorism in Xinjiang and China's role in war on terror.

Keywords: China, Xinjiang, separatism, terrorism, Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), war on terror.

Introduction

Terrorism is the most violent threat to life and property of human being. It is the most serious threat not only because of killing people but because of the power and influence it provides to its associates. The major terrorist threat that China faces is posed by Uyghur separatist of Xinjiang.

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They claim and fight for a separate independent state called "East Turkistan", or at the least wide authority than the presently allowed.[1] Their agitation is recorded since the 1949 communist revolution but on April 5, 1990 a group of militants of East Turkistan Islamic Movement launched a severe attack in Baren Town of Xinjiang and advocated a "holy war", in order to gain "East Turkistan".[2] This event was the beginning of Uyghur's aggression and violence. At present many Uyghur's organizations are operating in China among which the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is identified as a Terrorist organization, which the U.S government has also declared as a terrorist organization.[3] This organization fight for an independent state called "East Turkistan". The militants of East Turkistan movement launch attacks in order to pressurise and terrorise the government of China for their political objectives. The criminal laws of People's Republic of China defines terrorism as "whoever implies any idea, talk or action that by method of violence damage or danger, intends to create social fear and anxiety, impact national strategy and policy making, formulate ethnic dislike and intensely, challenge state power, or part the state". Terrorists hurt non-combatants to move forward their cause. Intentional and deliberate killing of non-combatant is not allowed even in war, that's why terrorism is unjust and unfair, and such is the case in Xinjiang region of China. Terrorism is an effective strategy for the weaker group in a conflict. It is a criminal and illegal act that affects the society and its citizens more than immediate victim.

Literature Review

Few scholarly works on China's role in war on terror. The analysis of the literature show gaps in the related academic scholarship on the issue concerned. First, there is lack of quality literature on China's domestic war on terror, second, most of the available works cover either ethnic or religious dimensions of the Uyghur community living in Xinjiang, and third, there is also lack of quality literature on cooperation of China in war on terror with other countries. Yoram Evron says that the primary threat of terrorism that China faces is from Uyghur separatists, living in China's Province Xinjiang.[4] Basically, they are separatists, but their activities fall in the categories of terrorism. Martine I. Wayne examined the causes of Uyghur's uprising and counter uprising policies and initiatives. He says that the issue is local but has foreign support and links with international terrorist organizations.[5]

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[1] Yoram Evron, "China's Anti-Terrorism Policy," *Strategic*, 10(3), (2007): 76.

[2] Davide Giglio, *Separatism and the War on Terror in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region*, (UN Peace Operations training Institute), 13.

[3] Ibid, 76.

[4] Yoram Evron, "China's Anti-Terrorism Policy," *Strategic*, 10(3), (2007): 76-83.

[5] Martine I. Wayne, *China's War on Terrorism Counter Insurgency, Politics, and Internal Security*, (London: Routledge, 2008).

Richard Weitz study shows the links of Taliban with extremist groups active in Xinjiang who are involved in attacks against on government assets, officials and civilians in China. Therefore, Beijing supported NATO operations to eliminate terrorism in Afghanistan, and providing for the rehabilitation of Afghanistan.[6] As concerned Chinese cooperation with other countries against terrorism, Xu Xin analysed the China-US cooperation in war on terror after the 9/11 attacks. It says that China casted her vote in favour of the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and supported the US attack on Afghanistan. The US Department of States also declared East Turkistan Islamic Movement active in Xinjiang as a terrorist organization.[7] The study of Anthony H. Cordesman and Brandon Fete highlighted the China and U.S policy differences in war on terror, and China's diplomatic efforts against terrorism. They are also agreed to cooperate in anti-money laundering and counter financing of terrorism.[8] Pan Guang studied that combating terrorism has become a significant feature of China's domestic policy. Beijing counter terrorism strategy at home started even before 9/11 attacks when in April 1990, Uyghur separatists launched an attack in Baren district of Xinjiang in which about 60 citizens and policemen were killed. It was the beginning of terrorism carried out by the East Turkestan activists. Due to this threat China become to be an active country in the international anti-terrorism efforts.[9]

History of Xinjiang

The word "Xinjiang" literally means "new territory" or "new frontier" was coined during the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912). It is the North-Western province of China having an area of 1.6 million sq. km. i.e. 1/6 (one sixth) of the total area of China.[10] It has 5,600 km long border shares with eight countries; Afghanistan, Russia, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, India and Mongolia.[11] Its population is approximately 19 million.[12] Among the 47 ethnic groups living in China in which 13 are officially recognised, many are living in Xinjiang including, Han, Hui (The

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[6] Richard Weitz, "The Limits of Partnership: China, NATO and the Afghan War," *China Security*, 6(1), (2010): 21-35.

[7] Xu Xin, "Harmonization of NTS Securitization in U.S.-China Security Cooperation," *Ritsumeikan Journal of Asia Pacific Studies*, 19, (2004): 1-28.

[8] Anthony H. Cordesman and Brandon Fite, *US and Chinese Cooperation in Counterterrorism in the Middle East and Central Asia*, (Washington DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2011).

[9] Pan Guang, "East Turkestan Terrorism and the Terrorist Arc: China's Post-9/11 Anti-Terror Strategy," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, 4(2), (2006): 19-24.

[10] James Millward, *Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment*, (Washington DC: Policy Studies East-West Center, 2004): 52.

[11] Lillian Craig Harris, "Xinjiang, Central Asia and the Implications for China's Policy in the Islamic World," *China Quarterly*, 133, (1993): 111.

[12] Yoram Evron, "China's Anti-Terrorism Policy," *Strategic*, 10(3), (2007): 76.

Hun are Muslim), Uyghur, Kazaks (1 million), Mongolian (159,000), Kyrgyz (150,000) and small number of Uzbeks and Tajiks are also living there.[13]

Figure 1: Map Showing Xinjiang Neighbours.

Uyghurs are Sunni Muslims, followers of Hanafi school of thought. They are racially Turk arrived Xinjiang region in 8th and 9th century from present day Mongolia. They founded a kingdom in this region in late eighth century and held the control of this area until Genghis Khan captured in 13th century. The present Chinese control of Xinjiang dates back to 1870s when a Muslim revolt led by Yaqub Beg was suppressed by Qing dynasty and thus in 1884 Xinjiang became a province of China.[14] After the communist revolution and establishment of People's Republic of China in 1949 the Xinjian region became an autonomous region of China enjoying wide autonomy. In fact, Xinjian is Chinese territory since ancient time and an integral part of China.

Importance of Xinjiang Province for China

Xinjiang region has huge economic, political as well as strategic importance for China. It has extensive hydrocarbon and under soil mineral resources including approximately 30% of China's oil reservoirs, 40% of coal reservoirs and 34% of gas reservoirs. Likewise, huge amount of oil and gas are imported by pipelines from Central Asia to China through this province. The province is also one of the China's biggest gas generating and second biggest oil generating regions. It is estimated that only the Tarim Basin oil reservoirs has 74 billion barrels oil and 282 trillion cubic feet gas. These reservoirs are too much significant as China's indigenous energy needs. This province has also 115 out of total 147 kinds of minerals found in China. It also ensures the supply of 1/3 of total cotton production of the

[13] Davide Giglio, *Separatism and the War on Terror in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,* (U.N Peace Operations Training Institute): 7.
[14] Ibid. 9-10

country.[15] Xinjiang also enlarges China's boundaries to Central Asia and South Asia. It has 5,600 km long border shares with eight countries: Afghanistan, Russia, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, India and Mongolia. China has also important military installations in this region and also conducted her nuclear weapons tests in Xinjiang.[16] There are six air bases, 12 army divisions and the majority of her ballistic missiles and other weapon stores are situated in Xinjiang.[17]

Terrorism in Xinjiang

Since very long many ethnic groups are living here, communicated each other, mixed together, living together, working together, living in harmony, learning together, having fun together, working together and developed the society in harmonious manner, but since 1990 some groups started uprising based on their political objectives. They started a separatist movement to establish "East Turkistan". Terrorist attacks are taking place in China particularly in Xinjiang with growing number since the 1990 as the outcome of the objections of Uyghurs. They say that their cultural and religious hold on Xinjiang is under attack through strict religious, social, educational and economic policies of Chinese central government. The major tensions between them and central government of China are provincial autonomy, cultural and religious freedom and their claim for separate state. A report issued by the government of China in January 2002, titled "East Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity" stated that Osama had financed and planned with the leaders of the Central and Western Asian terrorist organizations to help the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in Xinjiang to start holy war against China. The report further says that Osama meet with the head of ETIM in 1999 and told him to make coordination with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Afghan Taliban and assured economic assistance. Osama and Taliban offered funds for the training of the East Turkistan fighters, bear the costs of the operations, offered them weapons, bullets, vehicles and telecommunications equipment. It further elaborated that Uyghurs terrorists had launched more than 200 attacks in which 162 persons died and 440 injured from 1990 to 2001.[18]

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[15] Ibid, 72-73.

[16] Lillian Craig Harris, "Xinjiang, Central Asia and the Implications for China's Policy in the Islamic World," *China Quarterly*, 133, (1993), 111.

[17] Dana Carver Boehm, "China's Failed War on Terror: Fanning the Flames of Uyghur Separatist Violence," *Berkeley Journal of Middle Eastern & Islamic Law*, 2(3), (2009): 72.

[18] China State Council Information Office, "East Turkestan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity," (Government of China, January 21, 2002) http://www.china-un.ch/eng/23949.html, accessed on 11/3/2018.

Leading Terrorist Attacks in China

Bombing and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) are the common weapons of terrorists in China. They not only target security forces but also target public places. The leading attacks were the following.

1. Separatists launched an attack in Baran in Akto district of Xinjiang region on April 5, 1990 in which about 60 civilian and police personals were killed. This Violent attack symbolized the starting of terrorist aggression carried out by the "East Turkestan" activists.[19]
2. In March 2003, a bus was attacked by terrorist in Xinjiang in which 21 passengers and 19 other citizens were killed.[20]
3. On January 22, 2005, thirteen people were killed and eighteen others wounded in 2 separate blasts in Xinjiang during Eidal Adha.[21]
4. In 2007, total 19 terrorist attacks took place in which 38 people were killed and 127 others injured.[22]
5. At the time of Olympic Games in 2008, two Uyghur women did suicide attacks in which 31 people died in Xinjiang.[23]
6. On August 4, 2008, 16 policemen were died and 16 others were injured in a terrorist attack. In another attack on August 10, 2008 in Kucha district by Uyghurs on a police station and other government offices with explosive devices 31 people were killed.[24]
7. In July 2009, an uprising was started in Urumqi in which many vehicles and shops were burned, 200 people were killed and more than 1600 injured.[25]
8. On August 19, 2010, a terrorist drove an explosive tricycle into a mass in Aksu city. In the blast 18 people killed included three security officials and 15 others injured.[26]
9. In July 2011 terrorist launched an attack in Kashgar city which took the lives of some three-dozen people.[27]

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[19] Pan Guang, "East Turkestan Terrorism and the Terrorist Arc: China's Post-9/11 Anti-Terror Strategy," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, 4(2), (2006): 19-20.

[20] Michael Clarke, "China's 'War on Terror' in Xinjiang: Human Security and the Causes of Violent Uyghur Separatism," *Griffith Asia Institute*, 11, (2007): 16.

[21] Raman, "Explosive Situation in Xinjiang," *Asia Times*, 28/01/2005.

[22] Anthony H. Cordesman and Brandon Fite, *US and Chinese Cooperation in Counterterrorism in the Middle East and Central Asia*, (Washington DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2011): 6.

[23] Richard Lloyd Parry, "Female Suicide Bombers in Uyghur Separatist War in Xinjiang Province," *Times Online (UK)*, 11/08/2008.

[24] Dana Carver Boehm, "China's Failed War on Terror: Fanning the Flames of Uyghur Separatist Violence," *Berkeley Journal of Middle Eastern & Islamic Law*, 2(3), (2009): 112-113.

[25] Richard Weitz, "The Limits of Partnership: China, NATO and the Afghan War," *China Security*, 6(1), (2010): 23.

[26] *The Guardian*, 19/08/2010.

10. In 2011, 197 people including 4 policemen had lost their lives in different terrorist attacks.[28]
11. On February 28, 2012, a terrorist group attacked with knives and killed 10 innocent persons in Yecheng city.[29]
12. On April 23, 2013 in an attack 21 people died. On another occasion, the Tiananmen Square which is the political heart of the Beijing, jeep crashed into crowd in which 5 people were killed and at least 38 wounded.[30]
13. The year 2014 saw two worst terrorist attacks. In March, a violent group armed with knives attacked on travellers at the Kunming Railway station in Yunnan in which 29 people died and 140 injured. Another deadly attack took place in May 2014 in Urumqi, in which 43 civilians died and other 90 injured.[31]
14. On October 12, 2014 in Kashgar city in an attack 22 people were killed and on November 18, 2014 in another bomb blast and knife attacks in Shache 15 people were killed.[32]
15. On October 28, 2014, a Jeep blasted by ETIM in Tiananmen Square in which 5 people were killed and 40 injured.[33]
16. In the last week of June 2014, within Xinjiang 100 were killed in different terrorist attacks and 50 more died in aggression in Luntai district in September 2014.[34]
17. On June 24, 2015 Uyghur terrorist attacked with hand grenades on Police Station in Xinjiang in which 18 Policemen were killed and many injured.
18. On September 18, 2015 terrorists launched an attack at the Sogan Colliery in Aksu city in which 50 people were killed.[35]
19. On December 28, 2016 in a terrorist attack in Moyu county caused 2 death and three people injured and five people were killed in another attack Xinjiang on Communist party office.[36]

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[27] Dirk Van Der Kley, *China's Foreign Policy in Afghanistan,* (Australia: Lowy Institute, 2014): 4.
[28] *The Guardian,* 18/07/2011.
[29] "The Xinjiang problem and Pakistan," *The Express Tribune,* 05/03/2012.
[30] Malcolm Moore, "Tiananmen Square on lockdown after car explosion kills five," *The Telegraph*, 28/10/2013.
[31] Gartenstein Ross Daveed, *et al., China's Post-2014 Role in Afghanistan*, (Washington D.C: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2014): 13.
[32] Yuwen Wu, "China hails crackdown on terror in Xinjiang," BBC News, 27/05/2015.
[33] Nick Holdstock, *Islam and instability in China's Xinjiang,* (Norway: Norwegian Peace Building Resource Centre, 2014): 6.
[34] Dirk Van Der Kley, *China's Foreign Policy in Afghanistan,* (Australia: Lowy Institute, 2014): 3.
[35] *The Guardian,* 01/10/2015.
[36] Government of China, "White Paper: Xinjiang's Anti-Terrorism, De-radicalization Struggle and Human Rights Protection," Information Office of the State Council,

20. On February 16, 2017, eight people were killed in Xinjian during a knife attack.[37]

Since 2018 there is comparatively stability and no major terrorist attack recorded. Last year more than 150 million local and foreigner tourist visited Xinjiang. This is a positive sign of peace and stability in the region.

Uyghur's Links with Al-Qaeda and Taliban

There is considerable evidence that show Uyghurs relations with Al-Qaeda and Taliban which increased their operational capabilities in China. For instance, ETIM ex-leader Hasan Mahsum took shelter in Afghanistan during Taliban rule in 1997 and founded its base camp near Khost city and a training camp for Uyghurs militants to wages *Jihad* against China with the consent of Osama. With the help of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, ETIM founded three more training camps in Afghanistan between 1997 and 2001.[38] In May 2002, it was reported that 1000 Uyghur terrorists had received training in the training camps of Taliban in Afghanistan and came back to Xinjiang to take part in the separatist movement. About 20 Uyghurs were killed and 300 had been arrested in Afghanistan by US army. In June 2002, the representative of China's armed forces stated that some 400 Uyghurs fighting in Afghanistan against US and NATO forces.[39] In October 2009 Abu Yahya Al-Libi, the Libyan Al-Qaeda leader called on Uyghurs to fight holy war against China. In 2012 in a US Drone attack Abdul Shakoor Turkistani killed who was the leader of ETIM and a key figure of Al-Qaeda in FATA area of Pakistan. However, after July 30 and 31, 2011, attacks in Kashgar area a video had been released by the East Turkistan Islamic Movement showed one of the attacker getting training in a training camp of Taliban.[40] In 2013, Al-Qaeda chief Al-Zawahiri showed his support with the militants fighting against China.[41] These are some evidence that shows Uyghur's links with Al-Qaeda and Taliban.

China's Counter Terrorism Campaign

In order to cope the terrorist challenge that threatened China's security and unity, she launched an anti-terrorism strategy fighting terrorism at three level: militarily, diplomatically and socially. The first dimension is related

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March 18, 2019, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-03/18/content_5374643.htm accessed on 19/8/2020.

[37] South China Morning Post, 15/02/2017.

[38] Michael Clarke, "China's "War on Terror' in Xinjiang: Human Security and the Causes of Violent Uyghur Separatism," *Griffith Asia Institute*, 11, (2007): 20.

[39] Daveed Gartenstein Ross, Daniel Trombly & Nathaniel Barr, *China's Post-2014 Role in Afghanistan,* (Washington DC: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2014): 12.

[40] Philip B. K. Potter, "Terrorism in China Growing Threats with Global Implications," *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Winter, (2013): 75.

[41] Dirk Van Der Kley, *China's Foreign Policy in Afghanistan,* (Australia: Lowy Institute 2014): 5.

with preventing and suppressing terrorists through anti-terrorist legislation and law enforcement agencies actions, second dimension is related with diplomatic actions against terrorists to isolate them and get international support against them and the third dimension is related with religious, economic and social policies.

Domestic Suppression

In 1996, the government of China started "Strike Hard Campaign" to counter separatism, extremism and terrorism.[42] China also deployed army on the borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan to stop terrorists coming from those countries. In Xinjiang from March 2002 to February 2005, 325 people were sentenced due to their involvement in terrorist activities.[43] On December 15, 2003, China Ministry of Public Security make public a list of the 11 most wanted persons belonged to East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM).[44] In January 2007 during an operation 18 terrorists killed and detected and confiscated 22 bombs and 1,500 others which were in making process, as well as rifles and explosives devices.[45] On April 10, 2008 law enforcement agencies arrested 45 persons and disclosed a plan arranged by terrorists to kidnap the foreign countries citizens and launch suicide attacks in Beijing during the Olympics games.[46] In response to the uprising and terrorism took place on July 5, 2009 in Urumqi, about 4,000 insurgents were detained within 15 days of the incident among whom at least death sentences were given to 26 militants.[47] Moreover, in June 2014, thirteen terrorists had been sentenced in Xinjiang for terrorist acts. Twelve more were given death sentences in October 2014 for the attacks in which 100 people killed in Shache in July 2014.[48] The government of China has also increased too much the defence budget of Xinjiang. The official sources show 90 % increase in the Xinjiang defence budget reached 2.89 billion Yuan equal to 423 million U.S dollars.[49] The government of China opposing all type of

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[42] Bhavna Singh, *Separatism in Xinjiang between Local Problems and International Jihad,* (New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), (2012): 3-4.

[43] Dana Carver Boehm, "China's Failed War on Terror: Fanning the Flames of Uyghur Separatist Violence," *Berkeley Journal of Middle Eastern & Islamic Law*, 2(3), (2009): 117.

[44] Bhavna Singh, *Separatism in Xinjiang between Local Problems and International Jihad?* (New Delhi India: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), (2012): 6.

[45] Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, *Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China,* (Hawaii: Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies, 2008): 5.

[46] Richard Weitz, "The Limits of Partnership: China, NATO and the Afghan War," *China Security*, 6(1), **(**2010): 22-23.

[47] Sean Robert, *Imaginary Terrorism? The Global War on Terror and the Narrative of the Uyghur Terrorist Threat,* (Washington DC: PONARS Eurasia, George Washington University, 2012): 15.

[48] Yuwen Wu, "China Hails Crackdown on Terror in Xinjiang," *BBC News,* 27/05/2015.

[49] Philip B. K. Potter, "Terrorism in China Growing Threats with Global Implications," *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Winter, (2013): 73.

extremism and terrorism. Terrorist assaults have occurred repeatedly, affecting the property and lives of all racial factions. On March 18, 2019, the State Council Information Office of China issued a white paper on "Xinjiang's Anti-Terrorism, De-radicalization Struggle and Human Rights Protection". According to this white paper the Xinjiang region has been severely affected by ethnic separatists, religious extremists and terrorists also referred in China as "three forces". The separatism and terrorist militants in Xinjiang region are involved in violent attacks and sabotage movements, caused great destruction to peace, security and social stability in the Xinjiang region and also the cause of pain of other ethnic sects. For countering these three evils the government formulated anti-terrorism and de-radicalization campaigns which are always carried out under the rule of law to ensure peace, security, stability and national unity.[50] It also not only fully respects and protects freedom of religious belief of Uyghurs but also permit and ensure legal religious activities and meets the normal religious needs of religious minorities.

China's Anti-Terrorism Legislation

To tackle the issue and punish terrorists China has made strict anti-terrorist laws. On December 29, 2001, National People's Congress amended the article 120 of Criminal Laws of the state which enhanced penalties to minimum ten years and maximum life prison for those who runs terrorist organizations or having its membership. It also determined five years imprisonment for those who finance terrorist organizations.[51] In addition, a "Counter Terrorism Law" has been passed on July 1, 2015 created "counter terrorism bodies" at centre and all provinces under the Ministry of Public Security.[52] Apart from these, other significant measures introduced by this law are including; article 3 makes stronger the preventing measures of terrorism, article 4 improves the information sharing mechanism by state intelligence agencies, article 7 authorized law enforcement agencies to conduct anti-terrorist operations and article 15 bound both local and foreign telecommunication and internet service providing companies to set up "backdoors" to report encryption keys to the concerned authorities. These new laws are the combination of military, judicial and administrative means to tackle the problem of terrorism. As most of the people in Xinjiang region are not aware of legal knowledge therefore government popularize the legal

[50] Government of China, "White Paper: Xinjiang's Anti-Terrorism, De-radicalization Struggle and Human Rights Protection," Information Office of the State Council, March 18, 2019, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-03/18/content_5374643.htm accessed on 19/8/2020.

[51] Amnesty International. "People's Republic of China: China's anti-terrorism Legislation and Repression in the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous Region," 22/03/2002. http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGASA170102002, accessed on 11/3/2018.

[52] Zunyou Zhou, "China's Draft Counter-Terrorism Law," *Global Research and Analysis, Jamestown Foundation*, 15(14), (2015).

knowledge and improve awareness about the rule of law.[53] People in rural areas have lack of legal understanding and weak sense of the rule of law. Therefore, they are vulnerable to easily misguide and exploited by terrorist organization to do offenses. The government gives immense importance to propagation of law and introduced the "Rules on Publicity and Education of the Legal System of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region" to help people in this regard.

China Educational and Social Anti-Terrorism Policies

To tackle the issue of separatism and terrorism Chinese policy makers also introduced considerable educational and social reforms in Xinjiang. Since the emergence of this issue in the early 1990s, social restrictions and control made tight in Xinjiang than elsewhere in China. After the 1990 protest in Baren city of Xinjiang against which lead to terrorism, the provincial government approved new rules regarding protests in the province. These regulations determined that for all types of protests official permission will be necessary. In addition, the applicant must determine the protest objectives, method, slogan, number of participant and assurance that it will not endanger public security and unification.[54] Wearing such clothes having a falcate moon and star (symbols appearing on the East Turkestan freedom flag) is also prohibited. On December 24, 2014 the provincial government promulgated and implemented telecommunication regulations, seeks to make stronger the administration of Internet security to stop the use of the Internet to produce, photocopy, distribute, propagate or store data related to terrorism and separatism in order to protect social order and national security".[55] Moreover, in recent years as a result of efficient precautionary anti-extremism and anti-terrorism measures social atmosphere in Xinjiang has experienced considerable positive changes. Morality and justice have risen, malevolent feelings have deteriorated, legal awareness among people has significantly increased, the quest for modern technological and scientific knowledge and a civilized lifestyle adopted massively and integration of ethnic groups at local level is significantly improved as Xinjiang is the home of many ethnic groups.

Development for Peace

Chinese policy makers have the opinion that economic development can weaken Uyghur's freedom movement and terrorism and can resolve the

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[53] Government of China, "White Paper: Xinjiang's Anti-Terrorism, De-radicalization Struggle and Human Rights Protection", Information Office of the State Council, March 18, 2019, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-03/18/content_5374643.htm accessed on 19/8/2020.

[54] Nick Holdstock, *Islam and Instability in China's Xinjiang*, (Norway: Norwegian Peace Building Resource Centre, 2014): 4.

[55] Yang Tao, "Xinjiang People's Government Notice on Strengthening the Management of Internet Information Security," *Xinjiang Daily*, 07/01/2015.

issue. Therefore, she is spending a huge amount on developmental projects in Xinjiang. Huge investments worth of $300 billion have been done in this province till 2015.[56] In addition, the central government has announced the investment of 100 billion Yuan on 70 most important developmental programs in the province during next 5 years. China has also officially attempted to decrease the gap between per-capita income of Uyghurs and Hans in Xinjiang. Since 2010 a new 5% reserve tax has been charging on gas and oil producing in Xinjiang to increase local income by 25%.[57] Such policies are very helpful to counter terrorism, extremism and separatism in Xinjiang. In recent years, focus on improving people's living standard the government has done a good job in improving and safeguarding people's living standard which is related to the welfare, peace, stability and social harmony. In Xinjiang government executed the people-centred development ideology which concentrated on safeguarding and developing living standard and strongly supported such schemes that benefit citizens in the areas of health, education, employment and social security. Implemented the three years developmental plan (2018-2020), employment scheme for 100,000 citizens and employed 75,000 laborers from extremely needy families, promoting job opportunities through the development of industries and encouraging entrepreneurship to encourage employment and create more opportunities. Only from the year 2016 to 2018 total 1.4408 million new jobs were created in Xinjiang.[58] For enhancing people capabilities teaching and training centres have been established focusing on different vocational skills seeking, legal knowledge, national language and de-radicalization.

China's Anti-Terrorism Diplomacy

China is also fighting terrorism at diplomatic front. Its anti-terrorist diplomatic efforts are successful. Soon after 9/11 attacks, Beijing effectively lobbied to declare ETIM as a terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of State in August 2002. It was a big diplomatic success of China as before this U.S. was continuously criticizing Chinese policies in Xinjiang for human rights violations. Moreover, it is also the result of China effective diplomacy that the government of Pakistan and its political parties, especially religious parties support China's stand on Xinxiang issue. It is playing positive role in the solution of Muslim uprising and separatist movement in Xinjiang province and trying to convince its supporters and propagators to turn away from the separatist campaign. In this regard the

[56] Sebastien Peyrouse, "Security and Islam in Asia: Lessons from China's Uyghur Minority," *Policy Brief*-N-87, (2011): 2.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Government of China, "*White Paper: Xinjiang's Anti-Terrorism, De-radicalization Struggle and Human Rights Protection*," (Information Office of the State Council, March 18, 2019), Retrieved from: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-03/18/content_5374643.htm accessed on 19/8/2020.

visit of chief of Jamiatul Ulema-i-Islam (F) Mulana Fazlur Rehman and Amir Jamaat-i-Islami Qazi Husain Ahmad to China at the invitation of the Chinese government was an effective diplomatic success.[59] In past Uyghurs were coming to Pakistan to take shelter and for religious education. It was another China diplomatic success that Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf in his visit to China in November 2003 declared that "his state will never permit any one including activists of East Turkestan to exploit the Pakistani territory for the accomplishment of anti-China activity". Both the countries signed extradition treaty to make possible the exchange of detainee in 2003. Ismail Kadir who was third chief leader of East Turkistan Islamic Movement was arrested by Pakistani agencies and handed over to China. Another East Turkistan Islamic Movement founder and an important figure, Ismail Semed was extradited to China by Pakistan in October 2005.[60] Islamabad also bound the administrators of religious Schools (Madrassa) not to enroll any Uighur student. Furthermore, China and Pakistan conduct joint anti-terrorist armed exercise from time to time.

China's Anti-terrorist Cooperation with Other Countries

China's official post 9/11 policy is "terrorism is a worldwide evil threaten international peace, security and stability". After 9/11 attacks China voted in United Nation Security Council in favour of Resolution 1368, aimed to fight against terrorism.[61] It is also cooperating with the US in the war on terror. China is fighting war against terrorists at home and also cooperates with such state fighting terrorism. It is also playing a very important indirect role in Afghanistan by assisting its security agencies, providing huge economic aid, doing investment, political support and facilitating peace talks between Afghan government and the Taliban with the collaboration of Pakistan. The talks were hosted in the Xinjiang capital Urumqi and Pakistan's City Murree. On many occasions the Afghan government appreciated China's role in peace process. Moreover, it is also providing training facility to Afghan officials and armed forces to build its capacity and strengthen administration in Afghanistan to protect it from falling again. For instance, China trained 300 Afghan army officers under defence agreement signed on June 6, 2012.[62] Under this agreement China has also provided 1.5 million dollars grant to the government of

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[59] Rashid Ahmad Khan, "Pakistan and China: Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism," *Strategic Studies,* (2012): 77.

[60] Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, *Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China,* (Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2008): 6.

[61] Shirley A. Kan, *U.S.-China Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy,* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010): 2.

[62] Daveed Gartenstein Ross, Daniel Trombly & Nathaniel Barr, *China's Post-2014 Role in Afghanistan,* (Washington, DC: Foundation, 2014): 16.

Afghanistan.[63] It provides economic aid to Afghanistan as the government is facing economic difficulties in order to protect it from collapse. China's investment and aid are as significant as that of US and NATO troops for stability in Afghanistan. Economic development can probably resolve the issue of terrorism, militancy and conflict in Afghanistan as well as in other such countries facing terrorism, where poverty appears to be one of the most important cause of hostility, aggression, instability, violence and terrorism.
China is also closely cooperating with Pakistan in fighting terrorism. She has strong collaboration with Pakistan to crack down against the three evil forces "separatism, extremism and terrorism" to maintain the security and solidity of both states as well as the surrounding region.[64] With the help of Pakistan it has killed and arrested may key figures of ETIM. Pakistan had extradited 14 East Turkistan Islamic Movement members to China in 1997, 7 in 2002 and 9 in 2009.[65] Pakistan Army killed the leader of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement Hasan Mahsum in December 2003 during an operation in South Waziristan area of ex-FATA. On June 15, 2009, the then Pakistan's Interior Minister Rehman Malak visited China. During his visit China announced to provide 280 million dollars security equipments to Pakistan to build capacity of its law enforcement agencies to counter terrorism. These security equipments were included mobile and vehicle scanners and some other types of tools. Only between June 2009 and May 2010 Beijing provided 470 million dollars in material support to coup terrorist activities in Pakistan.[66] China considers Pakistan as an important state in international anti-terrorism campaign and recognises that it has contributions more than any other state. Beijing and Islamabad playing important role in war on terror and bringing peace and stability in the region.

China is also closely working with Central Asia Countries in fighting Terrorism. Since 1990 one of the main focuses of cooperation among China and Central Asian Republics is anti-terrorism. The terrorist organizations of Central Asia and Xinjiang also have links. Terrorism is a common security threat to both People's Republic of China and CARs therefore it needs their close collaboration and joint struggles with other regional and extra regional countries. China and Central Asia Republics individually as well as from the platform of SCO cooperating with each other to fight terrorism and eradicate this evil from the region. Main support to Xinjian based organization is also from the Central Asian terrorist organizations.

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[63] Elizabeth Wishnick, "Post-2014 Afghanistan Policy and the Limitations of China Global Role," *Central Asian Affairs,*1, (2014): 137.

[64] Ma Zhaoxus "*China-Pakistan Counter-terrorism Cooperation*," Chinese Embassy in Pakistan, August 3, 2011. Retrieved from: http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zbgx/t845496.htm (Accessed on 23/10/2020).

[65] *Daily Dawn*, (Karachi, August 10, 2011)

[66] Brigadier Najeeb Ahmad, "Sino-Pak Anti-Terrorism Collaboration,*" NDU Monograph,* 4(1), (2013): 23-24.

Mainly China, Central Asian Republics and Russia are cooperating with each other in fighting terrorism from the platform of SCO. One of the main aims of the creation of the SCO was also to fight terrorism, separatism and extremism in the region. At present, the major concern of SCO is the terrorism in the member countries therefore SCO has significantly strengthened anti-terrorist cooperation among its member countries. In this regard, the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of Shanghai Cooperation Organization is playing significant role in fighting terrorism, extremism and separatism. Shanghai Cooperation Organization has offered People's Republic of China with an influential regional counterterrorism, extremism and separatism platform. Under the "Shanghai Spirit," of Shanghai Cooperation Organization China is working with its member most importantly Central Asian Republics to ensure its internal security situation, stabalise Xinjiang and strengthen cooperation in other related fields of mutual interests with its neighbours. Being the leading member of SCO the "three evil forces" in Central Asian countries and Xinjiang province, it became essential for People's Republic of China to improve anti-terrorism collaboration in the organization. Therefore, since 2001, many important agreements and MoUs have been signed regarding counterterrorism by the members of cooperation Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In June 2001 the member countries adopted Shanghai Convention of Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Extremism and Counter-Secessionism, in 2004 signed an agreement about Counterterrorism Database, in 2006 adopted the Cooperation Guideline of Counterterrorism, Counter-extremism and Counter-secessionism, in 2008 signed an agreement for Counterterrorism Exercises of member countries, in 2009 an agreement signed between Shanghai Cooperation Organization members and Afghanistan about crack down smuggling and drugs Trafficking, and also hold many convention from the platform of SCO against terrorism.[67] According to the 2001 agreement and the SCO 2009 Convention against terrorism all members of the organization were greed that extremism, separatism and terrorism create serious threat to international security and peace, establishment of good relations among countries and insurance of human rights. In addition, in 2004, a special office for counterterrorism was established in Tashkent aimed to facilitate intelligence cooperation and sharing of related information among the member countries of the organization. China and other members of the organization are also closely cooperating in numerous multilateral counterterrorism exercises. China taking parts in all these military exercises. Alongside, counterterrorism collaboration of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has extended to other related fields to curb the economic

[67] Wang Jin and Kong Dehang, "Counter-Terrorism Cooperation between China and Central Asian States in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization," *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies,* 5(1), (2018): 71.

sources and funding of the terrorist organizations not only in the member countries but in the whole region. For instance, drugs smuggling is a main source of funding of terrorists therefore China highlighted this issue and with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization member countries signed an agreement about fighting illegal traffic of drugs in 2004.

Conclusion

History records Uyghur's peaceful freedom movement since October 1949, but since 1990 their movement has assumed the shape of terrorism, because its activists started lunching attacks in public places against military personals and also started targeting civilians. Xinjiang is the major concern and the focal point of China's present anti-terrorism strategy. In Xinjian province extremist and terrorist activities promoted intolerance among different cultural and religious sects and challenged human security, undermine peace, caused violation of human rights and affected socio-economic development. Though by the efforts of government the three evils in Xinjiang are now under control but threat is yet not fully eliminated. Terrorism and extremism are worst enemy of humanity and threat to international peace and stability. For its complete defeat further improving the international consciousness by the Chines approach of "Community with a shared future for mankind" the world can retain peace and can more effectively combat extremism and terrorism. In this regard China has also established anti-terrorism collaboration with the neighboring countries, including intelligence information sharing about terrorist activities, joint boundary control; countering terrorist's funding and fighting the cyber terrorism. Long term and most feasible solution of Xinjiang problem would be to eliminate the terrorist organizations like Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement and also tackle the fundamental grievances and doubts of the Uyghurs about the religious and socio-economic policies to fully eradicate the socio-economic causes of terrorism in region. Terrorism is an ideology therefore it needs a counter ideology to defeat. China should adopt a counter-ideology and best counter-ideology for China is, to address the religious, political and socio-economic grievances of Uyghurs.

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TRANSITION SHOCK AS TOOL OF INTEGRATION: APPLYING BERRY'S MODEL OF ACCULTURATION ON SINO-MUSLIMS

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Abstract

This paper aims to apply the recent approaches of intercultural interactions between minority-majority groups upon the historical acculturative phases of Sino-Muslims. Muslims in China departed their ghettos during Yuan/Mongol reign (1279-1368A.D) and got acquainted with Chinese culture at larger scale hence we contend that it was the period of 'transition shock' for them, to apply Alder's phrase; as they were not only familiarized with the Chinese society but also revisited their new identity amidst a new people thus underwent a process of change revising their 'self-understanding'. This cultural shock later propelled them to 'integration' during Ming (1368-1644A.D) thus served as a tool of their integration in China. Taking the Berry's model of acculturation, we suggest the early Mongol's was a period of 'contact' between the two cultures i.e. Islam and China whereas late Mongol and early Ming was characterized with 'conflict' and finally Ming age was the period of 'adaptation'..

Keywords: cultural transition; integration; adaptation; cultural shock as tool of integration; minority majority interrelationship

Introduction

Religion has been part and parcel of the lives of Chinese people as means but never the prime goal of their life orientations. Therefore Daoism, Buddhism and Confucianism simultaneously served the mundane purposes and performed metaphysical functions in the lives of Chinese populace. Islam has always been a religion of minority in China. It never asked for the imperial patronage nor did it try to proselytize people en masse so its history represents a case unlike the historical account of other religious traditions being practiced in China. Although the axiom that imperial propensity is determinant of

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historical pursuit of any religion applies here as well because in the monarchial societies, no social phenomena are shaped beyond the sovereign's influence. So, Muslims in China moved from the obligatory seclusion in Tang-Song China to the dispersion in the whole China as representatives of Yuan and finally ended up acculturating in the mainstream Chinese society, at least apparently, in Ming-Qing China. This pursuit of settlement and acculturation in China was significantly, if not solely, governed by the state policies. Apart from the state intervention, naturally the encounters between the Chinese majority and the Muslims (who came as foreign traders initially and settled in China gradually) in their daily lives and mutual influences also gave birth to new traits in the newly established Muslim community in China. Sometimes these new traits were evolved to be conciliatory and accommodative towards the majority and sometimes these served to safeguard and preserve the Muslim values and culture. So, the history of Muslims in China is a dialectical process between adaptation to the Chinese culture (not only material but also epistemological and philosophical) and retention of essentially Islamic religious traits.

It is a fact well-known to everyone engaged with the history of Muslims in China that each local Muslim community is distinct in its adaptational behavior towards their host majority society. No general analysis or description is possible in this regard if the standards of precision are to be met. And this is why all the analysts of Islam and Muslims in China made generalized statements while concluding their research recording an array of responses of different Muslim communities towards the phenomena of Sinicization. This piece of research is focused on the Muslim community of Xi'an and thus meant to examine the historical interrelationship of Muslims of Xi'an with the Chinese state and local non-Muslim population called Han henceforth. And the Muslims will be called Hui as this research engages with Hui Muslims solely excluding all other Muslim minority groups settled in Xi'an.

Conceptual Framework and Literature Review

We live in an age marked with globalization and intercultural communication where cross-cultural interactions and their impacts on individual and communal lives are talk of the town. With ever-growing progression in means of communication and transportation, people and societies are influencing each other more vigorously than ever. This intercultural interface has brought about significant changes in the behaviors and social patterns of people particularly the immigrants and settlers. Numerous models have been presented to analyze the patterns and consequences of acculturation and adaptation in an alien cultural atmosphere.[1]

[1] For a detailed view of literature on acculturation and its associated patterns, please see Paul N Lakey, "Acculturation: A Review of the Literature," *Intercultural Communication Studies* 12(2), (2003); John W Berry, "Acculturation as Varieties of Adaptation,"

Acculturation is defined as a multidirectional cultural change process triggered by intercultural contact which produces changes in attitudes, norms, behaviors, knowledge, and identity. It is suggested that when people are confronted with a culturally unfamiliar atmosphere, they experience a kind of 'cultural shock' or 'transition shock'.[2] This transition shock is characterized with a conscious awareness of their self with contrast to the new cultural paradigms leading to a sense of disorientation/alienation in the beginning and then familiarization with the new culture resulting into the learning of new cultural traits and embarking on creating a new identity later. The new identity often emerges as a result of bilateral process i.e. retention of native cultural traits and adaptation to new social norms.

The concept of cultural shock has been more extensively elaborated and applied in social psychology recently and the immigrant youth as well as adults predominantly in American and European social contexts.[3] Moreover, Berry's model of acculturation has been applied in both Asian and American social contexts in last two decades.[4] With respect to China, recently much attention has been paid to the study of Chinese Diaspora in the global age and the emergence of new identities, cultural fluidity and trans-nationalism as well as the majority-minority group relationships between Chinese and Others

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Acculturation: Theory, models and some new findings (1980); "Immigration, Acculturation, and Adaptation," *Applied psychology* 46(1), 1997; "Acculturation: Living Successfully in Two Cultures," *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 29(6) (2005); Amado M Padilla, Acculturation, Theory, Models, and Some New Findings, vol. 39 (Westview Pr, 1980); Colleen Ward and Arzu Rana-Deuba, "Acculturation and Adaptation Revisited," *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 30(4), (1999); Floyd W Rudmin, "Critical History of the Acculturation Psychology of Assimilation, Separation, Integration, and Marginalization," *Review of general psychology* 7(1), (2003); Young Yun Kim, *Becoming Intercultural: An Integrative Theory of Communication and Cross-Cultural Adaptation*, Sage, 2001; Larry Samovar, Richard Porter, and Edwin McDaniel, *Intercultural Communication: A Reader*, (Cengage Learning, 2011).

[2] For the illustration of the core concepts of 'cultural shock' and 'transition shock', please see Peter S Adler, "Culture Shock and the Cross-Cultural Learning Experience," Luce, Louise FiberX Smith, Elise C. Eds. *FW toward Internationalism W Readings in Cross J Cultural Communication* (1987).

[3] Janet Bennett, "Transition Shock: Putting Culture Shock in Perspective," *International and intercultural communication annual* 4 (1977); Claudia Feichtinger and Gerhard Fink, "The Collective Culture Shock in Transition Countries-Theoretical and Empirical Implications," *Leadership & Organization Development Journal* 19(6), (1998); Paul Pedersen, *The Five Stages of Culture Shock: Critical Incidents around the World* (ABC-CLIO, 1994); Colleen A Ward, Stephen Bochner, and Adrian Furnham, *The Psychology of Culture Shock*, (Psychology Press, 2001).

[4] Yuri Jang et al., "A Bidimensional Model of Acculturation for Korean American Older Adults," *Journal of Aging Studies* 21(3), (2007); Seth J Schwartz and Byron L Zamboanga, "Testing Berry's Model of Acculturation: A Confirmatory Latent Class Approach," *Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology* 14(4) (2008).

taking Chinese people as minority group.[5] This paper adds to this trend in a novel way taking Chinese in their homeland as a majority group investigating their relationship with Muslim minority in mainland China and the impact of these intercultural actions upon the minority group acculturative behaviors and identity.

Theory and Locale of Research

Considering the aforementioned impact of 'transition shock' on the acculturating communities, we hereby contend that it can serve as a tool of acculturation or adaptation to the new culture. We also propose that this process of acculturation is not exclusively a modern phenomenon rather the societies and individuals in the past also have been experiencing the same phases of adaptation whenever an ethnic group migrated to a different society or region. It is invincibly true that phenomenon of migration and acculturation was not as pervasive in the times of yore as in our day but it was undoubtedly extant. Having stated this, we suggest that the models and theories of acculturation, being empirically tested and studied quantitatively in the social scientific research, can be applied by the same token to analyse the historical process of intercultural contacts and its consequences.

Muslims came to China in 8th century A.D in small groups and it was a sort of Muslim Diaspora after the fall of Baghdad caliphate at the hands of Yuan that a substantial wave of Muslims entered China. With this, the already extant Muslim community of China got strengthened and departed their ghettos for the socio-economic purposes consequently getting acquainted with Chinese culture and society during Yuan reign. Therefore Mongol age was the period of 'transition shock' for Muslims in China, to borrow Alder's term. He defines it as a process in which one experiences 'profound learning, self-understanding and change' while interacting with a new culture.[6] Mongol age marks the preliminary stages of this transition while the fruits of this cultural communication ripened during Ming reign. Taking the adaptational model of Berry into consideration, we see that he views acculturation as a social process sub-divided into three phases i.e. contact, conflict and adaptation. The contact

[5] Ang, Ien. "Beyond Chinese groupism: Chinese Australians between assimilation, multiculturalism and diaspora." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 37(7), (2014): 1184-1196; Gomez, Edmund Terence, and Gregor Benton, eds. *Belonging to the Nation: Generational Change, Identity and the Chinese Diaspora*. Routledge, 2016; Liu, Hong. "Beyond co-ethnicity: The politics of differentiating and integrating new immigrants in Singapore." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 37(7), (2014): 1225-1238; Marsden, Anna. "Chinese descendants in Italy: Emergence, role and uncertain identity." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 37(7), (2014): 1239-1252; Nyíri, Pál. "Training for transnationalism: Chinese children in Hungary." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 37(7), (2014): 1253-1263; Zhou, Min. "Segmented assimilation and socio-economic integration of Chinese immigrant children in the USA." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 37(7), (2014): 1172-1183.

[6] Adler, Peter S. "The transitional experience: An alternative view of culture shock." *Journal of humanistic psychology*, (1975).

between two cultural spheres is the focal point of the whole phenomenon according to his theory therefore; the nature, frequency as well as intention and length of contact are the prime determinants of the extent and kind of adaptational behavior of the acculturating communities. We propose that the Muslims encountered a 'cultural shock' in Yuan age and were not only familiarized with the Chinese society but also revisited their new identity amidst a new people and culture thus underwent a process of change and revised their 'self-understanding'. This transition shock later propelled them to 'integration' during Ming thus served as a tool of their acculturation. Hence, we hypothesize here that 'transition shock' served as a tool of integration of Muslims in China and contrary to what Lipman proposes, we suggest that Mongol reign by all means served to pave the way of mixing and localization of Muslims in the Chinese society.

Methodology

This research employs the approach of historiography primarily as it traces the historical patterns of Muslims in Mongol China and analyzes them in the paradigm of acculturation thus contextualizing and reconstructing the phenomena of past Muslim practices in the light of contemporary framework of intercultural interactions. The sociopsychological approach is used as an aid in order to categorize the responses of Chinese Muslims to the emerging sociopolitical currents of the Chinese society.

A Discussion and Analysis

This paper engages with an extensive collection of literature in English and Chinese languages regarding the integration of Muslims in Yuan and Ming China. We see a sharp contrast in the opinions of foreign experts and local Chinese authors regarding the acculturative trends of Muslims in Mongol reign. The former propose that since Muslims enjoyed a prestigious status under Yuan dynasty, they had no social pressures to acculturate in the mainstream Han society hence they tended to maintain their cultural segregation and aboriginal identity.[7] Unlike the foreign scholarships, contemporary local historiographers tend to agree upon the notion that Mongol age was positively a prelude to the integration of Muslims in China.[8] They

[7] Lipman, "*Familiar Strangers: A Muslim History in China."; Raphael Israeli, Islam in China: Religion, Ethnicity, Culture, and Politics*, (Lexington Books, 2002); Donald Leslie, *Islam in Traditional China: A Short History to 1800*, (Canberra College of Advanced Education, 1986). Marshall Broomhall, *Islam in China : A Neglected Problem* (London; Philadelphia [etc.]: Morgan & Scott, ltd. ; China inland mission, 1910).

[8] YANG Gui-ping, "On Social and Cultural Context of Han-Kitab: A Perspective from Ritual Transformation of Hui Muslims During Yuan and Ming Dynasty," *Journal of Hui Muslim Minority Studies* 3 (2012). LI Chong, "Hundred Years' Study and Summary on National Policy in the Mongolia-Yuan Dynasty [J]," *Journal of Xinzhou Teachers University* 6 (2007); Ata Malik JuwainI and Rashid al-Din, "Muslim Merchants in Mongol Yuan China," *The East Asian Mediterranean: Maritime Crossroads of Culture, Commerce and Human Migration* 6 (2008). XU Li-li, "Nationalization of Central Asian

suggested that exposure of Muslims to Chinese culture and society during Yuan caused consciousness changes and resultantly they integrated in Ming more conveniently. They endorse our hypothesis saying that Yuan played the role of prologue to the integration of Muslims in Chinese society in later periods; the economic, educational, religious and nationalization policies of Mongol emperors remained crucial in development of a strand of Islamic tradition exclusive to China.

Phases of Acculturation

Acculturation, as referred earlier, comprises of three phases i.e. contact, conflict and adaptation; we see all three stages reflected in the history of Sino-Muslims in Yuan and Ming. It is worthy to be noted that these divisions are not like watertight compartments segregated from each other with marked boundaries rather they are constituted of individual human behaviors thus lack absolute coherence and reserve space for individual deviations and specific contextual divergences.

Contact

On the basis of general outlook of Muslims' life patterns in China, we can classify the period from the inception of Islam in Tang dynasty to Late Mongol as the phase of contact between the Muslims and Chinese society. Muslims came to China in 8th century A.D as ambassadors and traders predominantly. Since the purpose of their arrival was diplomatic/economic and not missionary, the state felt no threat so they encountered no hardships or suppression and received an impartial treatment. Like other foreigners, they were made to live in the enclaves reserved for the foreigners/'outsiders'. Their mandatory seclusion in the ghettos hindered the probability of frequent contact with the host Chinese culture. Their interaction with local people was business-oriented and otherwise they stayed segregated socially and linguistically. The situation changed considerably when Mongols occupied China bringing along with them a new array of immigrant Muslim troops and

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[8] Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett, *The Cambridge History of China: Alien Regimes and Border States, 907-1368* (Cambridge University Press, 1994).

artisans from the Central Asian territories after the fall of Baghdad caliphate.[9]With this begins a new chapter of Muslim history in China; there occurred a paradoxical transition in their status which endorsed them high official responsibilities but lowered their status in the eyes of local Chinese. Muslims started interacting with their host Chinese society and headed towards creating a new identity however this very mélange turned out to be a cause of hatred between them and the local Han majority.

Mongols ruled over more than half of the world in the Middle Ages and in 1279 they conquered China as well. Since Mongols ruled Eurasia, Central Asia and beyond, their bureaucracy and militia were truly multiethnic and multicultural. With the commencement of Yuan dynasty, this multiethnic administrative system flowed into China as well altering the previously xenophobic disposition of the Chinese state and society. Chinese social order used to deem foreigners as barbarians and uncivilized thus of inferior status; this mindset was reflected in their behavior towards foreigners placing them in separate ghettos outside the city premises not allowing them to intermix or intermarry with local people.[10] In Yuan dynasty, there was a huge wave of Central Asian Muslims entering China as soldiers or artisans and scholars because the whole territory under the Muslim caliphate was conquered by the Mongols with their skilled persons/artisans recruited in the army to accompany them to China.[11] So, Yuan dynasty, quite like other non-Chinese dynasties of China, produced a rich cultural diversity in the empire. The Mongols' widespread West Asian, Central Asian and even European contacts and expeditions resulted into huge opportunities of cultural exchange.[12] Religious tolerance was as characteristic of Yuan empire as all the major religions coexisted with peace and without discernment. Broomhall quoted many statements of Qublai khan from travelogue of Marco polo which testifies that Mongol exhibited a great religious tolerance and allowed religious freedom to followers of all faiths and traditions. Once, mentioning Jesus, Mohammed (P.B.U.H), Moses and Buddha, Qublai Khan said, "I do honor and show respect to all the four, and invoke to my aid whichever amongst them is in truth supreme in Heaven." [13]

The multicultural, multiethnic and religiously liberal behavior of Mongol emperors provided Muslims a favorable atmosphere for interacting with the majority culture with the constraint of seclusion in ghettos withdrawn.

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[9] Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett, *The Cambridge History of China: Alien Regimes and Border States, 907-1368*, (Cambridge University Press, 1994).

[10] Yung-Ho Chang, "*The Development of Chinese Islam : During the T'ang and Song Dynasties (618-1276 A.D.)*" (1999).

[11] David O Morgan, "Who Ran the Mongol Empire?," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain & Ireland (New Series)* 114(2), (1982).

[12] Timothy Brook, *The Troubled Empire: China in the Yuan and Ming Dynasties* (Harvard University Press, 2010).

[13] Broomhall, *Islam in China : A Neglected Problem*.,p.52

Although Confucian governmental practices and examinations based on the Classics were retained by the Mongols in order to pacify and please Han society yet the Chinese social hierarchy took a new shape under the Yuan rule. The populace was divided into four main classes: Mongols, Se Mu ren (people of various categories, often mistranslated as "men of colored eyes", including Muslims now called Huihui and other foreigners), Hanren (North Chinese) and Nanren (South Chinese).[14] The status of Semuren including Muslims was above the Chinese, inferior to only Mongols themselves. Chinese resented Mongols as oppressors and usurpers and Mongols also cognized the fact that the empire ultimately belongs to Han Chinese and if given any chance, local Chinese would not spare it to regain the throne. This is why they were not ready to rely on Chinese for the administrative and financial matters and Semuren were granted high official positions. Marco Polo reported that many Muslims were appointed as officials and high ranked administrators during the Mongol period particularly in the reign of Qublai Khan.[15] Kenneth even stated that China was ruled by Mongols and their foreign allies as their colony. It might be an overgeneralization but apparently all the important posts were specified for the Muslims.[16] They became shiboshi (trade commissioners in the ports), and they were also allowed to be darughaci (commissioner or local governor), the posts Chinese were supposed to be shorn of.

Muslims were actively in contact with their coreligionists within and outside China in Yuan age as they were enjoying free trade, privileged travelling and administrative status in the government. They needed to learn Chinese language and understand Han ways of behavior in order to deal with the Han community for administrative purposes. In this age, Muslims built mosques and schools, special Muslim Hostels for travelling Muslim traders. Within two or three generations, the Muslims under the Yuan learnt and mastered Chinese language to the extent that Muslim names can be found in the Confucian literati of the time. So, Yuan is the age of gradual identifying of Muslims with Chinese culture, language and customs but with a sense of supremacy over Chinese. This process of understanding the host culture was not instilled by Chinese majority rather chosen by the minority owing to the practical and material needs. Lipman assumes that if Muslim integration into the Chinese society started in Song, it was ceased or retarded in Yuan and though Muslims became ordinary and familiar then but they were equally 'antagonistic' and different in the eyes of Chinese. This claim is contentious as the circumstances of Muslims indicate that their integration took a new twirl and proceeded in disguise instead of cessation. We will elaborate this argument afterwards.

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[14] Brook, *The Troubled Empire: China in the Yuan and Ming Dynasties.*

[15] Stephen G Haw, *Marco Polo's China: A Venetian in the Realm of Khubilai Khan* (Routledge London: New York, 2006).

[16] Kenneth Pletcher, *The History of China*, (The Rosen Publishing Group, 2010).

Yuan dynasty was benevolent towards its Muslim subjects and its outcome was twofold i.e. the rapid growth of Muslim population in Muslim majority provinces including Shaanxi and the scattering of Muslims throughout China. Although they dispersed in the whole China to fill all the areas, locally the Muslims were concentrated in their ghettoes in the form of urban enclaves or independent villages with a central mosque and market. The imperial edicts are found which were issued to protect the mosques in Southern Shaanxi in the early 13th century by Mongols.

Muslims maintained their style of living in their separate communities as we see Ibn e Batuta[17] and Marco Polo bearing testimony to this practice in 13th century A.D. Muslim communities comprised of Arabs, Persians, newly immigrated Central Asian and Ueigur and Turk Muslims and were bound together with the ties of Islamic creed and laws; thus their religion was their shared identity and their foreign origins and collective political status under the umbrella of Semuren were the possible cornerstones of their social cohesion. Their dependence upon a mosque as an essential communal institution and their abstinence from pork made them more intertwined to each other to base independent Muslim neighborhoods distant from the rest of the population. These neighborhoods were allowed to decide their controversies under Islamic law but obviously under the monitoring of state.

In Tang and Song, it was obligatory but in Mongol reign it almost became habitual and customary to live separately; their status as Semuren in Yuan made Muslims think as a minority not only ethnically different from Han Chinese but also superior to them. This sense of superiority did not hinder the process of integration rather changed its intentions and modes only. Before the Muslims were trying to be a part of their host society in order to remove the tag of alienation and barbarism from them but now they had been already granted the status above the local population on the basis of ethnic difference. So, this very cultural difference and ethnic distinction which caused their estrangement in Chinese society before became a rewarding identity for them in Yuan. But that does not causally necessitate that they stopped identifying with Chinese language and culture. Being appointed on high official posts and actively involved in the trade activities travelling all across China from Southern seashores to Northern frontiers, the Semuren were inevitably interacting with Chinese society in its entirety. What confuses many historians of Islam in China is the seclusion of Muslims in their ethnic enclaves and it makes them assume that such a phenomenon is a sufficient indicator of the Muslims' refusal to integration in Yuan. But they must not neglect that being increasingly involved in the administrative and official activities, Muslims were simultaneously taking part in the Chinese politics, getting well-versed in Chinese classics and literature and getting aware of Chinese customs and

[17] Ross E Dunn, *The Adventures of Ibn Battuta: A Muslim Traveler of the 14th Century* (Univ of California Press, 2012).

systems through close personal observation. During Yuan, the highest posts were banned to Chinese and the system of examination to be a part of bureaucracy was ceased. As D.O. Morgan says, "Could it be that the Mongols, fearful of the notorious Chinese capacity for assimilating foreign conquerors, were anxious lest the Chinese bureaucrats should completely take over, and the ruling elite of Mongols be wholly dependent on their subjects?" [18] And all these actions were definitely paving the way for their integration into Chinese society which we see in Ming.

As theorized by Berry, the consequences of the phenomena of contact between acculturating community and the host majority are primarily dependent upon its nature, frequency, purpose and length. If the nature of contact is pleasant, it will result into good relationship and development of positive atmosphere for the integration of minority and vice versa. In this case, we see that Muslims contacted with Chinese from a higher profile; when a minority gets power and prestige by virtue of privilege over the host majority, it generates abhorrence among the majority and that happened. Nature of contact played an ambivalent role here; assisting Muslims in familiarizing with the host culture but creating a sense of detestation in the ambiance of Chinese society for Muslims at the same time. The frequency of contact increased considerably in Yuan as Muslims were immediate assistants of Mongols and they had to interact with Chinese populace from grass root level to the imperial court. The purpose of contact too underwent a significant shift in Mongol age in twofold ways. Firstly Muslims no more remained sojourners or foreign traders so purpose or length of contact was not hasty or temporary any longer rather determined by a sense of permanent settlement and adjustment in Chinese society. Secondly, the interface between Chinese and Muslim communities was not unilateral (oriented from Muslims to Chinese) any more rather Chinese people too were bound to interact with Semuren officials for their economic affairs etc. Hence, it would be appropriate to classify Mongol reign as a phase of contact between Muslims and Chinese communities and as a result Muslims became an inevitable, ever-present and economically established stratum of Chinese society by the end of Yuan.

In Northwestern China, an important shift in the occupational trends of Muslims was from trade and military professions to the agriculture. This change provided them with another economic resource as well as tied them with the land they were residing. As traders they were potential travelers but as farmers they possessed lands and became permanent inhabitants of the land. In the 14th century by the end of Mongol rule in China, the Muslims totaled about 4,000,000, more than any other minority in China.

Conflict

When two communities belonging to different cultural orientations come into contact with each other, conflicts transpire inevitably both at individual

[18] Morgan, "*Who Ran the Mongol Empire?*." p.132

and social levels. And the probability of conflict multiplies when the contact takes place in the state of affairs narrated above, therefore historical period of late Mongol and early Ming can be characterized as the phase of conflict between Muslims and Chinese. The status of Muslims as Semu in Yuan had enduring as well as discernible impact on the later attitude of Chinese state and society towards Muslims in the Ming. The state's inclination towards assimilation of the minorities and ethnic groups into the mainstream Chinese culture emerged in the Ming dynasty replacing the foreign Yuan policies. The change in policies may be attributed to the fact that in Tang and Song, the state was quite confident of their culture and they never doubted that any of the foreign nations could ever replace them and rule the Han majority. But after they experienced subjugation to Yuan, it became quite natural for the Ming to enforce the assimilation of the minorities. May be this is why Ming was so strict in its acculturative policies that the state stipulated the ethnic groups not to intermarry and change their names in order to break their strength and dissolve their identity. Ming emperors had a seemingly paradoxical rationale behind their attempts to acculturate the barbarians i.e. they feared 'others' and wanted to diminish them by scattering and disseminating them into Chinese society and thus depriving them from their identity and on the other hand they were convinced of the civilizing power of Chinese culture and wished to make the uncultured ethnic minorities a part of civilized society. Ming policies can be rightly understood as a U turn from multiethnic empire to a conservative model of state exclusive of the barbarians and foreigners.[19] It was a matter of insult for Han Chinese to be controlled by uncivilized barbarians and Muslims were responsible for this crime so they had to face the consequences once the Mongol empire was over.

Leslie quotes a statement from Tao Zongyi a writer of 1366 A.D (at the end of the Yuan) expressing the detestation and odium against Muslims in lay Chinese society : "[At a Muslim wedding, the building collapsed.] Their [Muslim] clothes and headgear are covered with dust, their elephant noses are now flat, their cat's eyes no longer shining...The cry "Allah" is not to be heard any more. Alas! The tree has fallen, and the monkey grandchildren of the monkey hu [i.e., foreigners] are dispersed."[20] This statement is just one from many others, a literature produced at the end of Yuan to express the hatred local Chinese developed in their hearts during their subjugation to Muslim officials in Yuan. Such resented attitude would cause attempts to crush the unique identity of Muslims or to force them either to assimilate or to extinguish.

Despite the fact that Ming state was liberal enough to let the minorities practice their religion and the emperors issued the edicts to deal with Huihui with justice and equality, the local Han gentry and regional officials were

[19]Brook, *The Troubled Empire: China in the Yuan and Ming Dynasties*.
[20]Leslie, *The Integration of Religious Minorities in China: The Case of Chinese Muslims*.p.10

prejudiced against Muslims. Thus, Muslims had to face severe punishments, harassment and unjust attitude from Han magistrates in case they had to appear in the court for any disputed matter. What happened to a Muslim family of Shaanxi can serve as an instance of the discrimination Muslims had to bear in the Ming China after parting with their Mongol patrons. Lipman quotes that A Muslim who belonged to a noble and honest family of Shaanxi had to appear before the local magistrate as he had a clash with a Han. The magistrate declared the Muslim to be guilty and sent his troop to arrest him. Muslim man got offended and took refuge in the mountains. He was afraid for his life because the Muslims were dealt with inequity and undue harshness when found guilty of a crime as compared to the other Chinese. Finally a local man of high repute Kang Lang stepped into the matter and asked the Muslim fellow to calm down. And he surrendered saying to Kang Lang, "You, sir, know our oppression, so I bind myself [for punishment at your disposal]. If it had been the governor, I would simply have been killed."[21] This remark of the Muslim prisoner gives a clear glimpse of the social situation of Shaanxi in which Muslims were living. Xin,[22] a local author suggests that Ming reign affected the legal positions of Muslims adversely; their political rights were weakened, marital and civil rights were limited and economic rights declined. He also posits that Islamic law was incompatible to Ming's legislation therefore there was encounter and conflict between both.

Adaptation

The integrative pressures from Ming and the abhorrence from Chinese laity resulted into a period of conflict between minority and majority society but sooner it was replaced with a thrust of adaptation to the host culture. Muslims found it inevitable to accommodate and reconcile to the socio-cultural norms of Chinese society and this process was augmented by the imperial policies of acculturation. It is necessary to note that the process of adaptation was more mandatory than discretionary. Before Ming, Muslims were free to choose between integration and separation, between marrying a Muslim and a Han woman, between religious and Chinese education, between retaining their native language and mastering Chinese lingua franca but with new policies of Ming, they were bound to shed off their cultural boundaries and intermix with Han Chinese. The Imperial edict issued by Hongwu Emperor prohibited Mongols and Muslims from intermarrying within their ethnic communities and ordered them to marry Chinese women.[23] So, they had to integrate and acculturate though materially as they married Chinese women

[21] Lipman, "*Familiar Strangers: A Muslim History in China*." p.40

[22] IANG Xin, "Legal Position of Muslims in Ming Dynasty——Influence of Legal Elements on Spreading and Development of Islam in Ming Dynasty," *Social Sciences in Ningxia* 5 (2010).

[23] Ge Zhuang, "Islam and Muslim in the Society of the Ming Dynasty (Summary)[J]," *Studes In World Religions* 1 (2002).

but after making them converted to Islam thus safeguarding their religious values. They adopted Chinese names and surnames but retained their Muslim names within their community; their children spoke Chinese and learnt classics but they were provided with religious education in Persian and Arabic, the lingua franca of Muslims. Despite these practices of acculturation and integration, the lineages were strictly preserved and the original ancestral lines of Chinese and immigrant integrating ethnic minorities were safeguarded for discriminating between Han and non-Han.[24]

Despite their integrative and assimilative policies Ming emperors were quite tolerant towards the religions. In the vein of their precursors, Ming also tended to oppose or resist only those religions which might challenge their authority or intrude state affairs. Islam has been taken akin to Confucianism by the Ming emperors and we find its evidence in many of the mosque inscriptions erected in Ming era. A monument erected in the old mosque of Xian dating from the 25th year of the emperor Hung-Wu of Ming dynasty records the decree of the emperor that by the imperial orders the mosque in Xi'an was being rebuilt and the Muslims were allowed to repair their mosques to save them for falling into ruins and they were free to travel and trade in all districts, prefectures and provinces and were free to pass from customs without any hindrance.

In 1335, Islam was recognized by the Emperor's declaration as Qingzhen Jiao i.e. 'the Pure and True Religion', a term still used to refer to Islam.[25] An imperial inscription from Ming age says, "I hereby give you my imperial decree in order to guard your residence. Officials, civil or military, or anyone, are not to offend or insult you. Anyone who offends or insults you against my imperial order will be punished as a criminal".[26] This favorable attitude of Ming emperors regarding the practice of Islam helped indigenization of Islam in China and localization of its adherents. These inscribed steles are the icons of adaptation of Muslims to the Chinese society as their statements emphatically highlight the analogy between Islam and Confucianism. Moreover, the change in very name of Islam as Qingzhen Jiao is a unique instance in the history of Muslim minorities as this nominal change was not superimposed rather Sino-Muslims embraced it wholeheartedly. With this shift, Islam naturally espoused Confucian flavor and Chinese whiff.

Ming is considered to be a crucial phase in the cultural history of Muslims in China and to borrow the well-known phrase of Leslie; they became 'Chinese Muslims' from 'Muslims in China'. They adopted Chinese material

[24] David M Robinson, "Images of Subject Mongols under the Ming Dynasty," *Late Imperial China* 25(1), (2004).
[25] LJ Newby, "'the Pure and True Religion'in China," *Third World Quarterly* 10(2), (1988).
[26] Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, "'the Marrano Emperor": The Mysterious, Intimate, Bond between Zhu Yuanzhang and His Muslims," in *Long Live the Emperor!: Uses of the Ming Founder across Six Centuries of East Asian History*, ed. Sarah Schneewind (Society for Ming Studies, 2008): 286

culture and Confucian social norms to greater or smaller extent but one must be aware of the fact that they did not become Chinese with Muslim faith, the way Buddhists were. They retained their essential religious values and some distinct socio-cultural traits and thus remained an ethnic minority in China.

Whatsoever the stimulus may be, the results of Ming acculturative policies were desirable. The Chinese wives and mothers switched the language of home from Arabic and Persian to Chinese and accelerated the intimacy of Muslims to the Chinese soil as their next generations belonged to a mixed ethnicity. Given that we know of schools established for the children of foreigners so that they might participate in imperial examination since Song, this practice became recurrent in Ming and one finds Chinese Muslims continued to be represented in significant numbers in the commercial, military and bureaucratic elites.[27] They served the Chinese empire as officials and administrators considering China to be their homeland. Their Muslimness was merged and fused into Chinese culture and instead of replacing one with the other or letting one fade its true colors, they created a new identity known as Huihui. This Huihui culture was a unique instance of Islam in China, peculiar to Chinese soil, embedded in both Chinese and Islamic civilization, possessing double identity associated with both their religion and their motherland China. They created a new dynamic pattern for their lives whose soul was breathed by Islam and whose body was ornamented with Chinese culture. Thus they managed to live in a way that was their own and which equally legitimated their Muslim origins and Chinese present. This unique culture demonstrated its outgrowths in religious as well as educational ways i.e. jiaofang and jingtang jiaoyu, the two unprecedented developments of Huihui during Ming.[28]

Ming aided and enhanced the process of integration through the policies of isolating minority populations from their native lands. So, the Muslims lost cultural contacts with the main Muslim world and had to confine themselves to what they already inherited and what they were learning from their Chinese mentors in prevalent educational system. In the Yuan dynasty, the Muslim population was characterized with great dispersion and small concentration so when Ming dynasty took over and shifted her attention from trade to agriculture, Hui lost the opportunity of extended travelling and the contacts between Muslim communities of different regions reduced a great deal. There were connections between Muslim communities of different provinces of China but not as frequent as these were in Mongol. So, this state of affairs pushed Muslims to interact with their Han neighbors at the local level for social and economic purposes. This intermingling of Muslims with local people made them adopt Chinese language and their native languages started dwindling gradually.

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[27]Xiao-rong HE and Jing CUI, "Ming Dynasty's Fundamental Policy on Islam and the Residents Distribution Believing in Islam," *Heilongjiang National Series* 4 (2013).
[28]Shoujiang You Jia Mi, *Islam in China* (Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2004).

What preserved the Muslim religious identity in times of constant pressure towards integration was the cohesive social structure they maintained and established through the local mosques. The mosque education helped to keep the Islamic education and Muslims' native languages alive though at a restricted and limited level. The clustered communities of Muslims continued to retain their religious practices under the guidance of local religious focal persons and thus though acculturating materially and outwardly, they retained their distinct religious characteristics within their neighborhoods. The centrality of mosque in a Muslim congregation and the influential role of religious scholars in the form of Ahong or Khateeb were the features which distinguished a Muslim neighborhood from a typical Han locality. The role of mosques became much more diversified in Ming as the Muslim population grew, their problems and needs multiplied as well and locally it were the mosques which served as community centers for them. Their local leadership seated at the mosque was responsible for their education, their economic and public welfare, sorting out their civil, religious and social problems so mosques became an indispensable part of Huihui communities in Ming. This role was strengthened with the development of jiaofang; a system of triple party administration comprising of Ahong, Khateeb and Muaddin. It was a creation of Chinese Islam, a practice rarely found in the Muslim world elsewhere; an outcome of historical development of Islam in Chinese circumstances. Since it was neither a body controlled by state with representatives at central or local levels nor the Muslim community was coherent and organized enough to organize it trans-locally throughout China, jiaofang were independent and exclusive to each other, not subordinate or related to each other. But they shared the centrality of mosque as their seating place and organized a community that covered religious, political, economic, cultural and civil affairs and social activities of the local Muslim neighborhood surrounding the mosque. In short, the mosque was the nucleus of the jiaofang, and the indispensable stipulation for its dawn and survival.

Thus it is evident that during Ming Muslims were localized entirely, developing their religious, educational and linguistic patterns in an exclusively Chinese context and producing a unique instance of Islamic tradition specific to Chinese territory. This was to lay the foundation of Hui culture; a way of living particular to Muslims of China. Huihui was the name of a people who managed to balance their identity both as true and loyal subjects to Chinese dynasty and as a sincere Muslim simultaneously.

Conclusion

This paper concludes that human nature corresponds to the external socio-cultural stimuli in identical ways therefore the theories employed in the contemporary social psychology and sociology are equally capable to analyse the historical human behavioral phenomena. Applying Berry's model of acculturation upon the integration pursuit of Chinese Muslims in Mongol (1279-1368A.D) and Ming (1386-1644 A.D) reigns, we see that they followed

the patterns of contact, conflict and adaptation quite comparable to the acculturative patterns of today's immigrant communities. The only difference lies herein is that the process was comparatively plodding and slow and it took them centuries in switching the phases. The raison d'être is obviously the fast pace of this global and interconnected world where the process of acculturation is hastened by multidimensional modes of communication and multiple means of influence. In pre-modern times, the resources of intercommunication were limited and few therefore what is accomplished within two generations today, was carried out in centuries' duration then. So, we see the span of localization of Muslims on China encompassing their contact, conflict and adaptation extended to four hundred years approximately.

It is interesting to note that the process of Muslims' acculturation in China was triggered by a non-Chinese dynasty and in Mongol age they were brought into contact with the Chinese society at large were not this familiarity with Chinese social norms, Muslims' adaptation in China would have impeded a great deal. The transition in the status and context of Muslims served as a shock for their consciousness and made them revisit their identity and determine their new orientations serving as a contrivance of their acculturation in the host society. The frequent contact between Chinese and Muslims in Mongol age played paradoxical role i.e. it helped dissemination of Muslims in China but simultaneously generated sentiments of detestation for them among the Chinese people. The Chinese abhorrence resulted into an atmosphere of conflict but the mechanism of conflict operated in a way aligned to the incorporation of Muslims in the Chinese society rather than their extermination. Hence began the phase of adaptation, boosted by the Ming integrative policies and accomplished by the Muslims' compliance to adapt to their host culture.

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CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN CHINESE EDUCATION SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY OF CHINESE TEACHERS

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Abstract

China is the world most populous state with a population over 1.3 billion, overlaying about 9.6 million kilometers. China has the largest educational system throughout world with almost 260 million college students and over 15 million teachers in about 514 000 schools. In current years, the Ministry of Education has shifted from direct manipulate to macro level. It steers education reform through legal guidelines, plans, finances allocation, information offerings, and coverage steering and administrative method. In this regard, teachers are the most crucial and useful means in schools that make an essential effect on improvement of the whole society. Without enough and qualified instructors, it is difficult to attain educational targets. Teachers' education mainly focused to develop four elements: enhancing the general academic education of instructors, increasing their knowledge about the subjects they are going to educate, knowledge about children in schools and the improvement of practical competencies. Thus the current study is fundamentally focusing on reforms introduced by the Chinese government which, undoubtedly, directly contributing to the quality of education system in China. Moreover, the understanding of reforms in China's education system will be a thought provoking for other countries which are endeavoring to build their education system on sound lines.

Keywords: Education, China's Education System, Teachers Training, Capacity building

Introduction

China has one of the largest educational systems in the world providing quality education to various grades. For further enhancing the quality of education the ministry of China has taken a step from direct manipulation to

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macro level. Undoubtedly, the new strategy ranges from legal guidelines to administrative methodology with especial focus on teachers which are considered the pillars of Chinese education system from the very beginning. The foundation of teacher education in China dates back to 1897 with the establishing of Nanyang Gongxue (a Higher Public School) in Shanghai (predecessor of Jiaotong University) after which Jinshi Daxuetang, the Imperial University of Peking (Predecessor of Beijing University) in 1898, with instructor schooling sections. In 1904, a proper independent system for teacher training was introduced where the primary was on institutional management, which includes student recruitment, selection of curricular content material, evaluation of educational goals modeled after Japanese teacher education system, which in flip, was borrowed from French model of instructor education.[1]

The teacher training institutions had been based on two levels – the intermediate and advanced colleges geared closer to teacher training for primary and junior secondary level. These institutions have been later changed into regular schools and normal universities. By 1920s, with tremendous adjustments in the whole Chinese society for modernization, the instructor training institutions turned to study and borrowed from the West, in particular from the U.S. This had a lot to do with students who were sent by the government to abroad in order to examine education system in the U.S. In 1922, the general public college was modified to a 6-3-3 version just like the U.S. Version (with 6 years of education at the primary level, 3 years at junior secondary and three year at the senior secondary.[2]

Along with this new system ,the diversification in teacher training institutions were also introduced and specialized teacher training colleges, regular schools and normal universities began to serve the purposes of teachers training at different stages of education and this completely changed teacher training programmes. With the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the improvement of instructor schooling entered into a new era.[3]

To meet the large call for to popularize education, the Soviet model was borrowed to further consolidate a 3-tier teacher training system even as retaining the impartial teacher training institutions that had existed earlier. The maximum dramatic change took place it was that each one of the instructor training institutions have become public ownership below the administration

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[1] Gopinathan, S., Tan, S., Fang, Y.P., Ponnusamy, L. D, Ramos, C., & Chao, E.. *Transforming Teacher Education: Redefining Professionals for 21st Century Schools*. (Singapore: National Institute of Education, 2008).

[2] Chen, Y., & Zhu, Y. *Teacher Education Research. East China Normal University Press*. (China: MOE, Development and Planning Department, 2011). See also *Analytical Report on the Development of National Education Enterprise. April 2011*(Internal circulation, 2003).

[3] Ibid.

of the central government, along with the writing and issuing of teaching packages, content and numerous institutional norms. Newly educated instructors had been assigned teaching posts through the authorities in a uniform way. Under an exceptionally centralized and planned system, trainer training in China has, for a long time, been run as "self- contained or closed" system.[4]

Thirty years later in 1979, with China's opening internationally, the academic agency embraced an energetic new age of reform and improvement. Law for Compulsory Education was issued in 1986, which legally mandated the constructing of an adequately trained, furnished and stable teaching force. This indicated a turning point in which the development of trainer schooling in China changed into connected with unparalleled significance. The Chinese government said that trainer schooling is a strategic degree and the "machine tool" for educational improvement.[5]

The government expanded financial investment, consolidated the infrastructure of instructor training institutions, laid emphasis on additional teaching training to more capable and competent teachers and research staff by means of encouraging academic studies, curriculum improvement and instructional reform to elevate the satisfactory of pre-service students and the quality of training.[6]

Scholarships have been supplied for students getting into training institutions and the recruited college students for teaching in schools on contract basis in order to meet the needs of teachers in exclusive areas. In-service teachers training became installed in massive scales and the schools for persevering with schooling for teachers in towns and counties were both reinstated or opened.[7]

Methodology

Research is qualitative and descriptive in nature in which the already available facts and information about the contents are critically analyzed. The data is collected through secondary sources which include the books, magazines and published articles. Since the data has been collected related to the new education policy in China, however, the old education policy has also

[4] Wang, J. School-based teacher professional development system: one elementary school's practice and its theoretical significance. In Zhou N.Z (Ed.). *Teacher education reform and teacher professional development: International vision and local practice*, (China: East China Normal University Press, 2007a).

[5] Wang, J. Teacher education in China: Current situation, issues and future trends. In Zhou N.Z (Ed.), *Teacher education reform and teacher professional development: International vision and local practice*. (China: East China Normal University Press, 2007b).

[6] Chen, Y., & Zhu, Y. *Teacher Education Research. East China Normal University Press*. (China: MOE, Development and Planning Department, 2011). See also *Analytical Report on the Development of National Education Enterprise. April 2011*(Internal circulation, 2003).

[7] Ibid

been focused and comparatively discussed for better understanding. The qualitative approach has been adopted since it was not possible to collect primary data due to lack of resources and accessibility limitations. Like all education based studies, this research does not claim to address the issue in completeness but one of the ways forward to understand the learning pedagogy and methodology of Chinese education system.

Recent Reforms in Teacher Education

As China reached its dreams for basically universalizing 9-year obligatory schooling in year 2000, the structure and social demand for schooling have changed with rapid expansion of education. The state, the society and the secondary colleges have positioned better expectations on teachers and the traditional instructor schooling system has been seemed as falling short in retaining up with the call for.[8]

Entering the new century, teacher education system in China has broken its conventional unbiased system and moved to a higher education of instructor schooling. The intermediate ordinary faculties fast disappeared due to mergers or their conversion into secondary or vocational faculties. "Consequently, the monopoly of teachers training institutions of teacher has been changed and is gone forever".[9]

In 2010, the Chinese authorities issued its guiding report, Outline of National Mid- and Long-term Educational Reforms and Developments (2010-2020), leading the Chinese education into a new decade. The outline emphasizes the significance and requirements for "strengthening the construction of the teaching force", which spells out the vision on restructuring the instructor schooling device for the near destiny.[10]

Nationwide Network of Teacher Preparation

Since 2008, China MOE, in collaboration with the World Bank, initiated a programme regarding improvement of requirements for primary and secondary school teachers, curriculum requirements for teachers training applications, accreditation standards for teacher schooling establishments and satisfactory of packages. It was decided that a system of teacher education will totally base on expert standards and the one that encourages innovations and is effective and sustainable in the long run.[11]

In 2002 and 2003, China MOE set up consultation organs for instructor schooling, which includes "Expert Committee for Teacher Education," "Expert Committee for ICT in Teacher Education," and "Expert Committee for Teacher Education Curriculum Resources." These Committees were entrusted to conduct studies; consultancy and other offerings on problems

[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] China MOE. *Outline of National Mid- and Long-term Educational Reform and Development (2010-2020),* (China: People's Education Press, 2010).
[11] Ibid.

faced by teacher in general education in order to make the system that follow the principle of democracy and scientific research.[12]

In September 2003, China MOE released "National Teacher Education Network Alliance Plan" with the 6 key normal universities beneath the direct administration of MOE performing as the primary collaborating institutions. The objectives were to set up an elevated system of teacher education which includes the ordinary universities and colleges, satellite TV network and internet. They decided to work in collaboration and to re-construct and exchange teacher education assets.[13]

Special training was designed for new teachers at some point of the probation period to help them to meet the criteria. The government additionally holds schooling programmes for educational administrators, mainly college principals in order to enhance their managerial capabilities and leadership skills. The government has granted sabbatical leave i.e half year every five years for headmasters and teachers for improving their qualifications.[14]

Innovations in Pre-service Education

With the increasing expectations and demand for elevating the professional quality of primary and secondary instructors, mainly below the deepening of the country wide, curriculum reforms for primary and secondary teachers training was initiated by the end of last century. Teacher training institutions were assigned different tasks to reform and up- to- date curriculum and introduced new pedagogical skills in teaching. In fact, lots of them have taken the initiative in actively developing their own strategies to meet the demand.[15]

Since 2007, East China Normal University (ECNU) initiated a reform plan that ambitions to polish the pre-service college students' professional abilities and cultivate high quality future instructors. Meng Xiancheng Academy, named after the primary President of ECNU, has been set up to offer skill based knowledge to hone up their fundamental social and management capabilities and emerge as greater holistically evolved future teachers who're competitive inside the job market place.[16]

Such activity-based training has enriched the curriculum and classroom teaching in instructor education programs and improves their quality of aiming to train future teachers in the right direction. Facing extra competitive in the

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[12]Ibid.

[13]Paine, L.W., & Fang, Y.P. Reform as hybrid model of teaching and teacher development in China. *International Journal for Education Research*, 45(4-5), (2006): 279-289.

[14] Ministry of Education. *Training Requirements for Primary and Secondary School Principals*, (2012). Retrieved from www.gov.cn/fwxx/bw/jyb/content_2267061.htm, accessed 9th November, 2016.

[15]Gao, D.. (Ed.) *Research and Practice in the Curriculum of Normal Universities and Colleges* , (Tianjin People's Press, 2000).

[16]Ibid.

process market, different ordinary universities have also started out similar activities. For a long term in China, in teacher training institutions three primary areas were focused, namely, the ones that specialize in disciplinary expertise, pedagogical know-how and teaching practice respectively. How to coordinate the three areas of publications properly has remained the focal point of discussion around reform in teacher education curriculum and pedagogy.[17]
As better professional standards are required for future teachers globally, key national ordinary universities have experimented with restructuring the curriculum provision for instructor education software offerings. North-East China Normal University has modified its curriculum into three wide modules: liberal arts, pedagogy in a special discipline, and teacher expert schooling. The liberal arts include humanities, social sciences, natural sciences, thinking and art-related publications.[18]

Current pre-service teacher training in China is provided at the tertiary schooling stage by means of three specialized colleges, four years undergraduate degree studies and post-graduate diploma or coursework. The conventional eight-week teaching practice has been criticized as being too short for teacher trainers and schools find it disrupting or too busy to have a tendency to students' instructors coming for practicum.[19]

In the rural regions of Southwest China, teacher shortages had been common problem and classroom teaching has been of low quality. Beginning teachers are unwilling to provide their services in poorly facilitated rural schools. After a good deal piloting, in 2006, Southwest University set up practicum faculties in rural areas where their pre-service students are sent for teaching practice guided by means of the subject specialists. Since then these colleges have come to be lengthy-term stable bases for the college's coaching practice.[20]
In the rural colleges, the teacher students spend one semester to teach their own classes and specialize in the following responsibilities:

- Planning and observing lesson plans, doing trial lessons and evaluating coaching, tutoring teacher students after class. They teach 4-15 hours in a week.
- Taking charge of the class and deal the students' problems, organize class activities and act as a class administrators.

[17]Ibid.
[18]Paine, L.W., Fang, Y.P., & Wilson, S. Entering a culture of teaching: Teacher induction in Shanghai. In E. Britton, L. Paine, D. Pimm, & S. Raizen, *Comprehensive teacher induction: Systems for early career learning* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003): 20-82
[19]Ibid.
[20]Sargent, T., & Hannum, E. *Doing More with Less: Teacher Professional Learning Communities in Resource-Constrained Primary Schools in Rural China*, (2009). Retrieved from at http://repository.upenn.edu/gansu papers/14. (October, 2011).

- Conducting academic studies which are mixed with the specifics of their disciplinary areas and observing the school needs and traits to identify and pursue studies of subject matter in their very own interest.
- Assisting the practicum schools' training and coaching reform tasks. They are endorsed to offer workshops to the school teaching staff related to their very own issue areas, educate teachers on using ICT in schools, develop teaching aids and restore broken facilities.
- They additionally take part inside the local communities' tradition, science and technology activities.[21]

Strengthening In-service Teacher Training

The new call by the teachers for his or her continuing education has challenged the adequacy and quality of traditional in-service provision institutions (which include refresher schools and faculties of training at city and district stages) and for this reason the faculties of education at city stage had been merged into regular universities or colleges to become school for adult training.[22]

On the other hand, however, the instructor refresher schools have been consolidated with new roles and functions such as professional development related to management, research service, improvement and use of educational records assets demanded by the neighborhood communities, townships and rural villages. These nonetheless independently run trainer schooling institutions on the county level and play indispensible roles in providing teachers with training for instructors in the rural regions.[23]

In-service teacher training courses offered in town or district schools was the main component of ongoing training for instructors. Time management of teachers at work and the susceptible connection of the content taught during training with practical day-to-day experiences had been two of the major complaints of instructor participants in general.[24] Student teachers are inducted into teacher learning communities where teaching, movement studies, action research and expert studying were combined.[25]

Professional development institutions intended to build "teacher centered in-service training'' mainly focused on permitting individuals to develop their confidence and experience of SBCD (school based curriculum

[21] Ibid.
[22] Shi, X., & Englert, P.A.J. Reform of Teacher Education in China, *Journal of Education for Teaching*, Vol. 34, no. 4, 2008, (2008): 347 – 359.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Paine, L.W., & Fang, Y.P. Reform as hybrid model of teaching and teacher development in China, (2006) *International Journal for Education Research*, 45(4-5): 279-289.
[25] Sun, Y., & Zhao, M.. Teacher professional development schools: Exploration, experience and learning. *Research in Teacher Education* 1, (2004).

development)".[26] In this manner, faculty-based instructor development has combined teaching, research and professional development into one entity.[27]

Online Teaching Training

With fast development of technology and its implementation in China, on-line studying has end up an important choice for elementary and secondary school teachers. More these days, China MOE prepared a sequence of on line training activities, inclusive of those for principals, teacher leaders, magnificence administrators (homeroom instructors) and new curriculum training. The "National Plan for Teacher Education Network Alliance" stated earlier has a main project to expand excessive high-quality teacher education sources to serve for the want of on-line instructor continuing training. Currently, this Alliance includes 14 participants, of which 09 are ordinary universities inclusive of the 06 national key normal universities. In 2011, 07 of the establishments have become national web sites for on line learning for teachers advocated by China MOE.[28]

However, two tremendous moves stand out as the result of the reform. First, a link was developed between ''legislative measures'' and 'academic regulation'' with the general making plans system. The Teachers Law and the Educational Law of the People's Republic of China have been made and publicized in latest years, in which instructors' rights and obligations and academic financing have been stipulated.[29]

Second, there has been a significant improvement, though some distance from adequate, in instructors' treatment. Almost all simple and secondary instructors have been paid their full salaries in the January 1995. Different measures were taken to make sure that instructors cashed the IOUs they collected over the preceding years.[30] Besides, new situations are making new demanding situations to the improvement of instructor training and to conduct studies within the field.[31]

Respect for Teachers

In 1983, the Chinese authorities introduced the primary ''Teachers' Day'' in Chinese history and has seeing that been celebrating it on 9th September

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[26] Xu, Y. School-based teacher development through a school-university collaborative project: a case study of a recent initiative in China. *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, Vol. 41, no.1, (2009): 49 – 66.

[27] Wang, J. Teacher education in China: Current situation, issues and future trends. In Zhou N.Z (Ed.), *Teacher education reform and teacher professional development: International vision and local practice*. (East China Normal University Press, 2007).

[28] China MOE. *Outline of National Mid- and Long-term Educational Reform and Development (2010-2020)*, (People's Education Press, 2010).

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ma, S. Teacher management. In B. Zhang (Ed.). *Chinese education almanac 1995*, (Beijing: People's Education Press, 1995): 261-263

[31] Ji, X. *Teacher education: Past and present: China educational sciences*, (Beijing: The Central Institute of Educational Research, 1986).

every year.[32] Many junior and secondary school teachers have been promoted for their contribution. In mid 1980s the public's attitudes toward teachers improved significantly.[33]

Improvement of Treatment of Teachers

Besides constructing up the public's respect for teachers, the authorities additionally made efforts to improve the treatment for instructors. Since 1978, there was a huge boom in Chinese instructors' salaries and their living situations have additionally been advanced. Teachers acquire subsidies primarily based on the time of teaching and also bonuses which can be calculated at 10% in their salaries.[34]

In 1985 the Chinese authorities decided that instructor education institutions ought to be orientated toward general education, especially in the rural regions where certified and devoted teachers were considered crucial for its development. Proponents of the former argued that professional development should be the purpose of teachers training because these trainers will be the future teachers of the country.[35]

Accreditation of Normal Institutions

To meet the big call for pre-service teachers, a massive variety of ordinary institutions had introduced since 1978. Besides, a few universities, majority of the institutions without having previous experience in any respect also involved in teacher education.[36]

Many teachers discovered themselves not able to keep up with the demands of social and educational development. In the ultimate 10 years, many regular faculties have been promoted and became regular faculties and, in flip, many normal faculties become normal universities.[37]

Improvement in Qualification of Teachers

The qualification system has gone through different reforms. It was decided that the people who were interested in teaching must receive qualification certificate and the teacher's qualification exam will be held nationally. In the past, the exam was held on the provincial level. But now the

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[32] Defeng, Li. Modernization and teacher education in China. *Teaching and Teacher Education, 15(2),* (1999): 182

[33] Yiming,Z. and YanPing, F. Characterizing Reform and C hange of Teacher Education in China in the N ew Era. *Journal of Research, Policy & Practice of Teachers & Teacher Education,* 1(1), (2011): 30-44

[34] Defeng, Li. Modernization and teacher education in China. *Teaching and Teacher Education,* 15(2), (1999): 183

[35] Shen, A. Teacher Education and National Development in China. *Journal of Education, 176*(2), (1994): 57—71

[36] Zhang, J. Teacher preparation in China. In J. Lane (Ed.), *Ferment in education*: *A look abroad,* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995): 148—156.

[37] Department of Teacher Education of State Education Commission *Teacher training and professional development in China*. (Beijing: State Education Commission, 1995).

prospective teachers will appear for two types of exam for all level i.e the written examination and the interview.[38]

Promotions and Rewards

Different expert titles were set for each primary and secondary teacher. Mostly, the teachers need to attend additional courses and certificates for promotions. However, in 2015, the Rural Teacher Support Programme was initiated which was mainly concerned with the promotion of rural teachers apart from publications and foreign language abilities. Special-Grade was introduced for teachers as an honour and their salary was based within 15% of the full range of all instructors.[39]

Salaries

Reform in the teachers' earnings structure, delivered in 2009, provided a new way of calculating teachers' salaries totally based on performance. In the new system, instructor income consists of 4 parts: post, grade, performance and allowance. Among them, the first two are the fundamental salaries and next two are totally based on their contributions.[40]

Conclusion

Since it has been argued that in term of quality education, China is providing the largest quality based education system which fulfills the market demands. The learning process consists of various grades which are designed to cater the needs of society. In this context, the role ministry of China has taken commendable step at policy level to further increase the quality of education. There is no denial to the fact that the new strategy not only provides legal guidelines and administrative methodology but deeply focuses teachers' capacity building which, undoubtedly, is considered the pillar of Chinese education system. Teacher education in China commenced from mastering and borrowing models and studies of different international locations. Nevertheless, reform and development must replicate the distinctiveness, creativity and development of China's own teacher education. As a massive rising modern state, China also wishes to take upon itself the responsibility, duty and capacity to offer first-class exercise and cases of achievement to teacher training globally especially within the place of policy making, curriculum improvement, models of pre- and in-service teacher development and so forth. Teacher training in China should broaden in dynamic interplay with global practices, which, perhaps, is the new route for reform and development.

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[38]OECD. *Education in China: A Snapshot*, (Organization and management of Education in China, 2016). Retrieved from https: www. Oecd.org\china\Edu-in-China-a-snapshot. Pdf, accessed August, 2018).

[39]Yiming, Z. and YanPing,F.Characterizing reform and change of teacher education in China in the new era. *Journal of Research, Policy & Practice of Teachers & Teacher Education*, 1(1), (2011): 30-44

[40]Ibid.

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CITIZENSHIP ISSUES FACED BY PAKISTAN'S PAKHTUNS COMMUNITY DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF REFUGEES FROM AFGHANISTAN: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract

This article clarifies the ambiguities related to the citizenship/ nationality of the Pakhtun community in Pakistan from the historical and legal perspective. Since the arrival of refugees from Afghanistan who are predominantly Pakhtuns, the Pakhtun nationals/citizens of Pakistan are fighting on two fronts simultaneously: one to accommodate and facilitate the vulnerable refugees who have lost almost everything at their motherland; and second to fights for equality in the country which is guaranteed under the Constitution of Pakistan. The article explain from the historical and legal context, the relationship of the Pakhtuns with their fellow Afghans, who have taken refuge in their land and with Pakistan in who's jurisdiction their territory falls due to which they are their citizens by default.

Keywords: Refugees, Afghanistan, Citizenship, Pakhtuns, Law, Pakistan

Introduction

Citizenship or nationality has been called upon to be everything to every individual in the world such as identity, social welfare, recognition, political and civil rights, the consciousness and common good of the community.[1] The term citizenship and nationality are frequently used synonymously and that a number of laws at domestic level use only the former concept. Due to the presence of Afghan refugees, there are certain

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[1] Liebich, A., 'Citizenship in its International Dimension', in A. Liebich & D. Warner with J. Dragovic (eds.), Citizenship East and West. (London: Kegan Paul International, 1995): 27

ambiguities related to Pakhtuns' citizenship/nationality in Pakistan, as majority of these refugees are also Pakhtuns. As it is a common practice among the Pakhtuns of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces, who are the nationals of Pakistan to write the word "Afghan" in the column relating to national (Qaum) as they are of Afghan origin. If one looks back into the history, the territory constituting Pakistan as well as India, Bangladesh, Afghanistan etc.; were parts of the Mughal Empire. After the British occupation of the Sub-Continent, some parts of Afghanistan were annexed into the British-India by the then British rulers and a boundary line known as Durand Line was drawn in between the British India and Afghanistan. Those Afghans who came within the territory of the British-India became their citizens by default. After the independence of Pakistan in 1947, all those people living in the territorial jurisdiction of the country became their citizens by default.

Until 1970's there was no issue related to the nationality of Pakhtuns in Pakistan but when the then Soviet Union attacked Afghanistan in 1979, due to which too many Afghans as a refugee came to Pakistan, then the confusion about the local Pakhtuns came to surface. This displaced Afghan population began to leave their native land during internal political disorders in 1970s. The subsequent occupation by the Soviet forces in December 1979 resulted in the world largest refugee crisis. Huge number of Afghan refugees crossed the Pak-Afghan border and settled in different parts of Pakistan, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and within few months, they started their business and become a visible entity of the area. These refugees deeply affected the culture, society, business, and law and order of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.[2] The affluent Afghan refugees become a permanent feature in the province as they purchased properties, possess National Identity Cards, passport, and settled in planned residential areas. In the tribal area, they have established ties with strong tribes through inter marriages and tribal links.

The Afghan refugees also spread in settled areas and brought with them upheaval in social and economic life of the province, and affected every aspect of life. The most instrumental causes of the smooth and rapid settlement of these refugees in the provinces are linguistic, cultural, and historical ties that existed between the population of the provinces and Afghans before migration. These similarities in terms of culture, language, and religion have facilitated the interaction between them, and have undermined the efforts to regularize the activities of these refugees in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochestan.[3] The Afghan refugees merged into

[2] Taha, and Aamir, History Culture and Cross-Border Migration: Impact of Afghan Refugees on Socio-Economic Environment of Peshawar. *International Journal of Independent Research and Studies* 1(4), (2012): 175. Retrieved from: SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2164925.

[3] Haris Gazdar, *Overview of Thematic Papers: Determinants and Drivers of Poverty Reduction in Rural Pakistan*, (Islamabad: Asian Development Bank, October 2005).

political and economic spheres of society.[4] Although millions of Afghan refugees have returned to Afghanistan since 2002, but still millions of them have yet to return, and among 3 million refugees who reside in Pakistan, 82 percent refugees have no immediate plans of return.[5] Since the last four decades Pakistan has remained host of the world's largest refugee population.

This research article will therefore investigate this confusion from legal as well as historical perspective along with possible solutions.

Historical Perspective

Historically Pakhtuns are known by numerous connected names. 'Afghan', denoting in juridical sense a national of Afghanistan, is interchangeable with 'Pakhtun'. Many Pakhtuns living in the north-western part of Pakistan are very much aware of their ethnicity but still mentioning their identity as 'Afghan' in the official documents; a practice that began in the raj.[6] Elaborate genealogies have been woven around Qais Abdul Rashid, who is assumed to be the primal ancestor of all Pakhtuns. Pakhtun genealogies originated in seventeenth-century Mughal courts and were written by court scribe Naematullah. These genealogies eventually found their way to British colonial ethnographies and are sometimes mentioned in modern books on the region. Their only relevance today is that they sketch a very rough chart of the relationship of different tribes to each other, or different lineages within tribes. Under the prevailing classifications, Pakhtuns are further classified into these four main tribal groupings: the Sarbani, Bhittani, Ghurghust and Karlani. The first three were considered to be the sons of Qais, while the fourth, Karlani, was an adopted son. The Sarbanis are divided into two branches: the Sharkbun and the Kharshbun. The most significant tribes of this branch today are the Sherani, the Tareen, the Urmer, the Durranis, Khalils, Mohmands, Daudzai, Chamkanis, Yousafzai, Shinwari and Tarkalani. The second branch, the Bhittani, consists of the Bhittanis, Niazis, the Lodhis, Marwats, Babars, Gandapurs and Kundis, and the Ghilzai confederacy. The Ghilzais are one of the largest nomadic populations in the world, known for their seasonal migratory herders called *kuchis*. The Hotak, Sulaiman Khel, Kharoti, Ali Khel, Nasar and Taraki are the main Ghilzai tribes. The Ghurghust branch includes the Kakar, Mando Khel, Musa Khel and Panri tribes, who inhabit districts of

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[4] Khattak, S. G., & Bokhari, S., *Household Food Economy Assessment: Refugee Camp Shamshatoo, NWFP Pakistan*, (Islamabad: Sustainable Development Policy Institute, 2004).

[5] Taha, and Aamir, History Culture and Cross-Border Migration: Impact of Afghan Refugees on Socio-Economic Environment of Peshawar. *International Journal of Independent Research and Studies* 1(4), (2012): 175. Retrieved from: SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2164925

[6] Abubakar Siddique, *The Pashtun Question: The Unresolved Key to the Future of Pakistan and Afghanistan*, (C. Hurst & Co., 2014): 11

Balochistan Province in Pakistan. The Safi and Gandun tribes are found in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, the Tribal Areas and in eastern Afghanistan. The fourth major grouping was little known to Mughal scribes. The Karlani preserve aspects of pristine tribal organization, supplemented by intricate traditional laws. Its members live today on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border. The Karlani include some of the most famous Pashtun tribes, among them the Afridis, the Khattaks, Mangal, Zadran, Muqbil, Zazi (Jaji), Bangash, Mehsud, Orakzai, Khugiani, Wardak, Turi and Wazirs. This great tribal maze makes the Pashtuns the world's largest tribally organized society.[7]

The history of Pakhtuns' dominance over Afghanistan as a state began in 1747, when Ahmad Shah Durrani occupied Delhi along with other parts of united India and stretched over his empire as far as to Kashmir, Delhi, Arabian Sea and the little-Tibet. The present shape of Afghanistan's territorial boundaries is the product of century long process of diplomacy and wars formally known as 'Great Game'- a geopolitical competition among Great Britain, Soviet Union and Iran. The period saw three Anglo-Afghan wars, many other violent occurrences with external powers, revolts and struggle for succession within country and the internal incursion of Afghan leader Amir Abdur Rehman Khan.[8] While accurate current census data is lacking, it can be estimated that Pakhtuns are projected to make up almost Afghanistan's half population and they also constitute largest minority of Pakistan, constituting almost 15–20 per cent of the nation's population. Originally the motherland of Pakhtun's was located in-between the central Afghanistan's Hindu Kush Mountains and the River Indus that bisect Pakistan, although Pakhtun communities are now spread-over a huge area. In northern Afghanistan, the Pakhtun population extends to the Amu Darya (Oxus River) border with Central Asia, where Pakhtun communities have grown substantially over the past century. The southern Pakistani port city of Karachi, on the Arabian Sea, is today home to one of the region's largest urban Pakhtun populations, the result of massive economic migration.[9] Afghanistan has remained a buffer between the competing interests of Britain and Russia since 1830s until the beginning of the 20th Century. It was during the British-Russian Great Game in the region that led to the creation of Durand Line in 1893, the agreement which demarcated a

[7] Abubakar Siddique, *The Pashtun Question: The Unresolved Key to the Future of Pakistan and Afghanistan,* (C. Hurst & Co., UK, 2014): 13.

[8] Barry, M. *Kabul's Long Shadows: Historical Perspectives,* (Princeton: NJ: Lichtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, 2011)

[9] Abubakar Siddique, *The Pashtun Question: The Unresolved Key to the Future of Pakistan and Afghanistan,* (C. Hurst & Co., UK, 2014).

line between British India, and Afghanistan and now separates Afghanistan and Pakistan.[10]

Afghanistan remained independent from super powers influence until the initial stages of cold war. However, when the cold war intensified the Soviet began to increase its influence in Afghanistan and on April 27, 1978, the Soviet Union installed a pro-communist regime in Kabul under the leadership of Nur Muhammad Taraki. The new government attempted to bring drastic liberal reforms in the country, which was not supported by the country social structure.[11] In reaction to Taraki reforms, the religious leaders started Jihad against the communist government and civil war began between the forces of Taraki and resistance groups. In December 1979 the Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan with the aim to stabilize the Soviet backed communist regime of Afghanistan. The Red Army invaded the People Democratic Republic of Afghanistan for consolidating its client state where the politico-military situation was deteriorating due to the growing strength of Mujahedeen. In the beginning, the Soviet decided to provide only logistic support to the Afghan forces against the insurgents, but later on the Soviet directly become involved in the most rugged mountainous country of the world, and with the most expert warriors of the world.

Afghan refugees impact on Pakistani Pakhtun Citizens

With the rise of the nation states in the late 18th to late 20th centuries, new ingredients of definition began to surface; ideas of nationality defined by common essentials and the right to live in the nation of birth rather than of ancestry began to overlay or displace the primacy of kinship. Perceiving something of a sea-change in bases of identity in the modern era, historians and social scientists have for some time been grappling with an attempt to define the concept of national identity.[12] However Pakhtun's history for at least the past six centuries has been shaped by war, invasion and endemic local violence. These ordeals have shown that the Pakhtun identity is resilient. While former nemeses such as the Mughals exist today only in history books, the Pakhtuns have survived to constitute a nation in the archetypal sense. But Pakhtuns, as a whole, have never been fully integrated into a single empire, state or political system—though they have formed empires of their own. Afghans have been at war since four decades. The long war has lifted devastating impact on the lives of Afghans. Millions of

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[10] Collins, J. *Understanding War in Afghanistan,* (Washington DC: National Defence University Press, 2011): 5-7

[11] Grau, L., & Cress, M. *The Soviet Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost,* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002): xxii

[12] E.J.Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, (London: Verso, rev. edn., 1991); E.Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith (eds), *Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); M.Fulbrook (ed.).

Afghans have been killed, injured, and have been forced to leave their homes. The prolong conflict has destroyed the Afghan social fabric, the state institutions and their country's infrastructure.[13]

As Pakhtuns today live in two distinct neighboring and sometimes hostile states; which have strikingly different political arrangements. The social make-up of Pakhtun communities varies according to whether they are rural or urban, the degree of their inclusion or separation from surrounding societies, their level of embracement of development and modernity, and the amount of the pressure they have experienced during the preceding four decades of turmoil. The mother-tongue of majority of Pakhtuns is Pashto, an Indo-European language. In fast growing urbanized regions and areas with diverse racial populations, bilingualism is common among the Pakhtuns. Embedded in a tribal organization of society, *Pakhtunwali* embrace principles that are common with the larger neighboring civilizations. However, its importance is that it has a set of essential principles of individual and joint behavior that are seen as specific to Pakhtuns.[14] Since the line of separation drawn in 1893 by Sir Mortimer Durand, which makes a boundary in between Pak-Afghan and was accepted by the then king of Afghanistan in a treaty that same year; but there have been no restrictions on the movement of Pakhtuns (Afghans) on both sides of the border, and shouldn't be confused with refugees' crossing into Pakistan. While the population on both sides shares a common ethnic identity, they hardly consider the line to be an international boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakhtuns living on both sides of the Durand Line have been moving back and forth across the divide; even living with their family on one side and pursued employment on the other side, often on a seasonal basis.

Keeping in view these facts in mind, one can imagine that the issues related to Afghan refugees in Pakistan are very complicated. The continued Afghan war and disturbance and the porous border between Pakistan and Afghanistan has kept the refugee inflow alive. Pakistan has demonstrated ambivalence and true generousness in its dealings with Afghan refugees. However, the huge size of refugees and their prolong stay have greatly impacted Pakistan's political, economic and social institution. Unfortunately refugee crisis were not resolved even after the end of Soviet war in Afghanistan due to the ensuing civil war and uncertainty. One of the most important aspects which is frequently overlooked by all the stakeholders is that due to the presence of Afghan refugee in the Pakhtun dominated areas, these Pakhtuns of Pakistani origin themselves also confronting a great number of hardships in their daily life, which include among others, the

[13] Jackson, A. *The Cost of Afghan War: Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978 – 2009. P.3.* (Oxfam International, 2009): 3

[14] Abubakar Siddique, *The Pashtun Question: The Unresolved Key to the Future of Pakistan and Afghanistan,* (C. Hurst & Co., UK, 2014): 14

blocking of their identity documents, racism, suspicion and prejudice from the government functionaries. Regardless of their geographical origin, all Pakhtuns are usually describing themselves as 'Afghans' in Pakistan also as mentioned earlier as well. Therefore we should never forget the sacrifices rendered by this community for welfare and prosperity of their motherland.

The Relevant Citizenship Law Position

The predominant notions of contemporary citizenship, as articulated in both popular and scholarly discussions, envisage that populations are ordered within nation state borders by rules of citizenship that acclaim 'national belongings' as the justifiable foundation of connection in modern states. Therefore, citizenship of a nation is described by the two fundamental principles: a congruence in-between territorial state and their national community; national belongings as their basis of rights and duties of people as well as their joint identity. Thus, what citizenship of a nationality indicates is a territorially bounded populace with a particular set of rights and duties, eliminating others on the basis of nationality.[15]

Pakistan enforced its first citizenship law, the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951 ("the Act"), on 13 April 1951. Before its creation in 1947, Pakistan was part of the British-Indian colony. Pakistan inherited several procedural and substantive laws as colonial legacy. Nonetheless, the British-India colony did not have any law on the issue of citizenship. The Act was especially drafted to accommodate diverse group of individuals then residing in Pakistani territory. Section 3 of the Act regulates the citizenship of all segments of population.[16]

Nevertheless, it is international law's guiding principle that it is for every state to set up its own rules and decide under its laws who are their nationals. Individual is not only connected through nationality to a state but is also connected through it to international law as well. Based on these principles the Government of Pakistan on the 19th of February 1962 made a declaration vide letter No. 11/15-M (501) TA, regarding Afghan Tribes, who were declared as indigenous tribes of Pakistan and were allowed to enjoy all facilities as are available to other citizens. As discussed above there should be no confusion about the status of Afghan refugees as there is no statutory provision of law expressly deals with the status of citizenship of refugees in general and Afghan refugees in particular in Pakistan, as they have been given only temporary stay here to remain till the normalization of situation in their motherland.

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[15]David Cesarani and Mary Fulbrook, *Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe*, (Routledge, 1996):18.

[16]Faryal Nazir, *Report on Citizenship Law Pakistan*, (Italy: European University Institute Badia Fiesolana, 2016):1



Copy of letter No: F. 22 F. I (501)/62, dated: 10.3.62. from the

GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN

(MINISTERY OF STATE AND FRONTIER REGION RAWALPINDI)

To the

Secretary of West Pakistan,
Home Secretary, Lahore.

Subject: Declaration of Hazara as local tribesman of Quetta Division.

I am directed to refer to your express letter No: 11/15-M (501) TA, dated: the 19th February 1962, and to my that The Government of Pakistan agree that Afghan Tribes, as detailed below which are at present treated as Semi-Indiganous tribes Quetta Division, should be declared Indiganous tribes of Pakistan and they may be allowed to enjoy all facilities as are available to other Indiganous local tribes.

1. Hazara
2. Durrani
   Barakzai
   Muhammadzai — Main Section
   Boorazai
   Others.
3. Yusafzai
4. Ghilzai
   Ander
   Kharot — Main Section
   Nasir
   Sulemankhel
   Others.

Another area of great concern in majority of the Muslim countries is related to women, where equality of citizenship is often declared in their constitutions, but it is not enforced in practice and Pakistan is no exception. Despite formal declaration of gender equality, women are not yet considered as being equal to men. Women are also very aware that equal social status and rights are a precursor to equal citizenship. They are struggling against this gendered approach of the law. In the 1973 Constitution of the country, male and female citizens are declared equal, however, there is a double standard resulting in the different treatment of men and women. Women struggle to balance the relationships between men and women by stressing the need to respect equal citizenship as outlined in the nation's Constitution. Despite discriminations and difficulties of everyday life in Pakistan, women are becoming more and more aware of the urgency to be considered equal citizens. They are beginning to complain about the violations of their rights at various forums, which then try to attract national attention and discourses. The fact that asserting gender equality and equal citizenship would further strengthen the regime, as women constitutes nearly fifty percent of the nation.[17]

Under the Pakistan Citizenship Act of 1951, married women are accorded an unusual treatment, by virtue of which a woman of foreign origin is entitled to the Pakistan's citizenship on the ground of marriage to a man

[17] Linda C. McClain & Joanna L. Grossman, Gender Equality; *Dimensions Of Women's Equal Citizenship*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009): 390-406.

having Pakistani nationality by birth, migration or descent.[18] Such a woman can also assert her right of citizenship even though her husband has died who was otherwise a national of Pakistan or was legally entitled to its nationality. While on the other hand those women having Pakistani nationality and have married foreigner such as Pakhtun women of Pakistani origin having married to Afghan refugees living here for nearly four decades and having children, etc; have been denied this right even though the Constitution of the country guarantees equal status to them and have been held just by the courts of country also as mentioned in a famous case below as well.

In one of the famous cases titled *Sharifan vs. Federation of Pakistan*, the constitutionality of Section 10 of the Act, was under consideration.[19] The petitioner being a woman having Pakistan's nationality and married to an Indian national claimed the citizenship for husband which was refused. However, Section 10 of the Citizenship Act only permits a woman of foreign origin to attain the country's citizenship on the ground of marriage if their husband is of Pakistani origin. On the other hand there is no corresponding provision of law which entitles a man of foreign origin marrying a woman of Pakistani origin to obtain nationality on marital bases. In this case, the petitioner argued that women should be given equal treatment in Pakistan and a man of foreign origin marrying a woman having Pakistan's nationality should be permitted to obtain Pakistan's nationality on the ground of marriage. The court unfortunately rejected the petitioner's claim with reasons that such protections can only be granted to women marrying men of Pakistani origin by keeping in view the women's position under Private International Law. The court rejected the plea of equality clause as guaranteed under the 1971 Constitution (Art. 25).

Still gender inequality in citizenship laws in Pakistan is a relevant issue, though the 1973 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan guarantees equal status to all citizens before the law irrespective of their gender as mentioned above. All those women of Pakistani nationality who have married to foreigners such as Afghan refugees etc; have been denied the citizenship of Pakistan, which was taken by the Federal Shariat Court in its suo moto jurisdiction and declared that it is against the Constitution which guarantees equal status to all the citizens and also against the spirit of Islam. The federal government appealed against it in the Supreme Court of Pakistan and still pending before it since 2007.

Conclusion

It can be concluded that citizenship/nationality entitles an individual to a variety of specific rights and duties; such as rights to property, political

[18] Government of Pakistan, *Section 10, the Pakistan Citizenship Act*, (1951).

[19] Sharifan vs. Federation of Pakistan, *The All Pakistan Legal Decisions (PLD)*, (Lahore : Punjab Educational Press, 1998): 59

representation and participation, residence, assorted benefits and, usually associated responsibilities to the public at large. Citizenship has wider, affective connotations too: the sense of belonging to a broader community, expressed in symbols and values, and the often quite vehement emotional identification which may be associated with that wider community of belonging. Conversely, exclusion from citizenship may be associated with experiences ranging from the relatively passive lack of entitlement to vote through infinitely more problematic and unpleasant aspects of life as 'aliens' in a not always hospitable host country. In its most frequently cited passage as to the meaning of nationality, the ICJ held that: '[N]ationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interest and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties.'[20]

Pakhtuns who make a sizable portion of the country's population and who are the indigenous people of the land as declared in above notification as well should not be denied or confused their citizenship of the country on the pretext of Afghan refugees. They have already made too many sacrifices for the nation and progressively working for the development of Pakistan. Pakhtuns are always at the forefront whenever there is a need for the security and prosperity of the country. It is the Pakhtun community who has suffered too many hardships in the form of terrorism, security, scarcity of employment opportunities, housing problems, Kalashnikov and narcotic culture and now the citizenship related issues due to the presence of these Afghan refugees in their areas.

Instead of focusing on their problems and hardships which this community has suffered due to the arrival of these refugees from Afghanistan since 1979, the government authorities are further aggravating their problems. It is the responsibility of the governmental authorities to keep their house in order by maintaining all the relevant record of these refugees in their custody in order to avoid such confusions in future which can create problems for their own Pakhtun community. Government should formulate a comprehensive policy related to these refugees.

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[20] European Convention on Nationality, Council of Europe, 6 November 1997, ETS 166, which defines 'nationality' as 'the legal bond between a person and a State that does not indicate the person's ethnic origin' (Art. 2).

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DISRUPTION OF THE STEREOTYPICAL GENDER CONSTRUCTION THROUGH AFGHAN WOMEN'S VOICES IN KHALID HOSSEINI'S *A THOUSAND SPLENDID SUNS*

Muhammad Shakil ur Rehman[*] & Salman Anwar[**]

Abstract

The paper aims to explore Khaled Hosseini's A Thousand Splendid Suns(2007) from the deconstructive perspective of gender construction through the untraditional and challenging role of women in patriarchal Afghan society. Hosseini is one of the acclaimed Afghan-American novelists whose art speaks against the concerns of discrimination and segregation on ethnic, religious and gender basis. His novels are deeply entrenched with his own observations and experiences to portray the grim realities and the woes of Afghan society that is badly torn by the unending wars on its soil. The deconstructive approach challenges the taken-for-granted patriarchal socio-cultural norms of Afghan society represented in A Thousand Splendid Suns. Women characters engage in diverse performances that question the stability of gender construction in the novel. The variability of gender in the novel depends upon performativity of the characters. In their actions, they generate multiple shades of gender identities while deviating from norms of masculinity and femininity. So performances of the characters in the novel determine their gender identities in their social existence, their sexual labelling has nothing to do with their gender identification. Therefore, the novel exhibits the stereotypical and patriarchal norms prevalent in Afghan society that are used as a justification for the persecution and discrimination of women on gender basis. The paper thus argues that the country's rampant gender stereotypical standards are resisted and challenged by the performativity of women characters. Furthermore, the research presents an

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innovative approach to study gender construction in a feudal Afghan society through its interrogation of gender stereotyping.

Keywords: Afghan, gender construction, patriarchy, deconstruction, resistance, stereotypical norms, fluidity

Introduction

Background of the Research

Gender has recently been one of the hotly debated themes across all disciplines of the world to highlight inequality and discrimination. We are surrounded by gender stereotypical ideals[1] that are too deep-rooted to be challenged. For a long time, women were considered to be for the service of men. They are thought to be born for domestic chores and household responsibilities. Outside these assumed limitations, women had no identity. The deeply-rooted community system strengthens gender norms that support patriarchy. "Community system puts the relationship of women and men manifested in various forms and patterns of behavior that reflects the acceptance of the women and men in the position of each gender."[2]

However, the study problematizes taken-for-granted gender notions in Hosseini's *A Thousand Splendid Suns* (2007) from Judith Butler's deconstructive perspective. The deconstructive approach through the analytical exploration of the novel is to interrogate the prevalent stereotypical gender identities in Afghan society.

The applied theoretical framework contends to question the dichotomous categorization of gender that leads to discrimination and inequality. Basically, a deconstructive approach disrupts the binary concept of gender that is defined into two i.e. masculinity and femininity. As Heathcoten (1998) contends, "patriarchy institutes univocal and discrete meanings in its place, so that sex and gender come to be seen as one"(p.139). Butler (1999) explains it that gender refers to the societal and cultural constitution of "masculinity and femininity and its ascription to the male and / or female sex" (p.526).

Therefore, the binary concept of gender that is challenged by the set objectives of the research to be the key concern in the novel. The traditional feminist and gender schools of thought believe that identity can only be promoted and acknowledged if it conforms to the binary categorization – masculinity[3] and femininity, out of the dichotomous concept that is strange and unnatural to believe. However, the present research challenges this

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[1] Eckert & McConnell-Ginet, *Language and Gender,* (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003)

[2] Soray, "The Subalter Voice in A thousand Splendid Suns." *Jakarta,Journal Lingua Cultura* 9 (2), (2015). Retrieved from http://journal.binus.ac.id

[3] Ray, "Memory,Identity,Patriarchy: Projecting a Past in the Memoirs of Sara Suleri and Michael Ondaatje." *Modern Fiction Studies,* 39 (1), (1993): 37-58

stance of feminism by saying, "Gender is not an essential, biologically determined quality or an inherent entity but is repeatedly performed, based on, and reinforced by, societal norms"[4]

About the novelist and brief critical overview of the selected work

Khaled Hosseini, an Afghan-American writer, was born in 1965 in Afghanistan's capital, Kabul where his father served on key posts in Afghan foreign ministry. Hosseini earned an international acclaim and recognition due to the appeal of his major works – *A Thousand Splendid Suns, The Mountains Echoed and The Kite Runner*. Kumar commented on this by saying, "all these three novels have been best-sellers. These novels are set in the backdrop of the Afghan conflict. In these novels, he has discussed the harsh realities of the contemporary world" (2018,p.22). His works echo harsh and grim realities of the war-torn Afghan society with comparison to the modern world. His first book, *The Kite Runner* which was published in 2003 proved one of the best-selling novels with its more than 10 million copies being sold worldwide. Later one, this work was adapted into a film with[5] the same name in 2007. His second novel, the focus of the present study is *A Thousand Splendid Suns* was published in 2007. Hosseini's works represent the conservative, feudal and patriarchal background of Afghanistan that is badly affected by the unending wars on its soil by indigenous as well as foreign usurpers. His art is the manifestation of socio-political and economic issues of the Afghan nation from an historical background.

As Rebecca Stuhr (2017) comments,

> *"Hosseini tucks within the plots and narratives of his two novels events and details that address the state of civil strife and international hegemony in Afghanistan, including the U.S. involvement there beginning in 2001. Although, the details of his plots and interaction of his characters, Hosseini presents problems of racism and ethnocentrism, as well as exile and immigration." (p.65)*

The novel under study depicts the sordid relationship of patriarchy with the women of their society. Actually the novel represents a thematic shift from his earlier work, *The Kite Runner* that narrates the story of two boys. So, the entire plot revolves around a male character which may be named as the protagonist of the novel. However, this work manifests the lasting and challenging bond of attachment between the two key women figures-Mariam and Laila who confront the bitter repression and discrimination by the society they survive in. The tale of the two women symbolizes the

[4] Morgenroth & Ryan, "Gender Trouble in Social Psychology: How can Butler's Work Inform Experimental Social Psychologists Conceptualization of Gender?." *Front Psycol*, (2018)

[5] Sangia. *Stylistic Analysis of Khaled Hosseini's Novel.* (2009). Retrieved from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327976213 (accessed Octoberr 2019).

horrifying effects of socio-political uncertainty[6] in Afghanistan through the life-portrayal of major characters of the novel. Therefore, the novel is a historical narration of the story of Afghanistan that is the fictional representation of her instability and chaotic history of more than four decades by the novelist. For instance, chapter fifteen of the novel describes the political, historical unrest though the growth of its protagonist, Mariam. The chapter starts with the following words

On April 17, 1978, the year Mariam turned nineteen, a man named Mir Akbar Khyber was found murdered two days later, there was a large demonstration in Kabul. Everyone in the neighborhood was in the streets talking about it . . . Rasheed said that Mir Akbar Khyber had been a prominent Communist and that his supporters were blaming the murder on President Daud Khan's government.[7]

Mariam is Jalil's illegitimate daughter, who is one of the big businessmen in the city of Herat. Mariam's mother, Nana is a maid at Jalil's house since she got pregnant by him. As she gave birth to Mariam, this was taken as a question on the family's name and honor, so both, Nana and Mariam were forced by Jalil and his family to live in a remote house in a desolate village of Gul Daman. They were thrown away to suffer in insolation so that no questions can be asked about the so-called honour of patriarchy. Nana's attitude with her illegitimate daughter is very abusive and harsh, she conveys to Mariam that she is an unwanted being. So the novel exhibits the stereotypical and patriarchal norms prevalent in Afghan society that are used as a justification for the persecution and discrimination of women on gender basis. This is commented by Nana while talking to her daughter, "Learn this now and learn it well, my daughter: Like a compass needle that points north, a man's accusing finger always finds a woman always. You remember that Mariam".[8]

Jalil visits Nana and Mariam once a week for which Mariam keeps waiting the whole week irritably. She spends the whole week at the heels for her father's arrival. However, she is rebuked by her mother for saying that men are selfish and use women as scapegoats for their own crimes. Therefore, the novel is the best reflection of historical and socio-political issues through the projection of gender construction that are promoted as a result of the traditional feudal system.

Research Questions

1. What is Judith Butler's deconstructive approach to analyze the socio-cultural gender Construction?

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[6] Sangia. *Stylistic Analysis of Khaled Hosseini's Novel.* (2009).Retrieved from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327976213 (accessed Octoberr 2019).

[7] Khaled Hosseini, "*A Thousand Splendid Suns"*(London: Bloomsbury, 2007), 96-97.

[8] Khaled Hosseini, *A Thousand Splendid Suns,* (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), 7

2. How does the deconstructive gender approach challenge the Afghan gender stereotyping represented in Hosseini's *A Thousand Splendid Suns*?
3. Why does gender binary categorization is questioned by the research through the assertive performance of different characters that leads to gender discrimination and inequality?

Research Objectives

The study carries some of key research objectives which are as follow,

To explore the novel through Butler deconstructive perspective of gender that is one of the prolific literary works about Afghan society. The study attempts to highlight one of the pivotal concerns of gender constructed identities that are rampant in the patriarchal culture of Afghanistan. It is mostly misrepresented by the traditional disciplines of feminism and gender.

To probe the issue of gender equality through the research framework that carries much importance across all disciplines. Therefore, gender identity invites intellectual attention for analysis. It is one of the leading objectives of the article to critically scrutinize the problem to recommend the causes of gender stereotyping.

1. To explore gender concept out of the traditional stances of feminist and gender studies
2. To highlight the mistaken predominant notions of gender stereotyping that reinforce the concept of gender as a socio-cultural construct.
3. To study from the contexts of Afghan culture portrayed in the selected work that gender is a fluid entity,
4. It is one of the fundamental objectives of the study to recommend the causes of gender discrimination by its findings.

Literature Review

Khaled Hosseini is one of the distinguished South Asian fiction writers having international acclaim and recognition. His literary voice represents the repressed segments of society like minority people, children, immigrants and women. Hence, his novels have attracted scholarly attention across the globe due to their potent voice. The bulk of research to date focuses on his reputed work *A Thousand Splendid Suns* which is as follows

Lindsay B. Shapiro, a scholar from the University of California conducted research in 2010 with the topic of "Middle Eastern Women's issues: An Analysis of A Thousand Splendid Suns and The New York Times". The study explored the thematic discussion of the renowned novels and the coverage of Middle-Eastern women issues by the New York Times. Similarly, the similarity of the thematic identical issues can be found in Hosseini's *A Thousand Splendid Suns* with the coverage made by the reputed newspaper. It is highlighted that what is portrayed by the journalistic

community regarding the concerns of women and their rights, the similar themes are emphasized in the themes of novels too.

There is another notable research on the work, *A Thousand Splendid Suns* by Azma Kazemian in 2012 titled as," *A Thousand Splendid Suns*: Rhetorical Vision of Afghan women", It did a comparative analysis of how the representation of women in the novel can be compared to women's portrayal in the Western media. The gap between the two is highlighted by the research.

Soraya in 2015 researched the novel under the title of "The Subaltern Voice in A Thousand Splendid Suns" by illustrating that the hard life in Afghanistan has marginalized and presented women as a second sex in the society. The research applied Edward Said's Orientalism as a research framework to pursue the targeted results. Furthermore, women are considered the east to be suppressed and colonized. Gyatrispivak's *Can a Subaltern Speak* has been used for the explanation of its objectives. As Spivak puts a question that representation of marginalized class is not tolerated by the male-dominancy and their voice is silenced not to be equal with the powerful class of a society. Similarly, women don't find their voices to be heard equally in Hosseini's novel being a subaltern class of the country.

Lis Sugianti in 2018 did a comparative study of the two works of the two novelists under the topic of "Gender Discrimination in Orhan Pamuk's Snow and Khaled Hosseini's A Thousand Splendid Suns". It discussed the two works from the perspective of feminism theorized by Damewood's that is commonly known as the theory of gender discrimination. It projected the prevalent violence, discrimination of women in a patriarchal culture through the framework of the proposed theory. The hard and tough plight of women as a result of this culture has in-detail been evaluated. Women donot find equality in all walks of life due to the prevalence of a specific mind-set.

To wind up the review of literature, the bulk of study has been done on Khaled Hossein's art but no study is undertaken to look into the stereotypical gender construction from the modern deconstructive perspective that is pursued by the present research. The study goes against the traditional stances taken by feminism and gender theorists. The selected novel portrays the women's resistance to the stereotypical gender construction through their performativity.

Research Methodology

The study is a qualitative narrative research and follows descriptive-cum investigative method. The textual references from the novel are given for the support of the argument of this research. Butlerian deconstructive gender approach is applied as a research framework to pursue its targeted research objectives. Judith Butler is one of challenging modern American gender theorists, she was born in 1957 in American state of Cleveland Ohio. Her thoughts, more specifically to say, impacted many modern fields of

thought and disciplines like literature, politics, gender, anthropology,[9] linguistics and feminism etc. Her magnum opus work, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity and Bodies that matter (1990) is one of the bigger roots of her reputation and recognition internationally. The book was published first in 1990 and then due to its worldwide demand, later on it was translated into as many as twenty-seven languages of the world to quench the thirst of researchers, analysts and readers. It is mostly a criticism to,"a pervasive heterosexual assumption in feminist literary theory".[10]

Furthermore, Butler contends to establish, 'Gender Trouble' by her interrogation and disruption of gender binary concept that is originally supported by the traditional norms of patriarchal culture. Gender construction is wrongly associated with sexual categorization; however, actually gender is not linked with sexual categorization of male and female. Gender is a socio-cultural construction; its identities vary from culture to culture and performativity to performativity. It is, "not essential, biologically determined quality or an inherent entity but is repeatedly performed, based on, and reinforced by, societal norms"[11]. The theorist coined a reputed philosophical idea of gender performativity which states that gender is constructed through one's own repetitive actions. So it is not a natural characteristic of human being, rather it is a fluid entity that keeps on changing as per the variability of actions of a person or a character.

Butlerian Deconstructive gender approach goes against the essentialist school of thought which argues that both gender and sexuality are inherited. Opposite to the understanding of essentialists, Butler claims that socio-cultural norms play a pivotal role in gender construction.

Discussion and Findings

The novel, A thousand Splendid Suns (2013) by Afghan-American writer manifests a resistance to the rampant gender patriarchal norms that go against the basic rights of women to survive. The plot revolves around the hard but challenging lives of three women- Nana, Mariam and Laila. It is a sordid tale of the trio that demonstrates their lasting relationship with each other in the backward society. "It then follows their subsequent friendship and support for each other in the backdrop of Kabul from the1970s to 2000. The novel is set against the background of instability in Afghanistan following the Soviet invasion. It also details the situation under the Talban

[9] Salih Salhi, *Judith Butler*, (Abingdon:Oxon, Routledge, 2002)

[10] Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the subversion of Identity*, (New York: Routledge,1999).

[11] Morgenroth & Ryan, "Gender Trouble in Social Psychology: How can Butler's Work Inform Experimental Social Psychologists Conceptualization of Gender?." *Front Psycol*, (2018).

regime". [12] The novel is segmented into three parts, each of its part is the representation of major female characters who confront and resist against the repression and marginalization due to their rank as an inferior being in the biased culture of patriarchy. Hosseini speaks through female characters of Mariam, Nana and Laila against the prejudiced gender norms set by the socio-cultural standards. As Bouviour in her famous work, The Second sex says, "One is not born a woman rather becomes a woman" (p.295). Therefore, women and their identities in a particular society is the outcome of socio-cultural construction. This can be proved from the novel in the beginning when Mariam comes to this world as an illegitimate daughter of a businessman, Jalil for whom she suffers throughout her life along with her mother. Mariam became the victim of the crime of her father who was having an illegitimate relationship with her mother, who was a maid at his house. The novel begins with a comment on this 'act' of her father that declared her to be a bastard. Mariam heard this word (bastard) first time at her age of five. [13]

The illegitimate affairs of Jalil with her maid does not bring a bad image to him, instead Nana and her innocent daughter have been thrown away to a village in the Afghan city of Herat. It shows the unequal treatment of gender norms that Jalil being a male is not affected by his wrong act but his act becomes a life-long 'crime' for Nana and Mariam to suffer for the rest of their lives. Therefore, Mariam and her mother are the victims of the severe Afghan patriarchal culture. Mariam is made aware consistently by her mother that we, women are inferior due to superiority of men. Her mother used to tell her that men's behavior and heart are very different from women since they are in their mother's womb. "Womb will not bleed or stretched because they have to take you in. She also reminds Mariam that," women like us suffer ... How can we bear all our burdens in silence" (p.118).

Mariam after her mother's death has to bear the suffering and repression as a lonely and forsaken woman, she was forced to marry Rashid by Jalil to get rid of her burden on him and his family. Mariam's submissiveness changes into a resistance as she knows that Rasheed is going to marry. She warns her husband by saying enough is enough now, "I ... do not want it" ... "You have many years makes me as a first wife (Ambagh) ... "I do not allow it." (262–263).

Mariam who has been discarded by her father and his family and she was left alone after her mother's death, now she cannot allow her husband to make her the first wife, someone else the second. Her identity from a submissive and docile person gets changed. She is now a challenging woman who determines to break the shackles set by the stereotypical system

[12]Sangia. *Stylistic Analysis of Khaled Hosseini's Novel.* (2009). Retrieved from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327976213 (accessed Octoberr 2019).
[13] Khaled Hosseini, *A Thousand Splendid Suns,* (London: Bloomsbury, 2007): 13.

in Afghan society. The time, she sees that Rasheed is going to beat Laila, she comes to her rescue. She becomes a wall against her husband to raise hand to beat a woman. The novel manifests the scene in following words,

> *Rasheed will kill her (Laila) ... she thought. Mariam could not let that happen. Rasheed has taken so many things from Mariam's lives in twenty-seven years of their marriage. Mariam never wants to watch Rasheed claims the life of Laila ... Mariam swings the shovel in her hand ... Mariam swings it high ... high until it touches the tip of his back ...while doing so, Mariam thinks that this is the first time she decides her own destiny.*[14]

After the murder of her husband, Mariam does not repent of her action. She takes it as a revenge to the entire society of gender discrimination. Later on, as the novel proceeds further. She is sentenced to be imprisoned, but she became savior of rights of other women. "In prison, Mariam is admired by other woman inmates since only Mariam is sentenced to jail for killing her husband".[15]

Thus, the variability of Mariam's identity from a submissive daughter and a humble wife to a reactive and challenging wife supports the fluidity of gender identity argued by Butler. The protagonist through her performativity resists and challenges the naturalness and reliability of the established gender patriarchal-driven norms of Afghan society. She is setting a precedent to fight against the gender stereotyping in the novel that goes against the equal representation.

Furthermore, Laila is the next character that illustrates to diffuse the impression of superiority of male in power, intelligence and cleverness. She succeeds in fooling Rasheed, her husband at their wedding night by bleeding her finger. Laila lets her finger bleeding so that her husband may be convinced of her virginity. It is illustrated in the novel,

> *"Rasheed looks awkward. Her fingers struggles endlessly to open his own shirt.... Through chattering teeth, Laila asks Rasheed to turn off the lights. in silence, after feeling Rasheed is asleep, Laila reaches under the bed and pulls out a knife .. With the knife, she cuts the tip of her finger and let her blood drips on the sheets where they sleep together".*[16]

Besides, Laila is not feeling comfortable with Rasheed because she feels it a guilt and injustice to Mariam, who is his first wife. Laila considers it a burden on her conscience, about which she often apologizes to her, "She rejects the wedding ring that is given by Rasheed since it is purchased by

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[14] Khaled Hosseini, *A Thousand Splendid Suns*, (London:Bloomsbury, 2013): 428-430.
[15] Soray, "The Subalter Voice in A thousand Splendid Suns." *Jakarta,Journal Lingua Cultura* 9 (2), (2015): 31.
[16] Khaled Hosseini, *A Thousand Splendid Suns*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2013): 269.

mortgaging Mariam's wedding ring. Laila repeatedly apologizes to Mariam".

Hence, the two women, who have been the construct of the patriarchal society, now question the imposed culture of gender discrimination that deprives them and other women of their society of their basic rights as human being to lead a respectable life. Their identity swings from the victim and passive roles to the resisting and daunting figures to deconstruct the taken-for-granted stereotypical gender norms of Afghan society.

Conclusion

The study has concluded to draw its findings from Hossein's *A Thousand Splendid Suns*. Gender in the novel is constructed on socio-cultural and religious basis that leads to unequal representation in Afghan society. The representation of gender stereotyping in the novel is analyzed through Butlerian deconstructive gender approach that challenges the traditional concept of gender in the selected novel. Therefore, it illustrated that determination of identities of the focused characters and contexts out of the selected work based on their repeated performances, not on their sexual categorization. As the scope of the research, the present study probed into the conservative misconception about gender and sexuality in Afghan society epitomized by the novelist. Besides, the research presented an innovative approach to study gender construction in a feudal society by deconstruction and disruption of taken-for-granted gender norms rampant in that culture.

Thus, the paper has attained the following results in this last section of the research,

1. Gender in Hosseini's work has a fluid and indeterminate tendency by negating the stereotypical notion of gender binary categorization.
1. The variability of gender in A Thousand Splendid Suns depends upon performativity of the characters. They undergo deviations of their actions generating multiple shades of gender. So performances of the characters in the novel do determine identities of their gender, not their sexual labelling.
2. The study presented an alternative approach to examine gender in the perspective Butler's theory of performativity. It led to restructuring of traditional feminist and gender understanding.
3. Gender stereotyping leads to unequal representation of all, men and women in all walks of life.

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COMPARISON OF TWO DIALECTS OF PASHTO, SPOKEN IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN: KANDAHARI DIALECT AND YUSUFZAI DIALECT[Ψ]

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Abstract

Pashto language, spoken in two countries Afghanistan and Pakistan, has numerous dialects. Existing studies show maximum five groups of the varieties of Pashto. Geographical and political factors followed by the absence of a comprehensive study of the Pashto dialects caused divided orthography and lack of unified literary and standard dialect in Pashto. This article mainly focuses on the classification, differences and literary and social status of the two mentioned dialects. Kandahari and Yusufzai dialects have been analyzed and compared mainly on phonological bases.

Keywords: Pashto Dialects, Yusufzai Dialect, Kandahari Dialect, Pashto Varieties, Pashto Standard Dialect.

Introduction

Pashto is a prolific language with respect to dialects. There are many dialects in Pashto. No proper study of all of the Pashto dialects has been conducted. Ghilzai and the people of Peshawar and Swat have least dialectal variations but the central part of Pashtun belt has great varieties of dialects. The study of various dialects is very important for formation of national and literary language. The study of the Pashto dialects is so poor that still the exact number of the Pashto dialects is not known. N.A. Dvgryankov has mentioned forty dialects in the main Pashto speaking

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districts of Afghanistan.[1] That is why the process of the formation of one national and literary language is quite complicated. We have literary standard, regional standard, and prestige dialect in Pashto. Pashto dialects should be studied on geographical as well as on tribal basis. The study on tribal basis is important because many tribes have shifted from one geographical location to another and thus they have influenced the dialect of the geographical area to which they have moved. Slight differences are found from tribe to tribe in grammar and pronunciation.[2] Different scholars have classified the dialects of Pashto in various groups. This classification ranges from two to five groups. It is obvious that this classification does not cover all of the varieties of Pashto language spoken in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Among these dialects two dialects have been declared as prestigious dialects by the scholars. They are the dialect of Kandahar and the dialect of Peshawar or Yusufzai dialect. There is no standard literary dialect decided by the writers of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although in this regard they have been trying for almost the last seventy years, but still the Pashto writers of Afghanistan and Pakistan have not agreed upon a mutually accepted literary and standard dialect of Pashto.

Dialect

The debate on the difference between language and dialect is very old. It is necessary to introduce dialect and differentiate it from language. Dialect has its etymology in Classical Greek language where it referred to conversation, way of speaking and discourse. Later on it was identified as a regional variety.[3] A manner of speech which is affiliated to some country, region and people and have differences of this manner from the people of other parts. Despite these differences in the manner of speech they have one radical language the substance of which they use.[4] If people of the one language speak in a different way but they are able to understand each other, it means that they are speaking dialects of the same language. On the other hand if they are not in a position to know each other language, they speak different languages. In the classification of the varieties of a language non-linguistic factors like culture, history, and politics also play important role. Besides these non-linguistic factors, the linguistic criteria is mutual intelligibility.[5] It is also important that this linguistic feature i.e.

[1] Dvgryankov, N.A., *Pashto Dialects and the Literary Language in Afghanistan*, XXVI International Congress of Orientalists, Papers presented by the USSR Delegation, p.3

[2] Grierson, George A., *Linguistic Survey of India: Volume. X, Eranian Languages*, (Calcutta, India: Government Press, 1921): 7

[3] Boberg, Charles, John Nerbonne, and Dominic Watt. *The Handbook of Dialectology*. (WILEY Blackwell, 2018): 23

[4] Boberg, Charles, John Nerbonne, and Dominic Watt. *The Handbook of Dialectology*. (WILEY Blackwell, 2018): 24

[5] Boberg, Charles, John Nerbonne, and Dominic Watt. *The Handbook of Dialectology*. (WILEY Blackwell, 2018): 5

intelligibility is also influenced by some other non-linguistic factors like population size, exposure, and education etc. there are some linguistic factors also exist that influence mutual intelligibility such as vocabulary replacement and sound change.[6] One must start from regional variation for proper exploration of the meaning of the dialect. But to know about regional variation it is important to understand social variation. Social differences followed by linguistic variation is reflected in speech communities. There is diversity in the manners of speech among speech communities like differences in the manners of eating, having fun and ways of dressing. These social difference are being influenced by ethnic identity, wealth, education, power, social identity and many other factors. Varieties of speech among social groups is called sociolects. It is a subject dealt in sociolinguistics. But these social varieties are also important in the studies of dialects.[7]

Dialect and accent

There are many aspects of differentiating dialects such as phonological, phonetic, syntactic, lexical, morphological, semantic and so on. There is another term, accent, which has often a complementary relation with the term dialect. Differences of dialects are in lexicon and grammar while accent has phonological and especially phonetic differences.[8]

Accent

Accent is not only associated with pronunciation. It also has psychological and social meaning. Accent has dialectal features like syntactic, morphological and lexical variations, interfaced with the phonological and phonetic features. Features of dialects also involve age, gender, social class, and geographical factors.[9]

Causes of Linguistic Varieties

Expansion of speech communities and language change are main causes of dialect differences. [10] Language change is universal. All languages change all the time. [11] Mountains, rivers, distances, social, economic and cultural divisions are main factors of dialect differences and linguistic

[6] Boberg, Charles, John Nerbonne, and Dominic Watt. *The Handbook of Dialectology*. (WILEY Blackwell, 2018): 5

[7] Boberg, Charles, John Nerbonne, and Dominic Watt. *The Handbook of Dialectology*. (WILEY Blackwell, 2018): 2

[8] Boberg, Charles, John Nerbonne, and Dominic Watt. *The Handbook of Dialectology*. (WILEY Blackwell, 2018): 4

[9] Bhatia TK. Accent, Intelligibility, mental health, and trauma. *World Englishes*. (2018): 422.

[10] Boberg, Charles, John Nerbonne, and Dominic Watt. *The Handbook of Dialectology*. (WILEY Blackwell, 2018): 5

[11] Boberg, Charles, John Nerbonne, and Dominic Watt. *The Handbook of Dialectology*. (WILEY Blackwell, 2018): 5

varieties.[12] At this process of dialectal and linguistic varieties a point of divergence comes where there is no mutual intelligibility and thus comes into being separate languages. [13] There are also examples that for centuries we see in a persistent and stable way dialect differences. In this case there is no disappearance, decline and language divergence.[14]

Pashto Language

In the classification of languages Pashto has been placed to the North-Eastern group within the Iranian branch of Indo-European languages.[15]Pashto is a language spoken in two neighbouring countries, Afghanistan and Pakistan. It enjoys the status of the official language in Afghanistan where it was promoted to the status of an official language in 1936 by a royal decree.[16] In Pakistan it is mainly spoken in tribal areas near Pak-Afghan border and in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. Pashto has also enjoyed the status of the official language in the then Swat State (1915-1969), now a district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It was declared as official language in Swat State in 1937 by the then ruler of Swat State Miangul Abdul Wadud.[17]

Division of Pashto Dialects

While studying varieties of Pashto language, one should be clear about the varieties of Pashto spoken in both the countries i.e. Pakistan and Afghanistan. Till date there is no thorough study of the dialects of Pashto. However some linguists and experts have formed different groups of the dialects of Pashto. They have divided the Pashto dialects into two, three, four and five groups. Among them some have studied the dialects of Pashto language in Pakistan (Hallberg:1992) and some have studied the varieties in Afghanistan (Dvgryankov) and some have studied the dialects of Pashto language of both of the countries. Most of the authors have established their division of Pashto dialects primarily on phonological basis because the morphological variations among the various dialects, especially among dialects of the most extreme of north-eastern and the dialects of south-western are relatively of no importance. While differentiating these varieties

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[12] Boberg, Charles, John Nerbonne, and Dominic Watt. *The Handbook of Dialectology*. (WILEY Blackwell, 2018):5.

[13] Boberg, Charles, John Nerbonne, and Dominic Watt. *The Handbook of Dialectology*. (WILEY Blackwell, 2018):5.

[14] Boberg, Charles, John Nerbonne, and Dominic Watt. *The Handbook of Dialectology*. (WILEY Blackwell, 2018):1

[15] Mackenzie, D.N., Pashto, In , The World's Major Languages, second edition, edited by Bernard Comrie, (London and Newyork, Routledge, 2009): 460.

[16] Kieffer,Ch.M.,*Languages*, In: *Encyclopaedie Iranica*. Vol. I. Edited by: Ehsan Yarshater, (London, Boston and Henley,Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985): 504.

[17] Dinakhel, Muhammad Ali, Pashto as Official Language in Swat State, Bilingual Quarterly Research Journal Pashto, Vol. 40-41, No. 642s (October 2011-June 2012), (Peshawar, Pashto Academy University of Peshawar): 26.

not only common words, their meaning, phonetics and lexical features analyzed but syntactical and morphological forms and structures have also been discussed.[18]

As described earlier that no thorough study of Pashto dialects exists but the available studies have discussed mainly the following varieties of Pashto: Afridi,Bangash, Banuchi, Dawarwola, Durrani, Ghilzai, Kakar, Kandahar, Khattak, Khogyani, Khosti, Marwat-Betani, Masidwola, , Sherani, Taniwola, Wardak, Wazirwola, Yusufzai, Zadran.

Main differences among the Dialects of Pashto

There are phonological, lexical and slight morphological differences among the different varieties of Pashto. Most of the experts have focused on phonetical differences. If we focus on phonological differences, we can see the following main differences among various Pashto dialects.

1. Difference exists between the southern, western and north-eastern dialects. In these dialects the first two have preserved the *ś̌* and *ź̌* phonemes and the last one has developed these phonemes into x and g.
2. In the dialects of the east-central we see vowel shift.
3. In the north-eastern dialect we see an assimilation of the dental affricates *c,j* into *s, z*
4. Assimilation, dissimilation and metathesis are also found as differences among various Pashto dialects.
5. Palatalization has also influenced the different varieties of Pashto.

An overview of different groups of dialects are given below.

Two Parts Division

First of all Major Raverty (1859) has referred to two dialects of Pashto that are eastern and western Pashto.[19] Grierson has also divided the dialects of Pashto into two main groups .Accordingly they divided Pashto into two regional based varieties which are North-east and of South-west groups. They divided these two dialects on the basis of the pronunciation of certain letters. The Pashtuns of the North-east pronounce ښ as *x̣h* and ږ as *g*, while the people of the South-west pronounce them *ṣh* and *ẓh,* respectively.[20] N. A. Dvgryankov has also mentioned two existing groups of Pashto dialects that are Western (Kandahar) "Pashto" and Eastern (Peshavar) "Pakhto".[21] Shafeev has also described the two main dialects of Pashto.

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[18]Dvgryankov, N.A., *Pashto Dialects and the Literary Language in Afghanistan*, XXVI International Congress of Orientalists, Papers presented by the USSR Delegation, p. 5

[19] Raverty, Major H.G., Grammar of the Pukhto, Pushto Language of the Afghans, (London, William and Norgate, 1859): IX.

[20] Grierson, George A., *Linguistic Survey of India: Volume. X, Eranian Languages*, (Calcutta, India: Government Press, 1921): 7.

[21] Dvgryankov, N.A., *Pashto Dialects and the Literary Language in Afghanistan*, XXVI International Congress of Orientalists, Papers presented by the USSR Delegation, p.2

Among them one is eastern dialect which is centred in Peshawar and the other is the western dialect that is centred in Kandahar. [22] The scholars who have divided Pashto dialects into two main groups, primarily they are focusing on the differences of the pronunciation of the letters ښ and ږ . According to Anne David Boyle the eastern generally refers to both Northwest and Northeast, and western means southwest and southeast.
The two parts division is also based on hard and soft dialects. A number of authors have pointed out the distinction between the two dialects as hard and soft. Although these distinctions are helpful but these are not adequate to show all of the important differences among these varieties. Hard and soft dialects division is mainly based on the second consonant phoneme of the name of the language. Areas where it is pronounced as *Kh* is considered of hard dialect and where it is pronounced as *sh* is called soft dialect. While considering two parts division in the Pashto speaking area of Pakistan, there are two main dialects namely the Yusufzai dialect and Khattak dialect. Among these dialects the former is called hard and the latter is called soft dialect. In 2019 De Chiara and Septfonds published *Le verbe Pashto.* It alsoproviding a quick review of the main differences among Pashto dialects. Particularly its third chapter "Les sources de variation dialectale" Is relevant to the division of Pashto dialects.[23]

Three Parts Division

N.A. Dvgrynakov has divided the Pashto dialects of Afghanistan into three groups. He has also suggested that these groups should be named after big provinces , where the majority of the people speak these dialects. Thus he has formed three groups of the dialects of Pashto spoken in Afghanistan. These groups are: Kandaharian (Western), Nangraharian (Eastern) and Paktian (Southern). [24] Habibullah Tegey has also described three dialects of Pashto. They have named them the western dialect or the dialect of Kandahar, the central dialect or the dialect of Kabul, and the eastern dialect or dialect of Nangrahar.[25]

Four Parts Division

Henderson in one of his articles *Four Varieties of Pashto*, has classified the dialects of Pashto spoken in Afghanistan and Pakistan, into four groups. According to his classification these dialects are spoken in

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[22] David, Anne Boyle, *Descriptive Grammar of Pasht and its Dialects*, (Gottingen, Germany, 2014): 41

[23] Actually this book is in French language but the author helped me in understanding relevant chapter of the book. I am thankful to one of the author Dr. Matteo De Chiara.

[24] Dvgryankov, N.A., *Pashto Dialects and the Literary Language in Afghanistan*, XXVI International Congress of Orientalists, Papers presented by the USSR Delegation, p.11

[25] Tegey, Habibullah and Barbara Robson, A Reference Grammar of Pashto, (Washington, Centre for Applied Linguistics, 1996): 6

Kandahar, Quetta, Northest part, Peshawar. This classification of Henderson is on the basis of the second consonant in the name of the language i.e پښتو and پشتو . these four varieties are Pəṣto (Kandahar), Pəšto (Quetta), Pəçto (northeast part of the Pashto area) and Paxto (Peshawar).[26] Mackenzie has described four varieties of Pashto that are South-west (Kandahar), South-east (Quetta), North-west (Central Ghilzai) and North-east (Yusufzai) dialect. [27] Hallberg has identified four groups of dialects of Pashto spoken only in Pashtun areas of Pakistan. Among these groups, three are clearly identifiable and he has termed the fourth one as "less distinct group".[28] The four groups of Pashto dialects identified by by Hallberg are: 1.Northern Group[29] 2. Southern Group/Baluchistan Group[30] 3. Central Group[31]/ Waziristan and Southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly known as N.W.F.P) 4. Middle Settled Area/Middle Tribal Group[32].

There are unique qualities found in other dialects of Pashto for example qualities of Waziri dialect are not covered in this four part division. Therefore Four parts division of Pashto dialects is unable to cover and show all qualities of Pashto dialect so it is not sufficient to exhibit the qualities of all of the varieties of the Pashto dialects.

Five Parts Division

The latest classification of Pashto dialects is five parts division. This classification has been made by Anne Boyle David in his *Descriptive Grammar of Pashto and its Grammar*. A set of five dialects described in this grammar are: Southwest, Southeast, Northwest, Northeast, and Middle dialect. The southwest dialect is spoken in Kandahar, Farah and Heart. The tribe which speak this dialect is called South Ghilzai. Southeast dialect is spoken in southern districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan including Quetta. This dialect is spoken by the Sherani, Bannuchi, Wazir, Kakar, Achakzi, Tarin, and other tribes. Northwest dialect of Pashto language is spoken by central Ghilzai and Afridi tribes living in east and northeast Afghanistan and Jalalabad. Northeast dialect is spoken in Peshawar, part of Nangrahar province (Afghanistan) and northern parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa by Shinwari, Yusufzai, Mohmand, northeast Ghilzai,

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[26] Henderson, Michael M. T. 1983. *Four varieties of Pashto*. *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 103(3) (Jul.-Sep., 1983): 595

[27] Mackenzie, D.N., *A Standard Pashto*, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 22(1/3), (1959): 232.

[28] Hallberg, Daniel G., Sociolinguistic Survey of Northern Pakistan Volume 4 Pashto Waneci Ormuri, (Islamabad, NIPS/SIL, 2004/1992):14

[29] Ibid., p. 16

[30] Ibid., p. 17

[31] Ibid., p. 18

[32] Ibid., p. 19

Hazara, Bangash, Orakzai and some Afridi tribes.[33] In the above mentioned five dialects, the first four are called dialects of general Pashto. There is a correspondence between /i/ and /e/ in closed-class words between the dialect of Southwest i.e. Kandahar, Farah and Heart and Northwest and Northeast dialects. Examples of correspondence between /i/ and /e/ in closed-class words, have been taken from Anne David Boyle's grammar, are given below.

Southwest	**Northwest, Northeast**
پوري pori 'to'	پوري pore 'to'
باندي bāndi 'on'	باندي bānde 'on'
کي ki 'in'	کي ke 'in'
لاندي lāndi 'under'	لاندي lānde 'under'
مي mi 'I, me'	مي me 'I,me'
دي di 'you'	دی de 'you'
تاسي tāsi 'you'	تاسي tāse 'you'

Dialect Reduction and Emergence of New Dialects

We see that dialects are being reduced as well as new dialects are being emerged. That is why traditional dialectologists collect samples and preserve them to preserve them from being lost.[34] Main factors of the reduction of dialects are industrial development, fast communication, mass education and personal mobility. Many non-standard urban and rural dialects are now disappearing and declining that cause a gradual contraction of dialects. But many older linguistic varieties are sustained. The main cause of this sustainability is force of local identity.[35] New dialects are also constantly emerged.[36]

Comparison of Kandahari And Yusufzai Dialect

Henderson has written that only in the *ṣ* area there is an eight-member contrastive set /š ž ṣ ẓ k g x γ /, corresponding to the orthography. In rest of the regions, *g* corresponds to Kandahar *ẓ*, and various other sound types correspond to Kandahar *ṣ*, as shown below.

Kandahar	Pəṣto	ṣ ẓ š ž k g x γ
Quetta	Pəšto	š ž š ž k g x γ

[33] David, Anne Boyle, *Descriptive Grammar of Pasht and its Dialects*, (Gottingen, Germany, 2014): 36

[34] Boberg, Charles, John Nerbonne, and Dominic Watt. *The Handbook of Dialectology*. (WILEY Blackwell, 2018):8

[35] Boberg, Charles, John Nerbonne, and Dominic Watt. *The Handbook of Dialectology*. (WILEY Blackwell, 2018):11

[36] Boberg, Charles, John Nerbonne, and Dominic Watt. *The Handbook of Dialectology*. (WILEY Blackwell, 2018):11

NE	Pəçto	ç g š ž k g x γ
Peshawar	Paxto	x g š ž k g x γ[37]

Mackenzie has compared the dialect of Kandahar with other dialects in the following table. [38]

	Sw (Kandahar)	SE (Quetta)	NW (Central Ghilzai)	NE (Yusufzai)
1	c [ts]	C	(s)	(s)
2	J [dz]	J	(z)	(z)
3	ž [ʒ]	ž	ž	(ǰ) [1]
4	ẓ [ʐ]	(ž) [2]	γ̌ [3] [j]	(g)
5	Ṣ [ʂ]	(š) [2]	x̌ [4] [c]	(x)

From this table it is obvious that when we go from south-western to the north-eastern, we see 'a steady depletion' in consonant phonemes.[39] In the above table the graphemes used for these phonemes from 1 to 5 are written respectively as ښ ږ ژ څ ځ . Main difference in Kandahari and Yusufzai dialect is in the following consonant phonemes.

Kandahari Dialect		Yusufzai Dialect
ṣ	ښ	خ
ẓ	ږ	ګ
Ts	څ	س/څ
Dz	ځ	ز
z̄	ژ	ج

Phonemes of Kandahari dialect are related to the existing writing system is that of the dialect of Kandahar. There are special graphemes in Pashto for the clusters of *ts* and *dz*. These graphemes are respectively څ and ځ . Herbert Penzl has declared the dialect of Kandahar as prestigious dialect. In this regard he has written that the dialect of Kandahar has the retroflexed voiceless and voiced sibilants ss and zz, which are written with the modified symbols s, sh, and z, zh respectively. This patterning of ss, s, sh, and of zz, z, zh is found only in the Kandahar dialect. There is a close correlation between the graphic pattern and phonemic pattern of the dialect of Kandahar. Therefore, it is assumed that these graphemes have been created

[37] Henderson, Michael M. T. 1983. *Four varieties of Pashto*. *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 103(3) (Jul.-Sep., 1983): 595

[38] Mackenzie, D.N., A Standard Pashto, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London,* 22(1/3), (1959): 232

[39] Ibid., p. 232

in Kandahar. That is why Kandahar is considered as a cradle for Pashto alphabets.[40]

Henderson also says that Pəṣto (dialect of Kandahar) is the most conservative dialect among Pashto dialects. According to Henderson, it is an isolated dialect and that is why it has not been influenced by other dialects. Hence we can call it a conservative dialect. The cause of remaining an isolated dialect is that this area has not been a trade route. [41] While in a broader sense classifying Pashto dialects in Afghanistan, there are three major divisions of Pashto dialects. They are western dialect or Kandahari dialect, central dialect, and eastern dialect or Ningrahar dialect. The Kandahari dialect is spoken in south west Afghanistan and in a few parts of Baluchistan. The Khattak tribe living in Kohat district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, also speaks Kandahari dialect. In the Waziri dialect there are some features of the Kandahari dialect, especially the same set of retroflex consonants.[42] Each Pashtun feel pride in his own dialect. However the dialect of Kandahar is generally considered a prestigious dialect.[43]

Yusufzai Dialect

Yusufzai live to the north-east of Peshawar. It has been recorded by many linguists and grammarians that *ts* and *dz* are pronounced s and z, respectively.but it is not the fact. In many areas of the Yusufzai dialect *ts* is pronounced as *ts* and not the *s*. when I collected data from Swat district and analyzed it, I found this phoneme as *ts* but *s* is also used instead of *ts*. The phoneme ږ is articulated like ګ . In glottal stops phonemes the *q* is pronounced in many areas of the Yusufzai dialect like Swat and Dir etc. However in some areas it is pronounced as *k*. In some areas of the Yusufzai dialect like Mardan and Swabi districts the velar spirant *kh* is exchanged with glottal *h*. the labial stop phoneme *p* and the labial spirant phoneme *f* is also differentiated in some areas of the Yusufzai dialect like Swabi and Mardan. There are more sub-dialects in the main Yusufzai dialects. Among them some have been pointed out by the researchers. They are the dialects of Swat,[44] Bune[45] and Khalil.[46]

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[40] Penzl, Herbert, *A Grammar of Pashto— a Descriptive study of the dialect of Kandahar, Afghanistan*, (American Council of Learned Societies, Washington, D.C., 1955): 9-10.

[41] Henderson, Michael M. T. 1983. *Four varieties of Pashto*. *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. 103, No. 3 (Jul.-Sep., 1983): 595

[42] Tegey, Habibullah and Barbara Robson, A Reference Grammar of Pashto, (Washington, Centre for Applied Linguistics, 1996): 7

[43] Ibid., p. 6

[44] Grierson, Sir George Abraham, *Linguistic Survey of India*, Vol. X, Specimen of Languages of the Eranian Family, (Culcutta (India), Superintendent Government Printing India, 1921): 35

[45] Grierson, Sir George Abraham, *Linguistic Survey of India*, Vol. X, Specimen of Languages of the Eranian Family, (Culcutta (India), Superintendent Government Printing India, 1921): 28

D.N. Mackenzie does not agree with the statement of Penzl and termed the dialect of Kandahar an 'aberrant dialect'.[47] Morgenstierne is also of the opinion that the prestigious and conservative dialect is that of the Yusufzais. In this regard he has written that it has great possibility that the Yusufzais and Mohmands have tendency towards velarization. This tendency has spread from these tribes towards other neighbouring tribes. When, in sixteenth century, the orthography of Pashto was fixed, the distinction between *š̭*, *ž̭* and *x*, *g* has preserved among the north-eastern tribes, who were probably the creators of Pashto literature. It may be noticed that a similar velarization of *š̭*, *ž̭* is found in some neighboring Dardic dialects.[48]

But later on in an article, Mackenzie comes to a conclusion about the conservative and prestigious dialect among the dialects of Pashto. He has stated that although all the consonant phonemes expressed in the standard alphabet have been preserved by the dialect of Kandahar and the north-east dialect has abandoned a number of consonant phonemes but has preserved the vowels in its morphological positions. Thus he has inferred that in an older stage of Pashto, there was a combination of 'south-western' consonant system with a 'north-eastern' vowel phoneme system.[49]

Advantages of standard variety speakers

Although all of the sociolinguists are of the opinion that the notion of inferior and superior dialects has no linguistic fact but based on social prejudice. There are unfair advantages to the speakers of standard variety. That is the reason that some people are "improving" their speech for measurable benefits. Teaching of standard dialects also increase job opportunities for students that is why it is being taught in schools.[50]

Conclusion

Pashto is prolific in dialects. According to the available studies, Pashto dialects have been classified into five groups. Further investigation and modern tools of dialectology are needed to employ for a comprehensive study of all of the dialects of Pashto. It is necessary to initiate a scientific study of all of the Pashto dialects in Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan. The study of the different dialects of Pashto will enrich the vocabulary of Pashto

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[46] Morgenstierne, Georg, *Report on a Linguistic Mission to Afghanistan*, (Instituttet for Sammenlingnende Kulturskning, printed in Norway, 1925): 10.

[47] Mackenzie, D.N., *Review of a Short grammatical Outline of Pashto by D.A. Shafeev translated into English by Herbert H. Paper*, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 28(3) (1965): 640.

[48] Morgenstierne, Georg, *Report on a Linguistic Mission to North-western India*, (Instituttet for Sammenlingnende Kulturskning, printed in Norway, 1932): 17.

[49] Mackenzie, D.N., *A Standard Pashto*, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. 22, No. 1/3, 1959, p. 235

[50] Boberg, Charles, John Nerbonne, and Dominic Watt. *The Handbook of Dialectology*. (WILEY Blackwell, 2018): 3.

language. One should bring closer all the dialects to each other and their encouragement in the literature for bringing forward the diversity of different tribal cultures. Thus the penetration of the various dialects will be promoted in the literary Pashto.

Kandahari and Yusufzai dialects have their own peculiar features. After investigating all of the Pashto dialects a standard and literary dialect is needed to be used for literary works according to standard and unified orthography. There are many problems in the formation of standard and literary dialect of Pashto. While increasing the literacy rate the Pashto speakers have a natural inclination towards a phonetic spellings instead of standard and mutually agreed upon ones. Lack of Language policy is also a hurdle in the formation of a standard dialect. The Durand line (border between Pakistan and Afghanistan) is also an effective factor in the formation of a standard dialect and use of a unified orthography.

From the comparison of the two dialect I came to the conclusion that there are some phonemes articulated by the Yusufzais in the northeast areas of Swat and Dir etc. but these phonemes have not been identified by the researchers because no proper dialectal study has been conducted. So it is obvious that there are relic areas in the Yusufzai belt that have nearly all the phonemes of Pashto. As pointed out by the researchers that the Kandahar dialect has preserved the consonants phonemes and the Yusufzai dialect has maintained majority of the vowels. As told earlier that dental affricate *ts* is present in Swat and Dir but it has been lost in lower districts of the Yusufzai dialect. From the history of literary tradition, maintaining of vowel sounds, and having nearly all consonant phonemes in undiscovered relic areas, one can conclude that Yusufzai dialect or the dialect of Peshawar can be a standard and literary dialect for Pashto language.

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KIPLING, RAILWAYS, AND THE *GREAT GAME*

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Abstract

The paper explores Rudyard Kipling's perspective on the importance of railways in India which is the theme of some of his poetic and prose work. Coupled with this, an overview of the importance of railways and its military, economic and social aspects in Central Asia, in the backdrop of the Great Game of the 19th Century between Russia and Britain is also offered. This study attempts to correlate the significance of the Trans-Caspian Railway (TCR), founded in 1879 and the North Western State Railway in British India formed seven years later in 1886. It also takes into account the railways' cultural importance for the people of Central Asia. The most important aspect of the subject under assessment is how the construction of railway lines worked as a device and a tool to strengthen the hold of both the colonizing powers. It is in this context that the poet and novelist Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936) glorified the benefits of Indian railways as a stabilizing factor for the strength of the Raj. The paper attempts to establish that railways not only strengthened colonial rule in both Central Asia and India but brought significant social and economic changes in the lives of the people living on both sides of the border. The perspective here is a post-colonial one that offers insights on the effects of colonization, most importantly the modernizing agenda or the enlightenment package attached to the great design of imperialism and empire-building. But the picture that appears after the passing of colonization is hazy when looked at the hybridized and ambivalent view that Kipling held, and also taking into account the hegemony, control, and the politics of aesthetics.

Keywords: Great Game, Trans-Caspian Railway, Rudyard Kipling, British India, Indian Railways

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During the nineteenth century political struggle between Czarist Russia and Victorian Britain ensued with both vying with each other for control in Asia. British India was well-established but had a difficult time controlling Afghanistan. Imperial Russia, on the other hand, was colonizing the Central Asia Khanate whose political and economic order was not strong enough to resist Russian involvement in Afghanistan. The bitter experience of the First Anglo-Afghan War of 1839-42 and the Second Anglo-Afghan War fought between 1878 and 1890 was another important factor. The British feared a Russian invasion of Afghanistan, which they considered their exclusive sphere of influence. The political, military and diplomatic struggle between the two rival empires culminated in the so-called *Great Game*, which began with the first Anglo-Afghan War and ended in the signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907. During this period a number of policy paradigms were seen in action by both the contestants. The Russian government began construction of the Trans-Caspian Railway (TCR), as one of the important military moves to control the Central Asian borders, which famous Russophobes like Kipling saw as an alarming situation fearing encroachment upon India. In response to the Russian initiative, the British too worked out a plan to construct a railway line to Torkham via the Khyber Pass and another one further south to the Iranian border through the Bolan Pass.

The TCR venture was a very ambitious project and aside from its military and strategic importance, particularly with reference to the power-play between Russia and Great Britain, it contributed to the modernization of Central Asia. Similarly, the Indian railways had the very same purpose which was to help maintain control of India and to glorify it as an agent of change. Kipling, in this context with works like *007*, *Among the Railway Folk* and *The Bridge Builders* and to some extent, *Kim*, refers to the benefits of railways in India.

007 is an interesting short story telling of a particular locomotive, namely 007, in a railway workshop. It had some extraordinary qualities which none of the others of its type had. It was the product of Kipling's own imagination as no such ideal machine existed. However, he, with his love of machines, technology, and artifacts, created 007 with futuristic qualities.

Kipling's enthusiasm for all things related to railways could be judged by the fact that he gave human traits to the machines and sang praises to it. 007 was an eight-wheeled "American" loco, slightly different from others of its type, and was worth ten thousand dollars on the Company's books.[1]

The fascination of the writer with the prospects of an important project like the Indian Railway could not be exaggerated as this short work symbolized the romance of the British Empire, which for Kipling remained a lifelong obsession. The onomatopoeic device, the sound sequence of the

[1] www.kipling.org.007.html, pp 2-3 (accessed 17.03.2011).

moving locomotive is his idealism, which he sees in the overall framework of the so-called civilizing mission.

The Bridge Builders (1898)

Kipling's short story *The Bridge Builders* is yet another example of his interests in railways as well as his glorification of colonial builders in India. Here one particular railway bridge crossing the River Ganges at Varanasi, the Kashi Bridge, the present-day Pandit Malvia Bridge, is the Centre of the story. In the story the Bridge was threatened by the flooding of the river. It contains a description of the ordeal, and of its Chief Engineer Findlay, his son Hitchcock, and Perro, the most impressive character in the story; a native 'Lascar, a Kharva from Bulsar familiar with every port between Rockhampton and London,' [2] face heroically and help avert a possible calamity. Two things are significant given the writer's praise of the British modernization agenda in India. One is the critical role the railways play in the sustenance of imperial power and the second is the benefits it brought to the local people. In this work too, the commitment of the British engineer is highlighted. Interestingly, however, the master-servant binary could also be seen working when Peeru, risking his own life, much like Ganga-Din, in the renowned eponymous poem of 1890 about a native water carrier who dies while taking water to the wounded and dying British soldiers on the battlefield.

Kim (1901)

Rudyard Kipling's masterpiece *Kim* relates the story of the *Great Game* in a romanticized narrative. The main characters, Kim and an aged Tibetan lama, travel by railway. In order to glorify the success of the British colonization of India, the writer put words in the mouths of travelers as well as those of the main characters, praising Indian railways in all its glory. In a dramatic moment in the novel, Kipling vividly paints a picture to the readers when the protagonists enter the railway station, "They entered the fort-like railway station, black in the end of night; the electrics sizzling over the goods yard where they handle the heavy Northern grain-traffic."[3]

On the way to Umbala on an espionage mission, Kim and the lama board the train where people from different social and religious backgrounds travel. But it is the lama who is overawed by the sight of the railway station and the train which he, for the first time boards. "This is the work of devils! said the lama, recoiling from the hollow echoing darkness, the glimmer of rails between the masonry platforms, and the maze of girders above."[4]

Not content with the praise the writer bestows on the benefits of the Indian railways, he made the local passengers certify his claim of its

[2]Rudyard Kipling, *Short story, "The Bridge Builder,"* Retrieved from http://www.readbookonline.net/readOnLine/2356, accessed on 19.04.2011.
[3]Rudyard Kipling, *Kim*, (London: Macmillan, 1925).
[4]Ibid.

magnificence. "Great is the speed of the train," said the banker, with a patronising grin. "We have gone farther since Lahore than thou couldst walk in two days: at evening, we shall enter Umballa."[5]

THE WHITE MAN'S GAME

"Warehouses, railway-sidings, and such are only counters in the White Man's Game, which can be swept up and re-dealt as the play varies."[6]

Among the Railway Folk[7]

Kipling's work, *Among the Railway Folk* (1899), is like a hymn praising the hardworking British colonial officials, busy running the Indian railways. Here he idealizes the life of a British railway settlement at Jamalpur, Bihar. These are people with a mission. The settlement is painted as a certain kind of *Shangri-la* where all things work under a system; a plan, perfect in all its aspects. "From St. Mary's Church to the railway station, and from the buildings where they print daily about half a lakh of tickets, to the ringing, roaring, rattling workshops, everything has the air of having been cleaned up at ten that very morning and put under a glass case."[8]

Among the Railway Folks is Kipling's ideal society where the white colonist lives in harmony with the natives with no signs of conflict, friction, or tension between them. The railway company is portrayed as an organization which patronized and felt duty-bound to care for its workers: "The 'Company,' who gives grants to the schools and builds the institute and throws the shadow of its protection all over the place, might help this scheme forward." [9]

Kipling was appreciative of the cooperation, of the natives who, hand in hand, made the railway initiative in India a great success. His bias, however, is too explicit to be ignored, "But one flying sentence goes straight to the heart. It is the cry of Humanity over the Task of Life, done into unrefined English."[10] "It was found anywhere you please between Howrah and Hoti Mardan; and here it is that the entire world may admire a prudent and far-sighted Board of Directors."[11]

It appeared an all-seeing vigilant micro chasm, where each part and particle worked in harmony and coordination that to the writer seems

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[5] Ibid.

[6] Kipling, Rudyard, *Letters of Travel 1892-1913*, Part 3,"The Fortunate Town", p.2 (accessed 17.10.2008).

[7] Kipling, Rudyard, *Among the Railway Folk* (orig., 1900). Retrieved from www.ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/k/**kipling**/rudyard/**railway**/, accessed on 12.02.2011.

[8] Ibid., p. 3.

[9] Ibid., Ch:2, p.1.

[10] Ibid., p. 6.

[11] Ibid., Ch: 3, p. 1.

unparalleled. Notwithstanding the obvious praise for the so-called civilizing mission, the artist's representation succeeded in bringing home the healthy and constructive environment of this particular colonial settlement. Where ideally nothing appears to be impossible, "The Company does everything, and knows everything." The British administrators at Jamalpur, were benign and kindly and went out of the way to help the workers, not only supporting them financially by employing them, but also helping inculcate the spirit of hard work, which they otherwise lacked, "Let us go down southward to the big Giridih collieries and see the coal that feeds the furnace that smelts the iron that makes the sleeper that bears the loco that pulls the carriage that holds the freight that comes from the country that is made richer by the Great Company Bahadur, the East Indian Railway." [12]

The Trans-Caspian Railways[13]

The idea to construct the Trans-Caspian Railway line was initiated by Czarist military strategists in Turkestan as part of their plan to connect the Turkmen towns of Ahal and Merv with Russia. The suggestion was put forward by Konstantin Petrovich von Kaufman (1818-82), the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan (1867-82), to the authorities in St. Petersburg in the 1870s. Various routes suggested by different officials were considered. Finally, the Panjdeh Incident of 1885, which brought Russia and Britain to the brink of war in Central Asia when Russia captured an Afghan border fort which the British thought presented a threat to British India but both sides backed down and war was avoided through diplomatic talks. As a result, however, Russia decided to extend the Trans-Caspian Railways eastwards from Kizl-Arvast.

The TCR reached Samarkand via Bukhara in 1888, where it halted for ten years, until it was extended to Tashkent and Andijan in 1898. The Tashkent Railway connecting the Trans-Caspian Military Railway with the network of other Russian and European railways was completed in 1906.[14] To journalist and historian Peter Hopkirk (1930-2014), who worked on Central Asia, particularly writing about the interesting episodes of the spy wars between Russia and Britain, are of special relevance. He also emphasized the crucial role the TCR was played in the *Great Game*, given its strategic and military dimensions. By the middle of 1888, it had reached Bokhara and Samarkand, and work on the final leg of its journey to Tashkent began.[15]

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[12] Ibid., p. 6.

[13] The Silk Road is the name of road network used for trade among the countries of Asia, Africa, and Europe. The name comes from the fact that this route was used for the silk trade with China.

[14] Retrieved from: Http://www.srilankaholidayhotels.com/wiki-Central_Asian_Railway , accessed on 09.02.2011.

[15] Ibid., pp. 438-39.

The author, while referring to the encounter of Czarist's Russia with the Central Asian Muslims Khanates, of the view that the interaction of the rising Russian Empire with the decaying socio-economo-political system of Central Asia in the nineteenth century, resulted in reformation of the state and society. In this connection, he situated the crucial phase in the history of the Muslim states as the historical junction when Russia began to construct the Trans-Caspian Railways line through a treaty with Amir Muzaffar of Bukhara. (r. 1860-85). "A new era in Russia's relations with Bukhara began after the imperial government's decision to build a Central Asia railroad. The idea to construct a Trans-Caspian railway line was initiated by Czarist military strategists in Turkistan as part of their plan to connect the Turkmen towns of Ahal and Merv with Russia. The suggestion was put forwarded by Kaufman, the Governor General of Turkistan, to the authorities in St. Petersburg in the 1870s."[16] But the author noted that, "Because the primary purpose of the Trans-Caspian Railroad was to facilitate the military subjugation of the Turkmens and not primarily to promote trade, the line proved unsatisfactory as a major artery for Russian Central Asian commerce."[17]

The social and cultural impact of the TCR in the lives of the people of the Central Asian Khanate is an interesting aspect of the power struggle between the two Empires. Since it was a robust modernizing factor, these far-reaching aspects were highlighted by the historian of Russia, Ian Murray Matley, in his article "Industrialization" in Edward Allworth's edited work, "*Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule.*" Russian intervention in modernizing the colony, particularly its agriculture, was more focused on increasing acreage for cotton production. "[O]ne of the main centers supplying cotton to Russia became the Farghana oblast [province] when the area sworn to cotton there rose 14 percent of the land farmed in 1885 to 44 percent in 1915."[18] Similarly, the industry that existed in India before British colonization was not "anything more than a rudimentary handicraft industry, with carpet and rug-making."[19] Though these developments continued even after 1907 when the rivalry between the two imperial powers formally ended, the impetus had been provided by an ambitious mega-project, namely the TCR. In the case of the Indian railways, which Kipling frequently travelled on and wrote about, it was also a catalytic element, even before their unrealized plan to lay a railway track up to Kabul.

The Frontier Railways

[16] Sarfraz Khan, *Muslim Reformist Political Thought: Revivalists, Modernists and Free Will*, (London: Routledge, 2003): 223.
[17] Ibid, p. 327.
[18] Murray, Ian Matley, "Industrialization" in Edward A. Allworth, ed., *130 Years of Russian Domination: A Historical Overview*, (Raleigh, NC: Duke University Press, 1994): 309.
[19] Ibid.

In order to respond to the challenge posed by the construction of the Trans-Caspian Railway line, the British authorities in India began to plan a line to reach the border with Afghanistan and Iran. In 1857 Sir William Patrick Andrew (1806-87), Chairman of the Scinde, Punjab and Delhi Railway Company, founded in 1870, suggested that railway lines to the Bolan and Khyber passes would play a strategic role in responding to any Russian threat. Orders were given that a railway should be built to Quetta, near the Afghan border. This developed into a scheme for the line to eventually reach Kandahar.[20]

"The glaring inadequacy of India's frontier communications, particularly its roads and railways, was now beginning to dawn on Calcutta and London."[21] "In response to this threat Britain restarted work on the railway to Afghanistan. Over 320 kilometers long, the line reached Quetta in March 1887, through barren mountains inhabited by armed tribesmen.[22] Though not as effective in a military or a commercial context, the Indian railway project to reach the borders was not a modest effort. Writing on the threat posed by the Russian railway, Hopkirk quoted the popular General Frederick Roberts (1832-1914) affectionately known as "Bobs", "There are no better civilizers than roads and railways."[23] Based on the report by different intelligence sources, but most importantly, by George Nathaniel Curzon (1859-1925) in his famous book, *Russia in Central Asia in 1889, and the Anglo-Russian Question* (1889), the British authorities in London as well as in Calcutta were greatly alarmed and perturbed by the Russian advance in Central Asia. This resulted in planning for a railway track to be laid to the Indian border with Afghanistan, with the hope that it would be extended to Kabul.

The Afghan Emirite and the British Railway Initiative

The history of the relations between British India and Afghanistan is a sad story of mistrust, betrayal, and suspicion. It ultimately resulted in three bloody wars which not only seriously questioned the ability of the British to control Afghanistan, but also unsuccessfully countered Russian influence. In this respect the story is not as fascinating and as romantic as the likes of Kipling would have liked to have imagined.

Amir Abdul Rahman (1840-1901), ruler of Afghanistan between 1880 and 1901, banned railways and the telegraph from entering Afghanistan in case they would be used in any British or Russian invasion of the country. Rehman commented that, "there will be a railway in Afghanistan when the

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[20] *Railway of Afghanistan: Afghan railroads, past, present and future*, Retrieved from http://www.andrewgrantham.co.uk/afghanistan/railways/the-great-game, p. 1.

[21] Hopkirk, Peter, *The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia*, (New York: Kodansha International, 1992): 438.

[22] *Railway of Afghanistan*, ibid. p. 3.

[23] Hopkirk, ibid., pp.439-440.

Afghans are able to make it themselves," and, "as long as Afghanistan has not arms enough to fight against any great attacking power, it would be folly to allow railways to be laid throughout the country." Rehman also forbade his subjects from travelling on the British line to Chaman,[24] the construction of which he described as "just like pushing a knife into my vitals."[25]

The reaction on the part of British India to counter the Russian challenge in the shape of the TCR was two-pronged: to lay a railway line up to the Khyber Pass, and onward to Kabul if the Abdur Rahman gave his permission. Another line to the Bolan Pass planned to be extended to Kandahar in southern Afghanistan. Not only was the Emir opposed to the plan but so too were the local Afridi and Mohmand tribesmen, They later were induced to change tack in a meeting with Sir George Roos-Keppel (1866-1921) , the Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province (1908-19), who facilitated the laying of the planned railway line. But due to the signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention on August 31, 1907, the rivalry in Central Asia between two countries came to a close.

The main purpose of both empires to construct railway lines was strategic: to counter each other in the context of control in Central Asia and in their respective colonies. As an important initiative, railway lines and other communication infrastructure was the bedrock for colonial control especially as it facilitated the exploitation and transportation of natural resources. In addition, the TCR was constructed to reach the borders of the Russian Empire in order to subjugate the colonized and secure the borders. It was this aspect that alarmed the likes of Kipling who warned, "There is no truce with Adam-zad, the Bear that looks like a Man!"[26] Victorian England in its bid to counter the Russians, planned to reach the border with Afghanistan through the Khyber Pass and extend to Kabul, if an agreement with the Emir could be reached, and to construct another line into Afghanistan via the Bolan Pass.

Social Change and the Railway War

The irony of the situation was that in the process of constructing the railroads in Central Asia and India, the colonized subject, rotting under old, decadent orders, received some benefits, although only as byproducts. In this respect, not only was trade boosted and jobs generated, but a new element of modernization came into play: new technological and architecture appeared on the otherwise dilapidated ruins that the locals dwelt in, "The old ways of transportation, mainly by mules, donkeys and carts was replaced by TCR

[24] Muhammad Khan, , ed., *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, (Chestnut Hill, MA: Adamant Media, 2001), orig., (London: John Murray, 1901).
[25] Ibid, p. 159.
[26] Rudyard Kipling, *The Five Nations, Garden City*, (NY: Doubleday, 1916, orig., London: Methuen,1903).

and even navigation on Sir Darya [Syr Sea or Syr River] and Amu Darya [the Oxus River] were rendered ineffective."[27]

An interesting aspect of this whole enterprise in Central Asia, has been highlighted in an article by ethnomusicologist Johanna Spector (1915-2008) who, while referring to the tradition of music and art of the Central Asian people, noted, "with the Trans-Caspian Railroad in operation, communication to Samarkand, and later on to Tashkent was greatly facilitated, so that many visiting artists, as well as entire opera companies poured into the Central Asian cities."[28]

The old caravans were replaced by railways in Central Asia, giving impetus to trade which became more organized and quicker, "[N]ew trades, especially in cotton and karakul, replaced the old caravan merchants. Goods-transporting firms, trade counters, postal and telegraph offices and printing press also appeared."[29] Dilating on the social changes that appeared on the landscape of Central Asia with the commencement of the railways, experts of the day highlighted the developmental process, in contrast to the existing reality, "The railway line also had great cultural effect, since it ended Bukhara's physical isolation, brought an influx of outsiders and enabled European civilization to enter what was still virtually a medieval state. Railway stations, with their neat, painted buildings, uniformed staff and European-type Russian settlement … emerged in the emirates."[30]

Conclusion

During the imperial struggle of the nineteenth century between Victorian England and Czarist Russia, railways as a military, political, economic, and social force, played an important role in transforming on-the-ground realities in Central Asia and India. In addition to strategic gains, the TCR brought significant social change to the Central Asian Khanates. The grand design of the TCR, and the jittery response by British India, were significant modernizing agents, though benefitting the rival empires more than actually transforming the lives of the colonized. Not only was trade fostered and transportation networks developed, but the railway war did bring about social and cultural change in the respective colonies. In case of India, Kipling's spirited tribute to the Indian railway and its benevolent role, in improving the life of the wretched and the poor, is a key aspect of his politics of imaginative literature. Similarly, the TCR impacted the social order of Central Asia, resulting in the construction of schools, houses, hospitals, and movie theatres, as well as other elements of modernization. The interesting aspect of the *Great Game*, however, was that it increased control on the lives and resources of the colonies, as well as secured their

[27] Allworth, ibid., p. 327.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Sarfraz Khan, ibid., pp. 43-45.
[30] Ibid.

respective empires from encroachment. The irony of the situation is that, although colonization is about control, subjugation, and hegemony, its benefit to the colonial space—its people and culture—could not be dismissed or brushed aside. This was the state of affairs that this paper attempted to highlight in the backdrop to the so-called *Great Game.*

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